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SOMALI PIRACY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
 
Abstract 
This thesis is an investigation into maritime piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia 
with a practical objective of understanding the drivers underpinning piracy behaviour to 
aid identifying how best to deal with this issue. Maritime piracy is a complicated crime 
which is unique in every region. The main findings from empirical data collected using 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews (n = 43 undertaken between 2012 and 2013 in 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Nairobi and Mombasa) showed that pirates 
could be categorized according to different strategies adopted in attacking ships: pirates 
in the Arabian Gulf applied hit and run techniques, while Somalis’ pirates adopted a 
kidnap for ransom approach. While both sets of pirates seek money as a reward, the 
question is why do Iraqi and Iranian pirates steal cash and valuables, whereas Somali 
pirates focus on ransom? In this thesis, the resultant analyses identified that motive is 
not the main key for forming the pirates’ chosen strategy - whether the motive is 
political, ideological or purely financial is not critical to the method selected. The 
reasons for the different strategies adopted by the pirates are manifold, however, three 
main variables emerged from the analyses: geographical advantage; state failure or 
success; and illegal fishing by foreign vessels. These three factors must be applied all 
together in order to trigger the kidnap-for-ransom strategy. In the Arabian Gulf, there is 
no illegal fishing or state failure, which suggests that Iraqi and Iranian pirates do not 
kidnap for ransom, whereas Somalia exhibits all three factors at the same time. Studying 
these and other factors by a combination of fieldwork and documentary analysis has led 
to a new  understanding of why different kinds of maritime piracy have arisen in the 
geographical areas researched, and the research presented herein offers new contextual 
evidence that could help the different regions decide how best to tackle the different 
types of piracy. These findings and the methods employed may also have potential 
application in other parts of the world where piracy is a problem of potential risk. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
The Arabian Gulf region is particularly vulnerable to the threat of piracy because of the 
intensity of international shipping in and out of the Gulf presenting a high number of 
opportunities for pirates to target. The problem is compounded by there being many different 
kinds of piracy, for example, piracy in this region is largely carried out by Somali pirates 
south of the Gulf generally in pursuit of ransom money, but piracy carried out by Iranian and 
Iraqi pirates in the North and the Central part of the Gulf is largely for cash, goods and some 
other items from the seafarers (Svan, 2006; Lando, 2010). Another complication is that there 
are many different types of responses to piracy by shipping nations. To illustrate, some of the 
responses taken by the Naval Task forces such as Coalition Task Force CTF 150, 151 and 
152 involved military actions against pirates (CMF, 2002), but other responses did not.  Thus 
there has to-date been no systematic approach to tackling piracy. Also some of the nations 
decided to deploy armed guards on their ships whereas other nations decided to avoid routes 
known to be frequented with pirates and travel via different routes Bryant et al. (2013, p. 76). 
In addition, some of the nations have negotiated with pirates and paid ransoms to free their 
hostages, whereas other nations have not. However, neither of these approaches appears to 
have made much impact in reducing piracy: military approaches seem to have made pirates 
more aggressive and more armed; while negotiations seem to have made pirates more active 
and eager to obtain money. Both approaches share one assumption in common - they address 
the symptoms of the problem not its causes. That is to say, they are reactive, not pro-active: 
they try to deal with piracy after, rather than before, the event. Instead of seeking to prevent 
piracy from happening in the first place by examining its causes, they seek to deal with it 
after it has occurred. “They fail to understand the core drivers that underpin piracy and the 
origin of piracy because their efforts thus far are confined to fighting and vanquishing the 
outcomes of terrorism, not to root out its sources or origins, meaning that they must mix long 
and short term solutions together” (Murphy, 2012, p. 10). The present study seeks to remedy 
this deficiency and current gap in knowledge by investigating the fundamental drivers of 
maritime piracy, and by doing so, to aid development of more effective strategies for dealing 
with piracy in future. 
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1.2 Seriousness of Somali piracy 
 
In what follows, more attention is paid to the Somali piracy since this is the most intractable 
and serious form of piracy in the geographical study area. This is because, first, unlike Iraqi 
and Iranian pirates, Somali pirates belong to clan gangs. Whitman (2012, p. 33) drew 
attention to “the importance of pirate clans, noting that although new recruits are accepted 
into gangs if they have skills, other recruits join the gang only because their fathers, uncles or 
relatives are in the gang”. This analysis suggests that the pirate gangs may be based on 
cultural or clan structure, and as a result, we can expect that the groups of pirates will have 
more loyalty; faith and team work because they are related by blood, which is more difficult 
to counter.  Whitman (2012, p. 34) named “the clans who are most actively involved with 
piracy in Somalia as: 
 
• Eyl Isse Mahmuud and Leelkase of the Darood clan; 
• Garad Omar Mahmuud of the Darood clan; 
• Hobyo Habargedir (Saad, Ayr, Suleiman) of the Hawiye clan; 
• Hardheere Habargedir (Ayr, Sarur, Suleiman) of the Hawiye clan, and; 
• Mogadishu Habargedir (Ayr) of the Hawiye clan” (International Expert Group, 2008, 
p. 20). 
 
Second, they can count on local support: “the Somali pirates rely on locals in the lands which 
are not under the control of the Somali government and those locals could provide shelters, 
food and places to keep the hostages” (Hallwood and Thomas,  2013, p. 343).  Third, as 
Hallwood and Thomas (2013, p. 343) note, they are well-organized - “the Somali pirates are 
more organized than other pirates which decrease their chance of being caught”. For 
example, Liwång et al. (2013, p. 101, 103) pointed out that the Somali attack groups can 
remain at sea without support from mother ships or land bases for more than seven days, 
which means that they can operate away from the Somali coast, and the farther they go, the 
harder it is for the naval task forces to detect them; that there are land bases for the pirates all 
around the Somali coast line; that the pirates’ search groups are careful to stay away from 
each other and change their locations frequently to avoid being detected; that they target 
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vessels with low heights and in routes which are away from naval task forces; and that in 
times of good visibility, the Somali pirates’ search groups can detect targets from long 
distances, depending on the targets’ free board size and the earth’s curvature. Fourth, Somali 
pirates have sophisticated means of financial transactions – based on the Hawala system. 
MacPhee (2012) in the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Beating the Banks - Hawala’s Place 
in the Global Financial Environment and its Potential Links to Piracy explained the Hawala 
system for distributing money, which is “a very common way of transferring money in the 
failed states”. Hawala in Arabic means “transfer”, but, as. MacPhee (2012, p. 2) said, “it is a 
complex procedure involving the transfer of money without physical movement of cash; is 
based on strong relationships of trust within and between families and clans; and it allows the 
users to remain anonymous, which is attractive for criminal groups everywhere to avoid been 
tracked by governments or International Police”. The report says that the “Hawala system is 
very common in Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Another advantage of Hawala is “its 
informality allowing it to adapt to changing regulatory, political, and business environments”. 
It is also convenient for international transfers of money: as MacPhee (2012, p. 5) explained,   
“no money actually changes hands… The exchange of transaction information can be made 
via telephone, email, or fax”. On  the  links between Hawala and piracy in Somalia, MacPhee 
(2012, p. 13) said that “according to (Geopolicity, 2011) estimates suggest that approximately 
40-50% of ransom proceeds are moving out of the country using Hawala, with the rest being 
reinvested back into the business and redistributed within the community”. MacPhee (2012) 
also said that “this study predicted that piracy income could increase to $200-400 million by 
2015”. Based on “Somalia’s GDP of roughly $5.9 billion that would put piracy proceeds at 
almost 7% of total GDP”.  
 
Clearly, then, Somali piracy is a particularly formidable challenge to maritime authorities, 
and its effects are far-reaching. Somali piracy has affected the global economy and security 
due to the many incidents of high-jacking and kidnapping of international shipping in and 
near the Gulf of Aden during the last five years. There were 518 recorded attacks from 2010 
to 2015 according to (IMO, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). So the piracy problem in 
Somalia is a serious threat because of the number of incidents committed by pirates (Shane 
and Magnuson, 2014, p. 11). But the problem is not only that the numbers are rising until 
2012: the real problem is that Somali pirates have both widened and deepened their 
operations. They have widened them in the sense that they have expanded their area of 
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operation to more than 1,500 nautical miles which means that they are building up an 
organization that is well supplied with finance, logistics, technology, weaponry and 
intelligence. They have deepened their operations in the sense that Somali pirates are 
kidnapping for ransom, which is a serious security issue that is not posed by Iranian or the 
Iraqi pirates in the Gulf who only attack ships in the area to steal goods and cash using 
minimal levels of violence against the victims.   
 
The Gulf Countries Council (GCC) states’ economies depend completely on the export of 
crude oil using oil tankers. The only way out and in to the GCC states is the Strait of Hormuz, 
located south of the Arabian Gulf. As the Somali pirates expand their operations more 
widely, we expect them to become a major problem affecting the ships using the Strait of 
Hormuz. It is noticeable by looking at the piracy live map (ICC, 2014) that the Somali pirates 
have started to operate very close to the Strait of Hurmuz. One of the main reasons for 
carrying out this research is to increase our knowledge of such trends in piracy operations in 
order to help evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to respond to them.  
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
The main aim of this research thesis is to understand the type of maritime threats that might 
be expected to occur for the ships traveling from Kuwait passing through the Arabian Gulf, 
the Strait of Hurmuz, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Eden, and the Strait of 
Bab-Almandab, and in doing so, to develop a typology of Iranian, Iraqi and Somali piracy. 
The rationale for understanding these types of piracy in the mentioned areas is to provide 
appropriate protection policies to deal with the different threats they pose.   
 
In order to achieve the main research aim, we will need to achieve the following objectives 
for each of the three geographical areas of interest - Research Area one (the Northern Arabian 
Gulf), Research Area two (The Central Arabian Gulf), and Research Area three (Somalia):  
 
a. Understanding the context of maritime piracy each area; 
b. Identifying drivers, motives and factors (social, economic, ideological, religious and 
political factors) of maritime piracy in each area; 
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c. Categorising the type, tactics, characteristics and procedures employed in maritime 
piracy in each area; 
d. Investigating relationships between the types, tactics, characteristics, procedures and 
policies used by governments, navies, coastguards and private security companies for 
dealing with maritime piracy in each area.  
 
1.4 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
The main research question is: “are the current anti-piracy policies and responses sufficient to 
compete with piracy?” In order to answer this main research question, we must address the 
following subsidiary research questions: 
a. Do the current piracy definitions define piracy behaviour in the best way? 
b. What are the consequences of piracy on the economy, humanity and security in the 
three geographical research areas?  
c. What are the differences between the types of piracy in the three research areas?  
d. What are the motives of pirates in the three research areas? 
e. Are the motives behind piracy relevant to explaining why pirates kidnap for ransom? 
f. What are the causes of piracy in the three research areas? 
g. What are the current responses to piracy by governments, companies, organizations or 
military units?  Are they effective in reducing piracy or protecting seafarers?  
h. What are the effects of marine environmental variables (such as sea and weather 
conditions) on piracy tactics and can understanding these aid risk analysis of likely 
occurrence? 
i. What is the best way for governments, companies, organizations or military units to 
deal with piracy? 
 
To achieve the research aims and to answer the research questions the following research 
hypotheses will be tested in this research thesis: 
a. Hypothesis 1: the motive behind piracy has nothing to do with the resulting type of 
piracy (armed robbery or kidnap for ransom). 
b. Hypothesis 2: the greater the state failure, the more piracy that will occur.  
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c. Hypothesis 3: the more hate that is generated, the more kidnap for ransom will take 
place.  
d. Hypothesis 4: the more cultural, religious and ethnical differences between pirates and 
seafarers, the more kidnap for ransom will occur. 
e. Hypothesis 5: military responses alone, without dealing with piracy’s roots, will either 
provoke the pirates to develop their military capabilities to compete with the deployed 
forces, or displace pirate operations somewhere else.  
 
1.5 The epistemological and methodological problems of gaining insights into 
piracy  
The main purpose of this research is to analyse and compare maritime piracy in the Arabian 
Gulf (Iraqi pirates in the North and Iranian pirates in the Central area) and in the Somali 
region. The analysis is to understand the motives behind the pirates in each region, the causes 
of piracy, the consequences, the tactics of each type of pirates, the responses, and the 
solutions proposed in dealing with each type of piracy. The aim of the analysis is to come up 
with a typology of piracy in two regions.  
The epistemological problems of conducting this research were twofold. First, there was a 
problem of verifying the truth of the claims made by the respondents that I interviewed. For 
example, some of the claims made by prisoners in the jail in Kenya (Mombasa) were 
unverifiable by other sources, such as the lack of medical facilities in the prison, being 
tortured by the Kenyan authorities, being tortured by the navies who captured them and being 
held in prison for a long time without trial, and I had to use my own judgement and common 
sense to decide whether I believed them. Among the issues that I grappled with included the 
possibility that some prisoners had a vested interest in exaggerating the injuries that they had 
suffered at the hands of their captors. By contrast, some of the claims made by officials such 
as the officer in charge of data at the Kenyan Embassy in Somalia (which is located in Kenya 
for security purposes), were clearly at variance with the official data issued by the Kenyan 
government so could be discounted - or rather, gave rise to questions such as whether he was 
trying to mislead me, and if so, why?  Second, there was a problem of verifying the truth of 
statistical data issued by the Kuwaiti and Qatari coastguards, which was at variance with the 
data recorded in ledgers.  Such discrepancies led to the interesting question of whether there 
was an attempt to deceive, or a genuine and legitimate difference of interpretation in the way 
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data are recorded. The problem of getting proof and evidence to substantiate respondents’ 
claims was one of the main obstacles to my research, and to overcome this obstacle, I used 
various solutions in particular cases, as the following four instances show: 
Case one: Some of the naval and coastguard officers claimed that the Iranian 
government supported the Iranian pirates in the Arabian Gulf to achieve some political 
goals. My response to this allegation was to expand the questions to all types of 
interviewees to find out whether or not Iran has supported Iranian pirates in the Gulf, and 
I compared all the answers together. Few answers substantiated the claim. Also, I asked 
all the interviewees who made this claim if they had evidence to support it. As a result, I 
discovered that all of their claims were based on their political views only. Finally, I 
have visited and reviewed the court files in Kuwait and Qatar looking for the 
investigation reports and signs of evidence to prove those claims made by the 
interviewees, but I found nothing. All this led me to reject the claims. 
Case two: Some of the Somali fisher-pirates claimed that they only attacked American 
and Western ships and would not attack Muslim ships, meaning that they were politically 
motivated. Also some of the pirates claimed that they only attacked fishing ships which 
conducted illegal fishing in the area, meaning that the main cause behind piracy is 
protection of Somali waters from overfishing. My response to these claims was to find 
out if the Somali pirates (especially the fishermen) have any political or radical motives, 
and I created a second quantitative data chapter where I analysed all the piracy attacks in 
Somalia reported by the IMO from 2010 to 2015. In this chapter I analysed the types of 
ships that the Somali pirates preferred, trying to find if they mostly attacked American 
and Western ships. I concluded from the quantitative chapter that the Somali pirates 
choose their targets based on the type of the target not the flag. Also I found that the 
most desired ships for the Somali pirates are oil tankers not fishing boats. All this meant 
that the claims of the Somali pirates that they only attacked American and Western ships, 
and/or that they only attacked fishing ships, were not true. 
Case three: Some of the pirates claimed that they had been tortured by the authorities in 
Kenya and by the navies who captured them. My response to this claim was to ask the 
Somali pirates to give me evidence of torture, and some of them have shown me injuries 
like scars or old wounds, but I could not tell if these injuries were caused by the Kenyan 
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authorities or were old injuries. Some of the pirates had lost arms or legs during their 
combats with the navies who captured them, but again, there was no corroboratory 
evidence that these losses were due to maltreatment by their captors. I asked the Kenyan 
prison authorities to see their medical reports, but the ones I read did not mention torture 
injuries. I concluded, therefore, that the pirates’ claims of being tortured could be neither 
verified nor refuted. 
Case four: There are no available data in either the IMO piracy records or the literature 
on piracy in the Northern or Central areas of the Arabian Gulf. My response to this data 
deficiency was to access the data and the court files of maritime crime in the Kuwaiti 
coastguards’ records, the Kuwaiti courts’ records, the Qatari coastguards’ records and the 
Qatari courts’ records, where all the information about piracy was available. These 
records stated all the information of the piracy attacks in the Arabian Gulf which they 
have never reported to the IMO. 
The methodological problems of conducting this research included the difficulty of 
obtaining access to genuine pirates, rather than fishers accused of piracy. It was too 
dangerous for me to attempt to find pirates in Somalia, and so I was restricted to pirates 
in Kenyan prisons, which was necessarily a biased sample. One of the problems faced in 
the field work in 2013 in Kenya that most of the Somali pirates in prison didn’t speak 
Arabic or English, so I had to depend on the translator the whole time which was  time 
consuming in asking the questions. Also one of the most noticeable problems faced is 
that a lot of the interviewees were careful in answering the questions or even accepting to 
be interviewed as the topics of the questions were sensitive, and they were in a 
vulnerable situation (awaiting trial in prison). 
 
1.6 Chapter overview  
Figure 1.1 outlines the structure and organization of the thesis and provides a fully-fledged 
chapter overview.  
 
 
This introductory chapter explains the importance of the Arabian Gulf 
region, the Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden and 
how piracy might affect these regions, especially in terms of economy 
and security.  I outline the main aim of this research which is to provide a 
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Chapter one security policy to deal with piracy effectively in these two regions. I also 
state six hypotheses to be tested in this research 
 
Chapter two 
 
 
 
 
This methodological chapter explains the fieldwork undertaken in 2012 
and in 2013. The field work in 2012 was in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and 
UAE, while that in 2013 was in Kenya. The chapter outlines the 
methodology used for the data collection, including the semi-structured 
interviews during the two fieldwork periods to obtain primary data, and 
the secondary quantitative data obtained by analysing the IMO’s piracy 
reports from 2010 to 2015. The chapter then states the way the two sets 
of data (primary and secondary) were analysed by using two forms of 
software:  Nvivo, used to code and analyse the interview data; and SPSS, 
used to record and analyse the quantitative data. The chapter also 
explains the theoretical frameworks used, including rational choice 
theory, structural theory and cognitive theory. This is followed by a 
literature review in which  the main themes of  the research are covered, 
namely  the definition of piracy, the motivations behind piracy, the 
causes of piracy, the manifestations of piracy, the consequences of 
piracy, the responses to piracy, the violations of international law and 
human rights in treating pirates, and recommendations for dealing with 
piracy 
 
 
Chapter Three 
This data chapter presents the qualitative data collected via interviews, 
analysed thematically. The chapter provides a list of interviewees in the 
fieldwork of both 2012 and 2013 and presents the contents of the data 
gathered thematically. The data are organized in the forms of themes, 
starting with the motives of piracy, the causes, the manifestations of 
piracy, and its consequences, the different responses to counter piracy, 
the violations of international law and human rights, and the solutions 
recommended by the interviewees.  
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
This data chapter provides a second data set comprising quantitative data 
analysed by recording all the IMO’s piracy reports from 2010 to 2015. 
The chapter shows how the data was recorded in SPSS software. The 
chapter explains the variables used in the analysis,which are the locations 
of the attacks, the victims’ ships types, the pirates’ ships types, the month 
of the attack, the wave heights, the wind speeds and the success and 
failure of the attacks. Then the chapter analyses all these variables to 
show the frequencies of each single variable and to explain how this 
reflects the themes and claims mentioned in the literature and expressed 
by the interviewees.  
 This discussion chapter discusses thematically the nine themes emerging 
from the analysis of the primary data, the secondary data, and the 
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Chapter Five 
literature review. The chapter discusses the old and new piracy, the 
definition of piracy, the motivation, the causes, the manifestations, the 
consequences, the responses, the violations of human rights and 
international law, and the proposed solutions to the piracy problems. 
Finally, the chapter presents the answers for all of the research questions 
and rehearses the main argument of the thesis claims and the contribution 
it has made to understanding the problem of piracy in the Arabian Gulf 
and in Somalia.   
 
Chapter Six 
This concluding chapter provides a template guide to the best solutions as 
viewed in this research, presenting an equation for the conditions needed 
in order for piracy to form in a particular place. Then the chapter explains 
the proposed political, military and economic solutions which state the 
best practical way to deal with piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia.  
Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure  
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2 Chapter Two:  Research Methodology, Theoretical Framework and 
Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In order to answer the main research question of how best to deal with the problem of piracy 
in the Middle East, I investigated all the aspects of maritime security in the Northern and 
Central Arabian Gulf and then compared the emergent themes with the same aspects of 
security identified in the Somali region. I studied the available statistics of piracy attacks 
reported in the region using the International Maritime Organization IMO’s piracy reports 
from 2010 to 2015 (IMO, 2015) and analysed its effect on global business, in terms of the 
costs of security, injuries, ransoms, and insurance wages for the two main areas of my 
research, which are the North of the Arabian Gulf and the Somali region. The first part of this 
examination studied the psychological and ideological aspects of piracy, looking at the 
pirates’ religions, languages, nationalities, ethnicities and other special characteristics such as 
physical strength and age. The second part of the examination included the technology and 
ship handling details of piracy, studying ways of conducting piracy, directions for boarding 
target vessels, approaches, manoeuvres, distances from victims, speed of attack and 
employment of aggression.  This examination also included the type of pirate ships, engines 
and power, modes of communication, the most common type of ships that pirates attack and 
also the most dangerous areas that are infected with piracy. This data was obtained from 
documentary sources such as IMO (2015) and Buoyweather (2015) and from interviews of 
pirates in the prisons of Kenya conducted in 2013? Furthermore, people who are responsible 
for dealing with piracy in both areas, such as the Kuwaiti, Qatari navies and coastguards and 
the task forces in Somalia and the Arabian Gulf such as the U.S. military base in Bahrain 
which holds the Naval Officers, Liaison Officers and Intelligence officers in the Coalition 
task forces CTF 150, 151 and 152 were also interviewed in the U.S. base in Manama, 
Bahrain. All of these analyses were designed to assist our understanding of how to deal with 
piracy in the Middle East.  
  
2.2  Research methodology 
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2.2.1 Data collection  
 
 The main research question of this thesis is “are the current anti-piracy policies and 
responses fit for purpose in dealing with piracy?” In order to answer this research question, I 
undertook the first period of fieldwork and gathering of data in the summer of 2012. In 20th 
July 2012, starting  in Kuwait, I travelled to Qatar from 5th August to 6th August 2012, 
travelled to Bahrain from 6th August to 9th August 2012, travelled to Dubai from 9th August to 
11th August 2012 and travelled to Abu Dhabi from 11th August to 13 August 2012. The first 
field work was a scoping study to determine the breadth of issues surrounding piracy. 
Appendix D and E show the list of interviewees and organizations I have visited in 2012.   
 
 Having determined the framework of how to approach properly the core of the problem of 
dealing practically with piracy I undertook a second period of field-work in 2013 in Kenya. I 
travelled to Nairobi, Kenya from Kuwait from the 10th August 2013 to the 16th August to 
interview targets in the Nairobi University, the United Nations Regional Office, the Somali 
Embassy and the Kenyan Embassy in Somalia which is based in Nairobi for security reasons, 
and I have finished my last interview on 16th of August. After that I travelled to Mombasa, 
Kenya because I was granted permission to see the pirates in Shemola Tower Prison.  I stayed 
in Mombasa from the 16th of August to the 22nd of August 2013, during which I interviewed 
most of the pirates in the prison and also interviewed the IMO officer in the IMO Regional 
Office in Mombasa.  After this I travelled from Mombasa to Adis Ababa to Dubai and then 
finally arrived to Kuwait on the 23 of August 2013. Appendices D and E list all the 
interviewees and the organizations I visited and interviewed during the second field-work in 
2013.   
 
 My methodology for collecting data was as follows: 
1. Semi- structured interviews of key informants as presented in Appendices  D and E 
2.  Documentary analysis of data on piracy attacks in chapter four which includes all the 
piracy attacks logged by the IMO (2015) reports, analysing them based on several 
variables. 
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 Appendix A shows the topics  covered  determine the breadth of issues surrounding piracy in 
field-work one in 2012, and the topics covered to identify  the key drivers underpinning 
piracy which were  collected during field-work two in 2013. 
 
2.2.2 Finding interviewees 
 
In order to achieve good coverage of the breadth of information relevant to understanding the 
topics mentioned in Appendix B, the following groups were targeted for semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews. Initial research showed it is very difficult to get access to details of 
piracy cases because of the classification status of such a sensitive issue, but after further 
investigation it was not impossible. My work as a Kuwaiti Naval Officer eased my access to 
the Kuwaiti Navy, Coastguard, jails and other official organizations. Kuwait is a member of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Oman, 
and the GCC countries are in the process of moving to a Con-federal stage trying to be 
similar to the European Union.  This gave me access to the GCC’s navies and coastguards 
because we have reciprocal protection agreements. The fieldwork took place while my family 
was in Kuwait with our extended family and friends. The first target of my field work was the 
Kuwaiti Naval Force and the naval intelligence Unit in the Kuwaiti Headquarters, who 
provided relevant data and contacts in the GCC. This provided unique access to sensitive data 
not easily accessible by a researcher and contributed to the original contribution of my 
research. Appendix B shows my interview inventory.  
 
2.2.3 Design of the fieldwork  
 
The United Nations has two ways of responding to and dealing with any international conflict 
which threatens international security, such as piracy or terrorism: (1) the first way is to 
tackle the root causes of the problem with development policy, regulations, negotiations, 
agreements and projects - for example, trying to solve the state failure of Somalia or to 
manage the conflict in the Middle East. (2) The second way is to use force and assign Task 
Forces to counter piracy – tackling the consequences of the problem – for example by using, 
CTF (Coalition Task Force) 151, CTF 150 and CTF 152. The project’s research design 
focuses on both these responses, first addressing the causes, motives and distinctions between 
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the Iranian, Iraqi and Somali pirates, and second analysing the attempts that have been made 
to deal with those pirates by governments, international organizations and private companies. 
The aim is to provide the best solutions to deal with each type of piracy in the two regions of 
the research. Appendix [C] shows the interview questionnaire contents tailored to each type 
of respondent interviewed. 
 
2.2.4  List of interviewees 
 
In Appendix D a list of interviewees and organizations that I engaged with during my two 
fieldwork trips in 2012 and 2013, is listed. 
  
2.2.5  Data  analysis  methods 
 
The aim of the research is to understand piracy from different perspectives, as each 
interviewee has a unique background, and each pirate attack has unique characteristics (such 
as the wave height at the time of attack, wind speed, type of ships, and locations). All of the 
data I obtained from the interviews and from the documentary data were used to provide 
detailed contextual information on how the pirates would react in different situations in the 
Gulf.    
 
Qualitative method - Coding and interpretation   
 
All of the survey questions were as open as possible to allow the interviewees to provide 
most of the information that came to mind when asked about a particular theme. Since the 
research deals with sensitive data, sometimes the interviewees hesitated to provide specific 
information or avoided answering some of the questions: one of the interviewees did not 
answer any of the questions. Also some of the pirates I have interviewed in the prison were 
afraid to answer some of the questions because they feared that the authorities would use 
their answers against them in court proceedings. Most of the interviews were planned to last 
for one hour and the questions were tested based on this timing, but some of the interviews 
times were less than one hour because the interviewee did not want to participate or the 
interviewee skipped some of the questions. Conversely, some of the interviews lasted for 
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more than one hour because with the open questions, new issues occurred during the 
interview which added more relevant material.   
 
To understand and interpret the data obtained in the two periods of fieldwork, I established 
the themes to be analysed by dividing the analyses into two geographical regions, the Arabian 
Gulf and Somalia, in order to compare the two sets of themes emerging from each area.  
Within each region and following a comprehensive literature review, I divided the emergent 
themes into financial piracy and terror piracy to enable me to find out if the division between 
pirates’ motives affects the outcomes of piracy attacks.  
 
For the coding of all the transcripts of the interviews conducted and the emergent themes I 
have used NVIVO (Wong, 2008) software which is qualitative data analysis software. I 
attended an intensive training course at Newcastle University to learn how to use NVIVO in 
interview coding and also used this in the literature review chapter to compare the data from 
the interviews with the literature findings. NVIVO provides a practical and an effective way 
to code all the emergent themes to show how often issues arising have been repeated, 
categories of interviewees backgrounds, relationships between categories and the 
relationships between each interviewee’s categories and the literature. The themes to be 
analysed in the literature and in the data analysis are the following; 1) motives of pirates 2) 
causes of piracy 3) links between financial and terror piracy 4) consequences of piracy 5) 
responses to piracy, and 6) violations of human rights and international law.  
 
Quantitative method - statistical data analysis 
 
The data gathered from the interviews and from the literature will be complemented by the 
statistical data chapter 4 in which I  have analysed all of the piracy attacks between 2010 to 
2015, using  SPSS software, the quantitative data analysis software (Bryman et al, 2004). In 
SPSS, I have analysed all the piracy attacks provided by the IMO piracy reports and analysed 
the following factors: 1) locations of the attack; 2) types of the victims’ ships; 3) the date of 
the attack; 4) the month of the attack, 5) the attack day of the week, 6) whether the attack was 
night or day time, 7) the wind speed, 8) the wave height, and 9) the pirates’ ships types.  
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When I had a better understanding about the variables tested in the quantitative data chapter, I 
compared them to the qualitative data from different perspectives identified from the 
interviews. For example, one of the hypotheses is that the Somali pirates who are motivated 
by political motives would attack American or Western ships so they can harm those 
countries’ economies: by comparing this claim with the types of ships attacked between 2010 
to 2015 we can decide if the target selection is randomly conducted or based on the flag of 
the ships. From the responses analysed emergent themes in the qualitative data were 
evaluated and compared with the responses from the interviews of the naval forces in the area  
and compared with the quantitative data’ information available from the IMO (2015) about 
the most dangerous areas in which most of the attacks been conducted.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section, we will consider the most common maritime piracy theories relevant to the 
piracy cases in Somalia and the Arabian Gulf areas. Rebecca Law (2011, p. 10) helpfully sets 
out three assumptions about Somali piracy. “The first assumption is that the majority of the 
Somali pirates are criminally-minded. The second assumption is that the failure of the state in 
Somalia has caused the absence of law which lowered the risk of capturing pirates and 
decreased the income of Somali citizens, thereby driving individuals to form groups of pirates 
to survive. The third assumption is that the new Somali transitional Federal Government is 
developing policies designed to contain the pirates. This containment strategy is akin to the 
drugs policy adopted in the Netherlands – i.e. where a government fails to counter a sort of 
crime they allow it in some level to enable the government at least to know the places of the 
crime and the number of criminals”. Applying these assumptions to piracy in general and not 
only in the Somali piracy case, we can divide theories of piracy into three main categories: 1. 
rational choice theory; 2. structural theory; and 3. cognitive theory. 
 
2.3.1 Rational choice theory  
 
Rational choice theory assumes that pirates are self-interested individuals, intent on personal 
gain – an assumption made by Law (2011, p. 10) that “the majority of Somali pirates are 
criminally minded”. According to this theory, piracy is a typical robbery, hijack, kidnap or 
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murder crime, and the only feature which makes it distinctive is that piracy is conducted at 
sea. On this theory, piracy is distinguished from terrorism:  as a typical and a classical type of 
crime we can exclude the political and ideological part of it and see it as pure self-interest. 
Gullen and Agnew (2006, p. 1) stated that “crime occurs when the benefits outweigh the 
costs and when people pursue self-interest in the absence of effective punishments”, meaning 
that crime is a rational and freely-willed choice. Applying this theory to maritime piracy and 
excluding other factors such as political, religious and ideological factors to concentrate only 
on the financial benefits of the high value of ransoms or stolen goods, we can understand that 
Somali pirate’s motives are purely financial due to the very weak economy in Somalia which 
led the state to poverty and hunger. Also we can understand that the failure of the state and 
the lack of applying law and punishments have encouraged pirates to expand their operations 
to further distances and encouraged more people to join the group of pirates.  Not only is the 
failure of the Somalia state causing the absence of punishments, but the international 
responses to maritime piracy are not effective in the matter of rules and regulations, military, 
security, weapon trade control and ship’s self-protection which decreased the risks for pirates 
to be captured, judged or fought which has made the pirate’s tasks easier with a lower risk. 
Shortlanda and Vothknecht (2011, p. 139 ) said that “the rational crime mode can be applied 
to pirates because they carefully plan and execute their operations which the aim is to attack 
and kidnap the victims for ransoms”.  
 
2.3.2 Structural theory  
 
Structural theory sees states like Somalia as oppressed by international economic forces 
which keep it in poverty by exploiting its natural resources such as fisheries. In other words, 
the developed world conspires to keep the developing world in a condition of dependence on 
aid (including military hardware) because weak developing countries are less likely than 
strong developing countries to challenge the economic dominance of developed countries. 
These structural factors explain how impoverished inhabitants turn to piracy because they 
have little or no alternative. Their alienated and anomic lives give them no respect for the 
property and lives of the people who oppress and rob them of their birth right. Their plight is 
reinforced by the demonised image which their exploiters construct for them: John Hamlin 
(2011, p. 3) explained how “social constructionist theory stated that people become criminals 
18 
 
when they are labelled as criminals”. This theory originated in the work of Edwin M. Lemert, 
Howard S. Becker, Kai Erikson, and John Kitsuse in the 1960s and the 1970s. It suggested 
that “when labelling people as criminals they will be stigmatized and the identity of criminals 
will develop automatically and then they will be sent to prison and all conventional roles will 
be removed from them”. Applying this social constructionist theory of crime to the Somali 
and the Arabian Gulf piracy cases it is noticeable that the international community has 
isolated Somalia from the international community hastening the process of state failure. This 
isolation was because the UN labelled Somalia as the most dangerous state in the world 
which automatically made the individuals sees themselves as criminals. In the Arabian Gulf 
the pirates are mostly from Iraq and Iran, and these countries have both been stigmatized in 
the West as pariah states which encourage or turn a blind eye to terrorism, as in Somalia. For 
example, after the second Gulf war in 1991, Saddam’s regime was punished and isolated 
from the international community as a consequence of invading Kuwait and that punishment 
and isolation lasted till the Iraqi liberation in 2003. This was similar to the Somali case 
because Iraq was labelled by the UN and the Arab League as a criminal and terrorist country, 
according to the labelling theory of crime, that pariah status encouraged people to commit 
crimes such as piracy against international shipping. So social construction is part of the 
structural processes which explain piracy.  
 
2.3.3 Cognitive theory  
 
This theory attributes piracy to the force of radical ideas, induced by suffering from extreme 
poverty. Gullen and Agnew (2006, p. 12) claim that “the main reason why people commit 
crimes is the inequality that they suffer”. When looking at the Somali case it is 
understandable that the causes for piracy include the suffering of inequality such as invasion 
of the country’s fishery by foreigners, the failure of the state and the poisoning of the Somali 
Sea. Xuseyn (2011) posted  a  video on Youtube showing the effect of the illegal fishing and 
the chemical waste on the Somalis. It may be that the Arabian Gulf piracy case is similar to 
the Somali case in that, for example, when Iraq was punished by the UN, the population felt 
an injustice. As a consequence of that resentment, and the use of force against Iraq in 1991 
and 2003, piracy increased in the area based on a holy case which grants pirates the right to 
recover their stolen rights as defined by the Iraqis. These cognitions are often reinforced by 
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radical ideological and religious groups, which sometimes give rise to maritime terrorism. 
 
As we shall see, each of these three theories illuminates some aspects of the piracy problem 
in the Gulf and Somalia.  
 
2.4 Literature Review 
The structure of the literature review is as follows: 
2 .4 .1 Definitions of piracy 
2 .4 .2 Motivations of pirates  
2.4.3 Causes of piracy. 
  2.4.4 Manifestations of piracy  
2.4.5 Consequences of piracy 
2.4.6 Responses to piracy 
2.4.7 Violation of international law and human rights  
2.4.8 Recommendations for dealing with piracy   
2.4.1 Definitions of piracy 
 
Defining piracy is very difficult. As Young (2007, p. 1) said,  “there is no fixed definition for 
piracy”, but there have been many attempts at defining the  term. Piracy is defined differently 
according to its agenda and goals, and by politicians, lawyers and others using this term. The 
literature provides a wide variety of definitions which arguably has led to some confusion 
when the same term is used to suggest very different meanings thus a lack of a clear universal 
definition has contributed misuse and confusion of the term. Haywood and Spivak (2012,  p. 
7) reported that the historian Plutarch produced the oldest definition of piracy which is “any 
attack on sea and coastal land without any authority”. This definition raises many questions, 
however, including ‘what if we discovered that the government is itself using its authority to 
influence pirates to conduct piracy?’   
Some writers find a historical pattern of evolution of piracy from buccaneering to business 
activity. For example, Mejia et al. (2009) claim that modern piracy involves some acts of 
violence against shipping that is much bloodier than older forms of piracy and that piracy has 
been more active since 1996. Baniela (2010, p. 191) also compared the past type of piracy 
with the new type, saying that “piracy nowadays is different from the old adventures which 
appeared in novels and stories about freebooters, buccaneers, corsairs and pirates”. He 
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defined piracy as a business which potentially makes profits from targeting merchant ships 
which have limited resources and training for their defence especially in waters which are 
weak in security. Galletti (2012, p. 1) said that “pirates and buccaneers or other maritime 
dangers have disappeared a long time ago, and  that till 1994 piracy was only described and 
connected to the productions of software and audio products”. In her article, she defined 
maritime piracy as “an armed robbery against ships”. However, maritime piracy never 
disappeared from the world but was limited to some areas which did not affect international 
economy or security, so was not widely reported by the media.  
 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 7) offer a more perspectival approach to the definition of 
piracy, arguing that  throughout history, “states have three different perspectives on pirates 
(allies, criminals or enemies) and each perspective will define the way they treat pirates”. 
They said that  
“if the state viewed pirates as criminals then they will deal with them similar to the 
civil criminals with formal courts and justice, but if the state viewed pirates as 
enemies then they will apply the rules of war on them and use lethal force against 
them and when they capture them they will be dealt as prisoners of war without rules 
and requirements of civil evidence and judicial process. But stating that pirates are 
allies or not depends on if they interfere with the state’s interests or not, so if the 
pirates interfere with the states’ interests they will be considered as enemies but, if 
they do not interfere with the state’s interests then they will be considered as allies”.  
 
In other words, the definition of piracy depends on states’ perspectives on the type and acts 
involved. Haywood and Spivak (2012,  p. 9) added that “in this century the states generally 
view pirates as criminals and not enemies nor allies”.   
 
One of the most prominent attempts to provide a more fixed definition is that of UNCLOS. 
UNCLOS (1982, p. 60) has defined piracy as follows: 
 
“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and 
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on-board such a ship or aircraft. (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or 
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property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary 
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts 
making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 
act described in the above sub-paragraphs” (UNCLOS,  1982, p. 60).   
As Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 10) note, the UNCLOS definition contains four elements:  
an  illegal act of violence at sea;  two vessels involved;  committed on the high seas; and  for 
private not political ends. 
By contrast, piracy as IMB (2009, p. 3) defined it is “an act of boarding or attempted 
boarding, with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability 
to use force in the furtherance of that act”. UNCLOS requires that piracy has to be committed 
on the high seas, not in a state’s territorial waters because UNCLOS considers violent acts 
against ships in territorial waters as armed robbery not piracy. But the IMB did not state any 
such limitation on the location of piracy. Another difference is that UNCLOS specifies that 
piracy must have only private ends, whereas IMB describes the impact on and the danger to 
victims only, without limitation on the motives (Young (2007, p. 1). Although Freedom 
(2009, p. 32) said “that there is no one definition of sea piracy that is accepted by all states, 
scholars or organizations”, he adopted the IMB’s definition of sea piracy.  As  Freedom 
(2009) notes,  IMB’s definition of piracy is more practical than UNCLOS’, but  leaving 
piracy without a location limitation might give international naval warships an excuse to 
invade the local waters for some states. One way to deal with this problem is to limit 
international warships’ access to territorial waters to permission of local states.  
 
Dillon (2005, p. 155), however, was not happy with the IMB definition because the reported 
piracy attacks by the IMB did not differentiate between different kinds of maritime crime.  
She said that  
“IMO and IMB should consider four categories of maritime crime - corruption, sea 
robbery, piracy and maritime terrorism, since each category of maritime crime 
requires different resources, methods of approach and agencies, and the lack of 
distinction in defining the problem complicates targeting resources and disperses 
efforts to unrelated and inconsequential issues. If crimes against ships were based on 
the above four categories, world leaders could use them to create policies to resolve 
the actual problem”.  
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Dillon is right to point out that definitional issues are not just semantic disputes, but matters 
of practical importance.    
 
From these definitional controversies in the literature, six issues of piracy definition arise:    
 
2.4.1.1 Maritime crime 
 
Dillon (2005, p 160)  distinguishes between piracy and sea robbery, and argues that the IMO 
and IMB should disaggregate reports of sea robbery from reports of piracy: “Sea robbery 
takes place in port against stationary ships at berth or anchor and does not usually involve 
violence. Expanded police work and patrolling counters robberies in ports”.  The IMO and 
the IMB do report sea robbery in the port areas and vessels that are at anchor but, in the 
Somali case the most attacked ships are the ships that are underway. 
 
2.4.1.2 Act of war 
 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 71)  reject the idea that piracy is an act of war, for four 
reasons:  “Pirates are not involved in armed conflicts;  they do not knowingly attack foreign 
naval vessels (meaning that the pirates in Somalia don’t wage war against military units -  
that they are criminals who avoid security vessels);  They control no territory (meaning  they 
do not  recognise themselves as a state such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria); and  They 
have no military command structure (meaning that they work randomly not like  organized 
terrorist groups). So piracy cannot be an act of war”.  However, it is difficult to deny that 
some kinds of piracy – such as maritime terrorist piracy - do constitute acts of war.    
 
2.4.1.3 Terrorism 
 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 71) raised the question of  “whether  piracy is terrorism?”,  
and  answered “that by means of the UNCLOS definition, by saying if pirates have private  
ends they should be considered as pirates, but if they have any other end such as political or 
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ideological then this is terrorism”. However, for Dillon (2005, p 155, 160) maritime 
terrorism, defined as “crimes against ships by terrorist organizations”, should not be 
classified as piracy: “The IMB and IMO should put attacks by terrorist groups into a separate 
category. A maritime terrorism category would be more useful to the maritime industry and 
government policymakers for formulating anti-terrorist policies than the current system of 
combining hundreds of reports of petty theft and common piracy with terrorist attacks”.  
However, acts of maritime terrorism are also acts of piracy:  whether a pirate is motivated by 
terrorist objectives to commit piracy is irrelevant to the question of whether he commits 
piracy, for two reasons: the first reason is that it is too difficult to determine the motives 
behind piratic acts without a deep psychological investigation which will not guarantee 
knowledge of the motives; the second reason is that the most important issue identified about 
the phenomenon of piracy is its consequence not its motive. Young (2007, p. 11) stated that 
“piracy has often been conflated with terrorism because they overlap in tactics and goals”, 
but “when this issue was discussed in the Tri-annual conference on piracy and maritime 
terrorism held in Kuala Lumpur in June 2004, it was concluded that it is inappropriate to 
conflate the increasing problem of piracy with the potentially more dangerous consequences 
of terrorism”. They said in the conference that “there was no evidence to show that piracy 
and terrorism have joined up”. However, there are links between piracy and terrorism in 
Somalia. As Joseph (2010, p. 1283) pointed out, “there is evidence that ransoms obtained 
from piracy in Somalia have been used to support terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda 
group”.  
 
2.4.1.4 Privateering 
 
The definition of piracy as privateering focuses on the first stipulation of UNCLOS – that 
piracy must be for private ends. However, Joseph (2010, p. 1283) criticized this stipulation, 
“because to restrict the definition of piracy to commercially motivated acts ignores the fact 
that acts meant to promote terror or political objectives can pose a similar threat to safety at 
sea”. On the UNCLOS stipulation, as Sterio (2010, p. 1467) pointed out,  “it is very difficult 
nowadays to distinguish between  private ends and  political or ideological ends; that modern 
pirates are mostly linked with political goals; and the stipulation would rule out any piracy in 
the world”. Sterio (2010, p. 1470) said that “SUA [Convention for the Suppression of 
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Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation] overcomes [this]…stipulation of 
UNCLOS because it excluded the requirements of private ends motives”. So this Convention 
has given a wider freedom for the law to be enforced to counter piracy. However, Sterio 
(2010, p. 1462) noted that “the Convention has not been as widely ratified as UNCLOS, and 
is not generally considered a part of customary international law. Also the countries who are 
most affected by piracy such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Somalia, have not ratified the SUA 
Convention”.  
 
2.4.1.5 Maritime corruption 
 
Dillon (2005) rightly “differentiates piracy from acts of extortion or collusion against marine 
vessels by government officials and/or port authorities”, but argues that “To reduce the 
opportunity for extortion or collusion among port officials the IMO should speed its efforts to 
improve the uniformity of inspection and reporting in ports. Further, Authorities should 
publish periodic reports that identify ports that regularly delay vessels or those where vessels 
report instances of official corruption or organized criminal gangs” (Dillon, 2005, p. 160). 
The implication is that maritime corruption, if not piracy in itself, can facilitate piracy. 
However, whether reducing  corruption in the port  would reduce piracy is questionable, 
because in Somali most of the pirates are fishermen who work on skiffs who attack ships 
randomly in the open sea which means that reducing the ports’ corruption will not have any 
impacts on reducing piracy.  
2.4.1.6 High seas versus territorial waters  
 
UNCLOS stipulates that piracy can only be committed on the high seas, but for Dillon (2005, 
p. 160), “The definition of piracy should be expanded to include all attacks against vessels 
while underway both in territorial waters and on the high seas”. Haywood and Spivak (2012, 
p. 10) also criticize this UNCLOS stipulation, noting that “according to the UNCLOS (1982), 
states like Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania could claim that there is no piracy in their countries 
even when seafarers have been attacked by pirates in their inland waters”. Joseph (2010, p. 
1274) also spelled out the implication of the UNCLOS stipulation “that piracy is limited to 
the high seas, that any attack on ships within territorial waters are to be considered as armed 
robbery which has to be dealt with by the local coastguards”. Joseph (2010, p. 1288) reported  
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two cases where “the US navy chased pirates in international waters, and when the pirates 
reached Somali territorial waters, the US navy called the chase off because according to 
UNCLOS interpretation of international law they cannot operate in the territorial waters in 
any other country than the USA”. According to Sterio (2010, p. 1465), “both US and UK law 
stipulates that piracy only occurs on the high seas, whereas Kenyan law stipulates that piracy 
can occur in territorial waters as well as on the high seas”.  Dillon (2005) pointed out that 
“the UNCLOS, US and UK view means that in the Somali case, military forces will never 
counter piracy in the territorial waters of Somalia, because there is no enforcement of the 
domestic Somali law in its territorial waters”. Hastings (2009, p. 217) said that “this 
distinction between the locations of exactly the same crimes makes it difficult to evaluate 
state failure as a cause of piracy”. As a result Hastings (2009) said that “he prefers to use the 
IMB (2009)’s piracy definition which defines piracy as crime committed in both the 
territorial and the international waters”. It seems sensible to say that the piracy definition 
must include attacks in both territorial waters and high seas, but this must be carefully stated 
so nations are not given carte blanche to invade other nation’s territorial waters under the 
excuse of combatting piracy 
 
Some authors have produced typologies of piracy which serve less to define the term than to 
describe the variety of forms piracy has taken. For example, Whitman (2012, p. 4) produced 
an organizational typology, stating that “there are three types of piracy in the world; 
Subsistence pirates are often local fishers or traders who turn to piracy activity to supplement 
their income. They engage in small-scale, localized attacks, targeting fishers at sea, robbing 
vessels at port, and/or providing territorial protection in their local areas. Subsistence pirates 
often come from isolated coastal communities, where there are dire economic hardships and 
limited prospects”. The second  type that Whitman (2012, p. 4) described is the “Organized 
pirates who have a higher level of sophistication, ambition, resources and frequently rely on 
violence. Their attacks extend beyond small-scale robbery, involving hijackings, 
kidnappings, cargo theft, or holding cargo, vessels and crew for ransom. Organized pirates 
often have links to organized crime groups that are involved in larger drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, and human trafficking, which facilitate the movement of their 
goods into the regional and global black markets”. The third type described by Whitman 
(2012, p. 4) is “the mid-way type between the small scale and the organized, which means 
that this type is semi-organized”. Applying this analysis to Somalia, the fishermen pirates in 
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Somalia are less organized and the later pirates are the more organized gangs. Whitman’s 
(2012) analysis has led me to revise my view of the relationship between organized pirates 
and terrorist organizations. I initially assumed in my research that Al-Qaedah had moved 
their activity to Africa (especially to failed states such as Somalia) after the war on 
Afghanistan, 2001 and the war on Iraq 2003. But I made this estimation upon the evidence of 
only one case - Somalia – and that evidence was inferential, namely that Somalia had been a 
failed state since 1991 and Somalian piracy began in 2005, just after the war on Iraq 2003, 
and from that I assumed that there was a relationship between the Al-Qaedah and Somali 
pirates. The assumption I made was that the organized pirates are more likely to work with 
other organizations to gain information and weapons supplies - organizations such as the Al-
Shabab group. But I now realise that organized pirates may not always have links to terrorist 
groups.   
 
Young (2007, p. 12) produced a temporal typology “of contemporary maritime piracy in 
Southeast Asia”, in which  “the most common incidents of piracy are robbery which is simple 
hit and run usually resulting in violence only if confronted, and the majority of victims are 
fishermen and other local sea transport users”. “The next level is the short-term seizure of a 
vessel which is often for less than 30 minutes”. Young (2007, p. 13) said that “this step needs 
more people to attack, more equipment and more organization, and causes more violence”.  
The next level Young (2007, p. 13) said, “is the high-end scale, which is very organized and 
long-term seizure, in which the ship is the target, and they repaint it, reflag it and resell it 
again, and of course this tactic involves more violence and more organization”. Young’s 
classification of types of piracy may well apply to the experience of the pirates in Southeast 
Asia, but it does not apply to piracy in the Gulf or Somalia, where there is no evidence of 
Young’s (2007) third level. Somali pirates are not interested in the ships but, they are 
interested in taking ransoms from hostages. 
 
Summing up this section on the definition of piracy, piracy must be addressed by its results 
not by the pirates’ motives or the location at sea.   
 
2.4.2 Motivations of pirates  
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In the literature, there are many studies of the motivations of pirates. Most authors believe 
that pirates are motivated solely by financial considerations, but a minority believe that 
political or ideological or religious motives also play a part, perhaps a decisive part. On 
financial considerations, as we saw earlier, Dillon (2005, p. 157) distinguished between four 
“types of maritime crimes, corruptions of port facilities, piracy, robbery and terrorism”, and 
defined piracy as a financial crime at sea:  “piracy has financial motives with less violence 
and less organization which is more related to rational choice crime”. Leeson (2010, p. 1220) 
also distinguished between pirates and terrorists, and claimed that “pirates are motivated by 
rational choice, they rationally break the law and against the community…the main motive of 
their crime is purely financial”. Similarly, Gathii (2010, p. 107) held that “piracy in general 
and in Somalia is a pure crime with no other motives such as political or ideological”, and he 
recommended “dealing with pirates as criminals not terrorists”. Likewise, Mejia et al. (2009, 
p. 893) argued that “pirates in general are “driven by rational choice in general: pirates 
choose targets and they conduct the crime according to the ease of the target and their 
abilities to board the ship”, not according to the flag of the ship. Haywood and Spivak (2012, 
p. 16), reported that “the ransoms of piracy have greatly increased to become 5 million 
dollars in 2011”. Piracy grew because pirates have a low risk of consequences and the 
prospect of very high rewards (ransom) and their motivation can be explained by the rational 
choice crime theory.  
 
However, other writers hold that pirates are motivated by political, ideological, and religious 
considerations, pointing to Somali pirates as a case in point. Whitman (2012, p. 31) analysed 
piracy motivation in the Gulf of Aden from a historical context, reporting that piracy in 
Somalia started after the failure of the state in 1991, which suggested “it was a form of self-
protection against water toxic dumping and illegal fishing”. Liss (2011, Chapter 1) discussed 
“the different motivations between pirates who have private, political or radical ends”. Liss 
(2011) described the “drivers behind terrorists, guerrillas and other criminal organizations 
that use piracy, and claimed that “there are some links between Alqaeda and piracy in the 
Southeast Asia and Bangladesh...So it is possible that in Somalia the Alshabab Group (part of 
Alqaueda), began to work at sea due to their experience gained from the Asian region”. Liss 
(2011) also explained how “piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh resulted from a variety 
of factors including the impact of ecological degradation and overfishing, and loopholes and 
shortcomings in maritime laws and regulations that are conducive to the operations of 
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pirates”, and how “piracy has an involvement with transnational crime syndicates and radical, 
politically motivated groups, and that there has been cooperation between terrorists and 
pirates since the attacks of 11 September 2001, worldwide, especially in Southeast Asia”. 
According to this interpretation, Al-qaedah and Al-Shabab groups (terrorist organizations) 
are engaged in some way with piracy, and the terrorist pirates will seek for targets which will 
damage the global economy, especially in the west. Dillon (2005, p. 161) stated that 
“maritime terrorism is more related to terrorist organizations that are more organized and 
have political and radical ends”.   
 
The argument that terrorist motivations play a part in piracy is a theory of structural 
determinism. Joseph (2010, p. 1273, 1283, 1294), arguing that “modern piracy is organized 
and structured…piracy promotes terror and it has the same safety consequences on the 
international scene as terrorism”, stated that “The ransom money is used by pirates to 
advance their extremist political objectives”, and that “Members of the Somali region of 
Puntland administer piracy activities”. Joseph (2010) used an incident to illustrate his 
argument: when the US military fatally shot down three Somali pirates, Somali pirates 
threatened to kill all the American sailors. It is true  that a general hatred against a specific 
nationality exists in some piracy cases, but this is far from demonstrating that “piracy 
everywhere in the world is not rational or free choice, it is an organized crime and structured 
with political objectives” (Joseph, 2010, p. 1286). Sterio (2010, p. 1458), more guardedly, 
said that “modern pirates in general, not only in Somalia, resort to violence because of 
ideological and political aims”. Liss (2011) mentioned piracy in South Asia and said that 
“piracy there is carried out by terrorist organizations such as the Jemaah Islamiya and the 
Mumpulan Mujahideen in Malaysia; the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia”, and she 
gave examples of some of those groups hijacking ships and asking for ransoms. Sterio (2010) 
coined the term “piratization of terrorism,” and applied it to Somalia, noting that “terrorism 
already has a foothold in Somalia” and Liss (2010) gave an example of a terrorist attack by 
the Islamist rebel group in which 23 people died at a medical school graduation ceremony in 
Maqadishuio, in December 2009. Stating that “pirates are linked to terrorist organizations, 
with whom they exchange weapons and finance”, Sterio (2010, p. 1459) said that “Alqaueda 
engaged in maritime attacks in USA and France (e.g. the attack on USS Cole in 2000), and 
that Osama Bin-laden had almost twenty fighters who are called the Alqaueda Navy”, 
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showing how terrorists can mobilize at sea: “Osama Bin-laden forced a merchant vessel to 
deliver explosives used to bomb the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998”. 
Sterio (2010, p. 1460) stated that “modern pirates in South Asia and Somalia are very similar 
to terrorists in that they are very well organized; that they discriminate between targets 
according to their nationalities; that they prefer to take hostages from several states and 
demand ransoms from their countries because it gives them more than one chance to get 
ransoms; and that like terrorist operations, piracy operations are managed by warlords who 
live in the land and the dirty work is conducted by youths who suffer  from poverty”. 
 
However, Ong (2014, p. 268) stated that “piracy must be based on two criteria 1. The 
numbers and types of the attacks and incidents that occur; 2. Economic, social, cultural and 
religion backgrounds of pirates’ activities”, meaning that those factors, especially religion, 
might play an important role in forming the pirates’ strategies in a region. But, the question is 
how strong is the religious background of the Somali pirates?  Ong (2014, p. 268) said that 
there is “no strong evidence that Al-shabab in Somalia has a connection with piracy”, and he 
concluded that “piracy in Somalia is probably purely a financial crime”. However, Ong 
(2014) based his views on the findings of the Hamilton (2010) report that Somali piracy is 
mostly economic crime, which relied on the fact that there are more than 100 pirates being 
prosecuted in Kenya, but the Kenyan justice system is not a reliable source of information, as 
I will show later.         
 
As we will see later in this research, motives behind piracy do not have a direct impact on the 
result of piracy.  In the Arabian Gulf, some of the Iraqi and the Iranian pirates have political 
motives but the majority of them have financial ends, yet all the piracy attacks in the Arabian 
Gulf are carried out with a minimum level of violence. Conversely, some Somali pirates are 
motivated solely by financial motives whereas other are motivated by political motives, yet 
both groups use violent means of ransom capturing. This signifies that the consequences of 
piracy do not depend on pirate’s motives.   
 
2.4.3 Causes of piracy  
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. In this section, the aim is to define the causes behind piracy in Somalia and the Arabian 
Gulf. There are six main causes of piracy identified in the literature:  
 
2.4.3.1 Failed state  
 
Several authors have alluded to state failure as a cause of Somali piracy. For instance, Gathii 
(2010, p. 108) reported “how Somalia became a failed state in 1990, and how piracy 
increased in the nation because of the importance of the region, the high value ships passing 
the Gulf of Aden, and the failure of Somalia to control crime because of its lack of power”. 
Liss (2010 chapter 2) claimed that “piracy may occur if there are lack of laws and regulations 
or if there is lack of control, and this argument can be applied  to the Somali case where there 
is a failed state which cannot keep the sea safe or protect their fishing industry”. One reason 
for the success rate of Somali pirates, according to  Sterio  (2010, p. 1451), is that “Somalia is 
a failed state with a very weak and unstable government and a police force which allows 
pirates to operate from the coastal towns very easily”. Whitman (2012, p. 1) referred to four 
“political root causes: a. the existence of corruption within the state; b. the presence of armed 
groups; c. limited state capacity; and d. regional disputes”. Baniela (2010, p. 195) discussed  
the factors  behind  piracy in Somalia saying that “piracy is the result of economic crises and 
an inadequate legal security system, both of which clearly occurred  since the regime of Siad 
Barre was overthrown in 1991… It is quite predictable that the crime rate would increase, 
including piracy, in the presence of a much failed state like Somalia”.  State failure is 
undoubtedly a contributory cause of some forms of piracy, but it is by no means the sole 
cause, even in Somalia. Somalia was a failed state since 1990, but kidnap for ransom become 
significant in 2004. Also Iraq was a failed state between 2003 and 2007, but kidnap for 
ransom never occurred in the Arabian Gulf region. So at least one form of piracy – kidnap for 
ransom – is not caused solely by state failure.  
2.4.3.2 Indifferent international community 
  
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 1) stated that “the most crucial factor is lack of international 
law, treaties and regulations to deal with piracy”, and in relation to Somalia, they ascribed 
“the increase of piracy to the failed state firstly; to the lack of international organizations to 
deal with the problem; to the lack of law and regulations; and to the lack of international 
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seriousness, willingness and commitment to deal with the Somali case”. Sterio (2010, p. 
1451) said that the international community is not interested in solving the problem for four 
reasons: (a) “Often there is no single state with responsibility. Pirates may attack a ship which 
has a flag of country A, but owned by country B, with crew members from countries C, D 
and E. So no single country is alone harmed from the attacks”; (b) “Most of the crews are 
from third-world countries, and major maritime powers such as USA and UK have no interest 
in paying out ransoms for such people if they became hostages”;. (c) “The lack of global 
cooperation to enforce law and failure to prosecute captured pirates”; and (d) “The shipping 
companies have made the situation worst when they pay ransoms for pirates to release ships 
and crew”.  
 
 International indifference is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the increase of piracy in 
Somalia.  Somalia was a failed state in 1991 and has remained failed, showing how the 
international community largely ignored the problem, Sterio’s points (a) and (d) are well 
taken, but his point (c) is inaccurate in that employees on board the US and the UK ships are 
under the employment law of their companies and most of the companies have their ships 
insured, so the payment of ransoms is often paid to the pirates.  
 
2.4.3.3 Marine resource degradation 
 
Liss (2010, chapter 2) suggested that “the increase of piracy in South East Asia may be 
related to an increase in environmental violations or decrease in fish stocks because of illegal 
fishing”. Again this is similar to the Somali case where the government could not protect the 
marine environment or fish stocks, because Somalia has not naval or coastguards to do so, 
allowing foreign companies to conduct illegal fishing and dump chemical waste in Somali 
waters which damaged marine life.  These were important reasons for the increase of piracy 
in Somalia. Schneider and Winkler (2013, p. 187) said that “the Somali pirates use the illegal 
fishing and the toxic dump in the Somali waters as reasons to legalize piracy…and they 
called this legalization the Robin Hood narrative…illegal fishing and toxic waste cause 
poverty by declining the fish stock; and…by piracy they protect the Somali waters from the 
illegal fishing and the toxic waste… illegal fishing and the toxic waste in the Somali waters 
generated anger against the west, and this anger fuelled support for piracy”. One of the 
pirates interviewed in Al-Jazeera (2009), the pirate named Abdilrashid Muse, said that “the 
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American and the European naval ships in the Somali waters are protecting their fishing 
vessels which are doing the illegal fishing in the Somali waters”.  Schneider and Winkler 
(2013, p. 187) said that “there is  some credible evidences that after the failure of Somalia in 
1991 the illegal fishing started in the Somali EEZ, and even in the Somali territorial waters, 
carried out by some foreign nations without the permission of Somalia”. Baniela (2010, p. 
195) explained “how the first phase of piracy began in Somalia, when trawlers from other 
countries took advantage of the absence of Somalian maritime security and coastguard and 
started to fish in Somali waters jeopardizing the livelihood of local Somali fishermen and 
leading to violent disputes…It is hardly surprising that people will do whatever it takes to 
find some other ways of obtaining income to survive”. Link-TV (2009) conducted  a 
telephone interview with Mohammed Bashir Waldo who said that “there are many physical 
evidences of the illegal fishing and the toxic waste in the Somali waters done by some foreign 
companies who want to get rid of their chemical materials in the Somali waters 
because…they can’t get rid of those materials in their own countries because of the strict 
rules in their countries” Waldo also said that one day before his interview, “the Somali 
community captured a huge container in the Gulf of Aden which was dumping a massive 
amount of toxic waste in the Somali waters” (Link-TV, 2009),  Moreira (2013) interviewed 
Franco Oliva, a former financial controller who said that “the Italian government and the 
Italian companies are getting involved in some development projects in Somali which used to 
cover the toxic dump in the Somali waters”, and he provided evidence with pictures to 
support his claims. These  pictures were shown during the interview were taken from the 
coast of Somalia after the Tsunami 2004 which showed all the tanks of the toxics waste 
which been dragged from the sea to the coast covering a huge area.  Diaz and Dubner (2010, 
p. 4) claimed that “the illegal fishing and the toxic waste in the Somali waters started since 
the Somali failure in 1991 which caused an extreme decline in the fishery sector”. Diaz and 
Dubner (2010, p. 5) also asserted  that “the U.N., NATO forces, the European Union, Russia, 
Japan, India, Egypt and Yemen are in the Somali waters to protect their own merchant ships 
and also to protect them while they are doing the illegal fishing”. There is little doubt, 
therefore that illegal fishing and toxic waste dumpling by western vessels has been taking 
place in Somali seas, and that this has caused anger among Somali fishers whose livelihoods 
have been undermined.  
2.4.3.4 Poverty and lucrative targets 
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Whitman (2012, p. 1) referred to three “economic root causes: a. the relatively high chances 
of substantial income; b. the relatively low costs of counter- attack; and c. the relatively low 
opportunity costs and economic risks”. Liss (2010, chapter 2) suggested that in SE Asia  “the 
increase of the recreational fishing industry may encourage and increase piracy”, which may 
be the case also in the Arabian Gulf where there are rich countries such as Kuwait with very 
expensive and luxury yachts fishing in front of very poor fishers from high crime rate 
countries (Iraq and Iran). This situation is clear in Somalia, where Somali citizens with 
extremely low personal incomes, which was $128.1 per annum? in 2012 according to (UN 
Data, 2015) look out at very valuable shipping passing in front of them without protection, 
and this has led them to use piracy as an alternative income, my assumption was based on the 
nature of societies when the absence of security comes in the time of poverty which would 
increase the crime in general including piracy. According to Sterio (2010, p 1451), “piracy is 
a very rewarding business: the average earning for ransom for a single merchant ship is 
$150,000 whereas the average yearly earning in Somalia is $600” which is much higher than 
the amount stated by the (UN Data, 2015), but according to Appendix I which shows the 
monthly income for the Somalis imprisoned in Kenya I can assume that the $600 mentioned 
by (Sterio, 2010) is more reliable. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 2) said that “the extreme 
increase of piracy in Somalia was because of the huge reward of piracy ransoms compared 
with the very low level of  household income in Somalia and the low risks of capture and 
punishments”. They reported that “in 2010 the earning from piracy was $238 million and the 
average ransom $5 million”. They also said that “piracy has increased because of the 
willingness of many companies to pay ransoms to pirates for the release of their crews and 
cargos, as a result of which ransoms been raised from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 
2010”.  
2.4.3.5 Social circumstances 
 
Whitman (2012, p. 1) referred to four  “social root causes: a. Maritime capacity and tradition 
in a region; b. the ability to gain social status through piracy; c. the existence of grievance, for 
example, capturing Somalis with no solid evidence and accusing  them of  piracy, and  illegal 
fishing and chemical dumping which destroyed  the fish stock in Somalia and left  Somali 
fishermen with no income and no government to protect the waters or to raise the issue to the 
international community; and d. the existence of community support for piracy”. All of these 
circumstances are relevant to Somali piracy. 
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2.4.3.6 Geographical situation 
 
Sterio (2010, p. 1451) focused on geographical factors while explaining why Somali pirates 
have a very high success rate. He said that there are five such factors. The first factor is that 
Somali pirates are operating in the Gulf of Aden, which is a very major passageway with 
potential targets that are more numerous than anywhere else in the Middle East”. According 
to Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 3), “the Gulf of Aden has become the most important 
waterway with the highest rates of  traffic in the world: more than 20,000 ships pass through 
it each year which is roughly 20 percent of the global total of commercial shipping”,  and 
they referred to “the estimation of the U.S. Department of Energy that 3.3 million barrels of 
oil which is about 4 percent of the daily global demand pass every day through the Gulf of 
Aden”. The second of Sterio’s (2010) geographical factors is that “Somali pirates use their 
geographical advantages very well: Somalia has the longest coast in Africa which is very 
hard to patrol; the coast is populated with towns in which pirates can easily blend in with 
other insurgent groups; and the Gulf of Aden is narrow which allows pirates to bring smaller 
ships to land very quickly, to secure them and wait for ransoms”. According to Pham (2010, 
p. 330), “state failure is not necessarily the reason for increased  piracy in Somali”, because  
“Somali was a failed state since 1991, long before piracy began”.  The “reason for the piracy 
in Somali is primarily because of the geographical advantage of the long Somali coast which 
is on the Gulf of Aden”. Pham (2010, p. 330) agreed with what   Murphy  (2009) said in his 
article that  “piracy is suitable in places that offer a combination of rewarding hunting 
grounds and acceptable levels of risk (which is that at least they will not be killed) and 
approximate safe havens”, and Pham (2010, p. 330) asserted  that “Somali has got those two 
factors and this was the main  reason for the rise of piracy”. Baniela (2010, p. 198) said that 
“while Somalia is located near such an important sea pathway used by high value oil tankers 
and cargos which are easy to hijack, it is obvious that they will use the easy way to provide 
income and even find several ethical excuses to perpetrate piracy”. All these geographical 
factors are well documented, but Baniela’s (2010) assertion that piracy is an “easy way to 
provide income” is facile: piracy is highly risky and hazardous.  
 
Ong (2014, p. 272), comparing  pirates in Somali and Southeast Asia, noted  that “Somali 
pirates operate in the high seas and kidnap for ransom, whereas pirates in Southeast Asia 
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operate near the coast and do not kidnap for ransom”. Ong (2014, p. 272) claimed  this was 
because  “of the geographical advantage of Somalia as Somali pirates have a huge area of 
operation all the way from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hurmuz”. Ong’s (2014) contrast is 
equally applicable to the contrast between Somali pirates and Iranian and Iraqi pirates: the 
latter operate near the coast and do not kidnap for ransom, and this is connected to their small 
coastlines.  
 
Summarising this theme of the causes of piracy, I conclude that although the causes of piracy 
vary from place to place, the cause most frequently mentioned in the literature is state failure. 
State failure in Somalia is the main cause of increased crime in general in the country (Gathii, 
2010, p. 108; Baniela, 2010, p. 195; Sterio, 2010, p. 1451; Whitman, 2012, p. 1; Liss, 2010 
chapter 2) including piracy, because state failure led to lack of law enforcement, corruption, 
weapon distribution, poverty, economic crisis and lack of education, while from the maritime 
perspective, lack of law enforcement resulted in illegal fishing and toxic dumping, as well as 
safe havens for pirates. State failure can be seen not only in Somalia but also in Iraq, which 
failed between 2003 and 2007, causing an increase of piracy, though with no kidnap-for-
ransom strategy. However, state failure on its own does not cause piracy: it may be a 
necessary cause (especially of kidnap for ransom) but it is not a sufficient cause, and it needs 
to be combined with other causes to produce piracy. Such other causes include particularly 
geographical factors. The literature mentioned the geographical advantage that Somalia has 
for pirates with its long coastline, enabling pirates to kidnap hostages and hide them in the 
land of the failed state. By contrast, for Iraqi pirates, the coastline in the North is limited in 
length which makes it more difficult to avoid being tracked by the Kuwaiti coastguards and 
navy in the area.  The Somali fishermen became more organized and used their seamanship 
skills to do piracy.  State failure would increase crime in any region, and if the failed state is 
located in an area of marine geographical advantage to pirates (which include sufficient coast 
line and also located nearby an important shipping line), such as Somalia, then piracy would 
increase over a wider range in the region, but if the failed state has a limited coastline then 
the pirates would operate near the coast. In failed states, if the marine environment has been 
violated, then the fishermen are more likely to become pirates, but if kidnap-for-ransom is 
seen to be successful in any area, then other criminals would engage in piracy whether or not 
there is illegal fishing. Another complementary cause of piracy suggested in the literature - 
that illegal fishing and chemical waste is the cause behind the kidnap-for-ransom attacks 
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carried out by Somali pirates – only applies to the earliest or original pirates who are the 
fishermen, not to the later pirates who are the criminals attracted to piracy to gain the huge 
ransoms, 
2.4.4 Manifestations of piracy 
 
 This section focuses on the manifestations of piracy in the literature. The way the literature 
portrays piracy is important to develop our understanding of how to combat it, because 
sometimes the characterisations are unclear or distorted and obscure important features of 
piracy, thereby impeding effective ways of dealing with it, which is the central concern of my 
thesis. In this section, the main factors analysed are areas of attack; amounts of ransom; 
pirates’ clans, language; levels of violence employed and weapons used; pirate ships’ 
recognition; target selection; and timings of attacks. 
2.4.4.1 Areas of attack 
 
Daxecker and Prins (2013, p. 943. 948) rightly pointed out that “piracy usually flourishes in 
areas poorly guarded by weak security ports [and that]…pirates usually prefer the areas close 
to major shipping lanes such as East Africa”. Following  Daxecker and Prins   (2013), we  
can see that the Gulf of Eden is a place where pirates prefer because its an important 
waterway through which a large number of ships pass daily and because the area is so huge, 
naval forces would be unable to guard the whole area effectively, because the Somali waters 
and the Gulf of Eden is huge compared to the capacity of the naval forces existance. 
Shortland and Varese (2014, p. 746) noted correctly that “in unstable political regimes the 
piracy activities increase only in areas which already rely on criminal revenues”, meaning 
that piracy would not increase in coastal areas where locals depend on decent businesses, so 
according to  Shortland and Verese  (2014)  the Somali society already depended on crime for 
a living and piracy became an opportunity to the society when several factors occurred such 
as the availabilities of ships and the possibility  of taking hostages. As Shortland and Varese 
(2014, p. 752) said, in Somalia the  locations unsuitable for pirates include “coastal areas 
such as Berbera, Bosasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo and two minor natural harbours Merka 
and el Ma’an near Mogadishu are holding the major ports that the Somali use for trading, 
exporting and importing and those ports wouldn’t provide shelters or anchorage areas for 
pirates”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) claim  that “there are 50 pirate bands along the 
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coast of Somalia containing 2,000 to 3,000 pirates and they are operating out of six known 
bases on the coast of Somalia”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) reported that “the attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean rose from 20 in 2006 to 219 in 2010, extending the 
pirate’s range to 1,300 nautical miles from the Somali coast”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 
2) said that “the Somali pirates shifted their activities to the Gulf of Aden in spring 2008 and 
by September 2008 the IMB reported that the attackers in the Gulf of Aden had  increased by 
60% since 2007”. This suggests that Somali pirates established bases and logistics outside 
Somalia because of the long distance from Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. There may be a 
parallel in this respect between piracy and Alqaueda which also began in small groups based 
in Afghanistan and during the years they managed to establish bases, logistics and other 
mobile sources all over the world. 
2.4.4.2 Amounts of ransom 
 
Commentators differ markedly in their assessments of the amounts of ransom obtained by 
pirates. Schuberta and Lades (2013, p. 482, 485) claimed that “the average amount for 
ransom per vessel increased in Somalia from $15,000 in 2005 to $4.8 million  in 2011…the 
typical amount of ransom that the Somali pirate gang in Elyl would get is $1.8 million…the 
commander in chief received 900,000 USD in return for a typical investment of about 40,000 
USD (financing the boat, outboard motors, weapons, fuel, and food…middle ranks, including 
an interpreter, an accountant, and a supplies logistics officer received between 30,000 and 
60,000 USD…and the attackers were paid 41,000 USD”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) 
claimed that “the average ransom rose from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010”. The 
amount of ransom is  unlikely to reflect the motive of the pirates, but more likely to be related 
to the type of the gang involved. Some gangs operated virtually as businesses in which the 
leaders calculate the amount of required ransom according to gang numbers, weapons used, 
number of boats, fuel and other expenses.  
2.4.4.3 Pirates’ clan and language  
 
The available literature is very thin on pirates’ clans, language, and how the pirates usually 
dress. This is partly because the IMO piracy reports do not routinely record piracy attacks in 
the Arabian Gulf. On clan membership among Somali pirates, Ibrahim (2010, p. 290) stated 
that “the relationship between pirates and Alshabab in Somalia is business, but there are some 
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clan factors as the pirates mostly come from the clan called Darod in the Central and 
Northern of Somalia, and Alshabab is made up of several clans, especially Hawiyeh who 
usually come from Maqadishio and the South”. So the clan factor may be one of the factors 
that connect pirates and terrorists, where relationships are not based on business only. 
However, Solomona (2014, p. 352) held that the clans who were engaged with Alshabab 
terrorist groups in Somalia were mainly the Digil and Rahanweyn clans, not the pirates’ clan 
of Darod, whose members came from different part of Somalia. Table 1 shows the origins of 
pirates in Somalia: the top row shows the main clan and each clan has its sub-clans in the 
rows below. Indeed, at least 70% of Alshabab groups come from different clans than pirates 
in Somalia, meaning that the clan factor between the two groups could be less than 30%: 
 
Table 2-1 Major Somali clans and sub clans (Solomona, 2014, p. 352) 
Main clan Digil  Hawiyeh Darod Isaq Dir Rahanweyn 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub Clans 
 Haber Gidir Ogaden Haber 
Yunis 
Issa  
 Abgal Majerteen Awal Gadabursi  
 Galjel Marehan Haber 
Jello 
Bimal  
 Ugajen Dulbahante Ayub   
 Jugundhabe Warsangali Idagale   
 Hawadlle Lelkase Ibran   
 Murursade  Arab   
 Shekhal  Haber 
Toljelo 
  
 Biamal     
 
 
2.4.4.4 Levels of violence employed 
 
Ibrahim (2010, p. 291) said that “the Somali pirates and Alshabab legitimised the use of 
violence within the Muslim tradition (self defence) against the illegal fishing”. Also Ibrahim 
(2010, p. 288) stated that “the failure of the U.S. and international policies towards Somalia 
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have generated a motive to target the American and Western units by the Somalis and 
Alshabab”, and he described several policy failures as examples. The UK Parliament Foreign 
Affairs Committee (2012, p. 15) reported that violence was routinely used by Somali pirates:  
“the Somali pirates usually use one single skiff or small vessels or sometimes two skiffs to 
attack the target; also they usually use small arms, guns ranging from AK47s to Rocket 
Propelled Grenade RPGs…and usually manoeuvre one of the skiffs alongside and throw a 
hook and then climb on-board to hijack the ship and if they have been detected while they do 
the climbing the pirates usually fire on the bridge to force the master to clear them the way 
and then they will proceed directly to the bridge to take over the ship”. However, the use of 
violence should not be exaggerated, in the absence of reliable evidence.  
2.4.4.5 Pirates’ ships recognition 
 
The aim of this section theme is to find out whether the literature provides a guide to 
differentiate between the ships or boats that pirates use and the boats of other seafarers in the 
maritime scene such as fishing boats. The difficulty of differentiating has caused lots of 
mistakes by the task forces in Somalia resulting sometimes in harm to innocent fishermen, or 
failure to pursue real pirates at sea because of fears of making such mistakes. Unfortunately, 
because the IMO piracy reports do not record piracy attacks in the Arabian Gulf region, we 
cannot discover the types of attacking boats of the pirates from the IMO reports. However, in 
the Somali region (IMO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 
2013; 2014; 2015) I can analyse all the attacks, and as we shall see in Chapter five, the 
reported Somali pirates boats or ships are identified as mother ships, dhows, skiffs or speed 
boats, and no more information is required to differentiate between the pirates attacking ships 
and any other boats used by Somali fishermen. In my view, this is a more satisfactory 
situation that in the Arabian Gulf, though errors of miss-identification can still be (and are) 
made as usually the pirates in the Arabian Gulf use similar ships that fishermen use such as 
dhows or fishing boats because most of the pirates are actually fishermen.     
 
2.4.4.6  Target selection 
 
In this section, we seek to find out from the literature how pirates decide to attack specific 
targets. Is it due to the easiness of the targets? Or the likely price for its capture? Or its flag? 
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Or the nationalities of the crew? Or the location? Shortland and Vothknecht (2011, p. 3) 
stated that “the Somali pirates or terrorists prefer the targets with lower self-protection or far 
away from naval protection and they prefer the private sector targets as they are willing to 
cooperate and pay the ransoms”. This issue was raised in the conferences I have attended 
during my research (BTM Group, 2013), as some participants “complained that some private 
companies paid ransoms to pirates without the knowledge of the task forces in the area, 
which encouraged more pirates to take hostages” (BTM, Group, 2013). In Chapter five, I 
analyse all the piracy attacks in Somalia to see which targets are more valuable for the pirates 
to attack.   Reuchlin  (2012, p. 49) claimed  that “pirates prefer cargo ships  and fishing 
vessels…  cargo vessels are the most important shipping industry for the west because they 
transport 75% of the goods to Europe, which is another reason why pirates select them”.  
Fishing vessels are usually slower than other vessels and their manoeuvres are restricted to 
their fishing apparatus. Ong (2014, p. 270) stated that “the pirates in the South East Asia 
prefer small and mid-size vessels” because they need to steal engine parts, cash and some 
other items”. By contrast, “the Somali pirates prefer to operate in the high seas and they 
attack a wide range of ships such as large cargos, containers and luxury private crafts” (Ong 
2014, p. 270).  The reason for this difference in the target selections between the pirates in the 
Southeast Asia and in Somalia is their different needs and skill sets:  the SE Asia pirates are 
interested in the ship itself, and this is why they seek  ships that are easy to board and easy to 
steal smaller engines than big engines, while the Somali pirates, who are more skilled at 
kidnapping,  seek  big ships as they have more  possible hostages on board,  and Somali 
pirates are interested more in the number of crew that  the ship itself.  
  
2.4.4.7  Timings of attacks  
 
What has the literature to tell us about the timing of piracy attacks? Liwång et al. (2013, p. 
105) said that “the best time for the Somali pirates to attack the targets is at daytime with a 
calm sea as the visibility would be much better for the pirates”. However, Baniela (2010, p. 
194) said that “the Somali pirates usually attack at night, from sunset to sunrise, so they can 
use the advantage of the low visibility”. In Chapter five, making use of the piracy attacks 
reports provided by the IMO, I analyse all the piracy attacks reported from 2010 to the end of 
2013 to find out what time is mostly  preferred by the Somali pirates to attack, but  my naval 
experience suggests  that the pirates’ preference for the time of their attack will be based on 
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the types of targets they seek and their geographical location. For example, when the targets 
are at anchor, the pirates would prefer to attack them at night for two reasons:  they can easily 
locate them by knowing the anchorage areas in advance, so  they don’t need good visibility to 
locate targets; and  they can use the cover of darkness  so they can approach, attack and run 
fast. But if targets are moving ships, the pirates would prefer to attack during daylight for two 
reasons;  they need good visibility to locate the targets; and  they need good visibilility to find 
out if the targets are armed or not or if a naval protection is near. From this I assume that 
Iranian and Iraqi pirates prefer night time attacks, because they normally attack ships at 
anchor, but Somali pirates prefer daytime attacks because they  usually attack ongoing ships 
which they need visibility to locate  in order to check for guards and whether  there is a naval 
ship protecting the target.    
 
2.4.5 Consequences of piracy 
 
Mejia et al. (2009) published a statistical analysis of all the reported piracy attempts and 
attacks in the world  from the IMB’s official reports in the period between 1996 and 2005, 
and produced  two data bases:  “the first one comprising the attacks or attempted attacks on 
ships reported by IMB between 1996 to 2005 (the total number is 3,164); and the second data 
base comprising the total merchant shipping reported from the Institute of Shipping and 
Logistics of Bremen (ISL) between 1996 to 2005 (the total number is 350,376 vessels)”. 
From this study, we can see how huge the number of the attacked ships was.  Mejia et al. 
(2009) estimated that the number of the Somali pirates was approximately 4,000.  
 
The literature on the consequences of piracy is quite extensive on its economic and human 
impacts. On the economic impact of piracy, most writers focus on the cost of Somali piracy. 
For example, Reuchlin (2012, p. 52, 53) explained that  on cargo transport,  “Somali pirates 
received US$ 160 million from cargo vessel ransoms in 2011”. In addition, “the cost of 
negotiations, logistics of the ransom payments and damages to the hijacked vessels cost the 
cargo industry an additional US$ 160 million, so the total cost for the attacks in the North 
Western area of the Indian Ocean on the cargo industry in 2011 was $ 320 million… [And] 
50% of those losses were paid by the insurance companies”. On the impacts of piracy on the 
fishery industry, Reuchlin (2012,  p. 12) said that “there are no accurate figures of the losses, 
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but all the reports say that fisheries are suffering the most from piracy in all regions of the 
world, especially in the Indian Ocean and Somalia. Pirates often use fishers as human shields 
to cover and camouflage them during their attacks”. Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi (2013, p. 
400)  said “that the effect of the increase of modern piracy on the costs of maritime transport 
is significant, and that the main affected route is between Europe and Asia because the route 
contain several failed states”. Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi (2013, p. 411) predicted “that 
the higher transport costs between Europe and Asia would decrease…European investment 
into the Asian market which will harm European trade in the Asian expanding market”. 
Sterio (2010, p. 1456) described “the Somali problem and how it is harming international 
security and the economic system…The economic harm includes the shipping industry’s 
expenses regarding security, such as insurance”. Sterio (2010, p. 1456) said that “in the past 
the average voyage cost for ship was $500 per voyage, but now the average cost for a ship in 
a piracy-infected area is $20,000 per voyage”, and she claimed that the “increased voyage 
cost began when Somalia became a failed state in 1991”.  Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) 
stated that “piracy in the Arabian Sea represents the major threat to the GCC maritime trade 
which their economies depend on…this piracy threat is not merely theoretical but real”. HH 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahayan, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs said, “Piracy is the 
most threatening challenges of the 21st century” – a statement he made after several attacks 
had been committed against GCC ships, including, in March 2011, the Kuwaiti oil tanker MV 
Zirku worth $100 million. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 3) referred to “the GCC’s 
economic dependence on crude oil production”, saying that “90 percent of the GCC oil 
exports transit in tankers which travel through the Arabian Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz 
which forms 40 percent of the world traded supply, and nearly 1,800 billion cubic feet of 
liquefied natural gas also pass through the Strait to the world…[Also] 90 percent of the GCC 
trade depends on maritime transport and the import of large quantities of other goods such as 
grain, iron, sugar, and  that  these trades pass through the dangerous piracy areas and come 
through the Strait of Hormuz to the major ports in the GCC”.  Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 
3) noted that “on February 4, 2011 nine ships were hijacked by pirates and those ships were 
owned by the UAE”.  
Hallwood and Thomas (2013, p. 345), pointing out  that “the Somali pirates aimed to hijack 
ships and ask for ransoms where other pirates in other parts of the world aim for robbery 
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only”, Hallwood and Thomas (2013, p. 345) claimed that “the annual costs of maritime 
piracy in Somalia were between $1 billion -$16 billion, made up as follows:   
a. Extra 20 days per trip for rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope 
b. Increased insurance costs which may exceed $20,000 per trip, owing to the 
designation by insurance agents to Lloyd’s of London of the Gulf of Aden as a war 
risk zone 
c. Increased charter rates 
d. Reduced tanker availabilities and more costs for cargoes  
e. Ransoms paid by ship owners between $500,000 -$5.5 million. 
f. Decrease in the international trade and 11% decrease in exports between Europe and 
Asia” 
However, according to Madsen et al. (2014, p. 7), “the cost of Somali piracy to international 
shipping was down by 50% in 2013 comparing to 2012 as the cost in 2013 was $3 billion 
whereas it was $6 billion in 2012”. Madsen, et al. (2014, p. 7) stated that “the cost of piracy 
reduced because of several factors such as the speed reducing as the cost of fuel consumption 
reduced (the ships don’t have to travel with a high speed to avoid pirates anymore), less re-
routing, lower insurance costs and other elements”. Madsen, et al. (2014, p. 9) also reported a 
fall in military expenditure: “the cost of the military to counter piracy in Somalia was as 
follows; $1.7 billion in 2011, $1.09 billion in 2012 and $0.999 billion in 2013”. However, 
although the total amount paid in ransom money also fell, the average ransom went up: 
Madsen, et al. (2014, p. 10) stated that “the ransoms paid in 2012 were $31 million to release 
8 ships and 316 hostages where the ransoms paid in 2013 were $21 million to release 3 ships 
and 567 hostages…the average ransom was $3.9 milion in 2012 and increased to $7.2 million 
in 2013”.   
 
On the human cost of piracy, Nikolic and Missoni (2013, p. 316) said that “the level of harm 
on the crew depends on the aim of the piracy attack…if the aim of the attack is to kidnap the 
ship only then the result may be to kill the whole crew but, if the crew were cooperative the 
pirates might let them just abandon the ship, but if the aim of the pirates is to take hostages 
for ransoms then this will mean that the crew will be held for a long time”. Nikolic and 
Missoni (2013, p. 316) said that “in 2012 the Somali pirates held 8 vessels and 104 hostages 
and in 2011 the Somali pirates held 1,206 hostages, 26 of them being held for more than 2 
years”. Nikolic and Missoni (2013, p. 316) said that “the increased time of holding hostages 
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cause an increase of violence against the hostages and also an increased risk of disease and 
malnutrition”. According to Hurlburt and Selye (2013, p. 3), “in 2010 the hostages taken 
were 1,090 and in 2011 the hostages were 555 and in in 2012 the hostages taken were 349 
and the reports states that the average time for the hostages remain is 11 months”. Hurlburt 
and Selye (2013, p. 4) claimed that “the hostages suffer from several types of abuse such as 
physical and psychological,” and that some “hostages have been killed between 2009 and 
2012, and 2011 was the year in which most hostages faced death as more than 35 hostages 
were killed”. According to (Madsen et al., 2014, p. 2) “in 2013, 486 ships were attacked by 
the Somali pirates and 60 vessels were boarded by the pirates though only 60 hostages were 
taken by the Somali pirates”.  The number of hostages kidnapped by Somali pirates dropped 
in 2013, and the reasons for this decrease will be discussed in section 4.7 below.  
  
The conclusion of this section is that the consequences of Somali piracy are twofold: 
economic consequences and human consequences. Since 2013, both economic and human 
consequences have diminished, but  the reasons for this decline have not been fully studied. 
Gaps in current information are addressed and discussed in Chapter five.  
 
2.4.6 Responses to piracy  
 
In the literature, there is much that has been written about political, legal and military 
responses to piracy.  In this section, we consider what authors have said about past and 
present responses to piracy conducted by military, governmental and private organization.  In 
what follows, I will consider the six most frequently discussed responses that have been made 
to counter the threat of piracy: (1) political will; (2) naval patrols using force; (3) arming 
commercial vessels; (4) re-routing commercial vessels; (5) establishing safe corridors; and 
(6) restoring Somalia to a healthy state. In the final section, I will consider writers’ 
recommendations on how to respond more effectively to piracy. 
 
2.4.6.1 Political will 
 
Campanelli (2012, p. 75) said that lack of political will was undermining current efforts to 
curb piracy: “piracy will be a non-problem if the states have the willingness to fight it...the 
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problem in the current situation is not piracy but, the willingness to solve it… [E.g.] the legal 
shortcoming is not the cause of piracy but a consequence of the absence of willingness to 
solve piracy by the states”. One measure of political will is the establishment of organisations 
with anti-piracy responsibilities, and many such organisations have been established in recent 
years, as Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 46) noted, listing the maritime governance 
organizations which have roles in combating piracy: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 
of Somalia (CGPCS); Djibouti Code of Conduct; ESA-IO Regional Strategy and Regional 
Plan of Action; EU; International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC); 
International Maritime Organization (IMO); INTERPOL; Kampala Process; League of Arab 
States; Malacca Strait Patrols; Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa 
(MOWCA); NATO; New York Declaration; Out of Area Nations; Port and Coastal Nations; 
Regional Agreement on Countering Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP); Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE); African Union; UK Maritime 
Trade Operations (UKMTO); UN Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary 
General; UN Development Programme (UNDP); UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); 
US;  Combined Maritime Forces (CMF); and World Maritime Day 2011 – “Piracy: 
Orchestrating the Response”.  
 
However, not all these organizations have taken their anti-piracy responsibilities sufficiently 
seriously. For instance, Hodgson (2012, p. 6) evaluated the role of the IMO in combatting 
maritime piracy, and concluded that “the IMO has been guided by the UNCLOS’s definition 
of piracy which has some shortcomings in addressing piracy”. The following is the IMO 
mission statement (Hodgson, 2012, p. 6): 
 
"The mission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a United Nations 
specialized agency is to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and 
sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be accomplished by adopting the 
highest practicable standards of maritime safety and security, efficiency of navigation 
and prevention and control of pollution from ships, as well as through consideration 
of the related legal matters and effective implementation of IMO’s instruments with a 
view to their universal and uniform application."  
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Hodgson (2012, pp. 5, 6) said that “after 9/11, the IMO adopted the International Ship and 
Port Security Code (ISPS Code) to strengthen the port and ship facilities to counter and 
prevent piracy… [and in] the IMO’s strategic plan between 2010-2015 for countering 
piracy…most of the recommendations were to enhance and develop the practical measures 
and security facilities in ships and ports and also to enhance the military cooperation to 
counter piracy”.  However, the IMO has focused exclusively on combating piracy at sea, 
whereas most writers believe that piracy must be countered through its roots which are inside 
Somalia and on land.   
 
Liwång et al. (2013, p. 101) said that “all piracy incidents must be reported to the 
International chamber of Commerce ICC and to the International Maritime Bureau IMB”. 
However, he said that “there are two problems with the reporting process: (1) there is over- 
reporting by the commercial ships in the Somali basin and the Gulf of Aden as they report 
everything at sea which makes the maritime scene inaccurate by reporting all the skiffs and 
ships in the areas as suspects of piracy; and (2) some of the commercial ships don’t report 
any of the suspected attacks because they fear  the legal consequences of the reporting which 
also makes the maritime scene inaccurate” (Liwång et al., 2013, p. 101). Hastings (2009, p. 
217) said that “reporting the piracy attacks increased the ships’ insurance premiums”, and he 
said that “many companies don’t report the piracy attacks when there are no human losses 
and they deal with kidnappers and ransoms without reporting them”. Hastings (2009, p. 217) 
said that “almost 50% of the piracy attacks are not reported to the IMO”.  This may be an 
optimistic estimate since my research found that none of the attacks reported by Kuwaiti and 
Qatari coastguards was mentioned in the IMP piracy reports. It may be that legal obligations 
must be placed on commercial ships to report all piracy attacks or attempted attacks to the 
IMO office so the maritime statistics would be more accurate. Also, it may be that the 
shipping/and or insurance private companies must not be allowed to deal with pirates 
directly.  
 
Naval patrols using military force 
 
Many authors have discussed the deployment of naval forces in areas where piracy is most 
prevalent. For example, Joseph (2010, p. 1293) referred to “international efforts to enforce 
law on piracy, noting that the UN has called on states, regional and international organization 
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to cooperate to fight Somali pirates… [And that the UN] “Gave rights to forces to pursue 
pirates in contiguous zones or the EEZs of the coastal states, but this right of pursuit ends as 
soon as a chase enters the territorial waters of a third state, and this is including Somalia”. 
This limitation which forbids naval forces from chasing pirates into territorial waters  - i.e. 
within 12 miles of its coast - would not be helpful in the case of failed states such as Somalia 
because when the pirates enter Somali territorial waters they are immune to pursuit, and the 
only solution after this will be paying ransoms to avoid the death of hostages. Nelson and 
Goossens (2011, p. 1) said that “the GCC had adopted a coordinated strategy of counter-
piracy to protect the Arabian Peninsula from the threat of piracy which was a recognition that 
the first thing the GCC must do to not lose the case is to address the problem of piracy”. 
Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 4, 5) pointed out that the “CTF-152…is a multitask force 
consisting of all the navies of GCC under the supervision of the U.S. fifth fleet in Bahrain”, 
but noted that “this task force doesn't participate directly in anti-piracy moves…since  Saudi 
Arabia is the only Gulf State which contributes to marine security beyond its territorial 
waters. Although all the GCC states are enhancing their naval capabilities, apart from Saudi 
Arabia the others have a limited naval role, which is to defend their own territory’s waters”. I 
think that despite the naval capabilities and technology that GCC have, they lack the 
necessary manpower, which makes countering piracy difficult for them.  In Kuwait, for 
example, the total number of patrol naval vessels is 12, which makes the navy too weak to 
defend even its own territorial waters. This weakness is due to Kuwait’s political strategy 
which prioritises developing its armed forces less than education, health and other domestic 
sectors, because the politician’s view is that Kuwait is under the protection of the U.S. so it is 
less concerned to provide for its own security.  
 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 1)  asked “how it is possible in the age of aircraft carriers, 
missiles, frigates and powerful naval forces that small skiffs can cause a significant maritime 
threat to the world?” They answered  by saying that “piracy is usually conducted outside the 
state’s jurisdiction waters and that although the world has been globalized, international law 
and treaties are still built on the state as the fundamental source of legal actions”. They said 
that “piracy is a global challenge which requires the creation of a new legal structure to tackle 
the problem”. They explained the increase of piracy in the world was because of the “lack of 
an effective legal system that can be acted on by governments outside their jurisdiction 
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waters”. In other words, it is a gap in the law governing international waters that has led to 
little apprehending of pirates which has encouraged pirates to expand their activities.  
 
According to Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 3), “There are three military operations 
addressing piracy in Somalia. The first operation, Atlanta and EU deployment (EU-
NAVFOR) is tasked with protecting the UN’s World Food Program shipments to Somalia. 
The second is operation Ocean Shield, which is a NATO force to protect other UN shipments 
to Somalia. The third is the combined task force 151 (CTF-151) led by the U.S. comprising 
25 nations headquartered in Bahrain  including all GCC nations, Russia, India, Japan, China 
and Iran which all conduct independent maritime security operations at sea”. 
 
Bahadur (2011, chapter 9) also said that “in the late 2008 there were three multinational task 
forces, CTF 150, US fifth fleet and the NATO forces, deployed in the Somali waters to 
counter piracy, but piracy started to rise between 2008 to 2010 and it continued to rise till the 
publication  of his book”. He said that “in 2009 also the UN deployed the CTF 151 and other 
navies engaged independently to protect their vessels in the area such as China, India, Iran, 
Russia and Malaysia”. Bahadur (2011, Chapter 9) said that “between 2008 and 2010 the 
naval units in the Somali area varied between 25 and 40 warships with an annual cost of $1-
$1.5 billion”. Pristrom et al. (2013, p. 686) reported that “some other navies are working 
independently to counter piracy in the area such as China and Russia”, and  that “the navies 
in the area operate with frigates, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), submarines, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)”. From my own experience working with CTF-151, this 
task force has a major problem in coordination between the units. The main problem is 
communication between units at sea (navies, coastguards, commercial ships, fishing vessels 
and seafarers) which requires knowing the operation areas in the open waters and distributing 
information between units, including suspect lists, suspected areas, targets information at sea 
and intelligence information about expected threats, all of which leads to confusion between 
the units at sea. 
 
Sterio (2010, p. 1473) described another attempt to deal with these problems: “in 2008, after 
the extremely large increase of piracy in Somalia, the UN Security Council adopted five 
resolutions that addressed concerns about hijackings in the Somali waters (resolutions 1851, 
1816, 1846, 1838 and 1844). The five resolutions together are designed to facilitate the task 
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of safeguarding the Gulf of Aden by extending patrolling nations’ jurisdictional and legal 
enforcement reach into Somalia”. However, Sterio (2010, p. 1473) said that “the five UN 
resolutions are limited in their scope because: (1) they only apply to Somalia; (2) they are not 
meant to establish any new rules of customary piracy law; (3) they require the consent of the 
Somali government for any action undertaken; (4) they require the patrolling nations to 
respect international humanitarian law; and (5) they pertain only to the current patrolling 
nations in the Gulf of Aden”. On point (3), it could be argued that in order to make an 
effective impact on piracy, we must engage the Somali government because this will give 
experience which will make them better in dealing with piracy in their territorial waters and 
also will give the international task forces a better picture of piracy by exchanging 
information with the Somali government.  
 
Bahadur (2011, Chapter 9) pointed out the limitations on using armed force:  “those heavy 
armed warships equipped with the most recent technology couldn’t stop half-starved pirates 
with aging rifles… since the Somali pirates operate in an area 3,000 km wide and 3,700 km 
from the coast of Oman to the Madagascar waters, and there are 2000 pirates operating in this 
area… the warships are playing a losing game with the pirates”.  Critics argue that the 
deployment of the naval forces in the Somali region will never be enough to defeat piracy, 
because the average time for the pirates to hijack a ship is between 15 to 40 minutes, and 
naval forces can rarely reach target ships in such a short space of time. Maybe some counter 
measures could be made by the targeted ships such as using their speed or water cannons to 
delay the pirates until the naval forces arrive, but this depends on the location of the attack 
and it increases safety risks. 
 
Furthermore, as Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi (2013, p. 411) said, “while the deployment 
of the naval forces significantly decreased the number of hijackings, it did so at the expense 
of transferring costs from the shipping companies and consumers to the national governments 
and taxpayers”. More importantly, they pointed out that “deploying the naval forces in the 
Gulf of Aden, and particularly the Operation of Atlanta by the European navies, didn’t 
actually vanish piracy, but only made the pirates expand their area of operations outside the 
Gulf of Aden”. Likewise, Leeson (2010, p. 1230) noted that “the international response to 
counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden (the actions of the naval task forces) has resulted in the 
pirates spreading their activities to impact other areas…[So] extreme enforcement of legal 
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changes may solve the problem in the short term, but in the long term, it might make pirates 
more aggressive or more dangerous”. Most of the maritime security experts, naval and 
coastguard officers interviewed during my two periods of fieldwork said that only using 
naval force against pirates will not solve the problem of piracy because violence will make 
pirates more armed and more violent. In any case, the use of force is impracticable, because 
the Indian Ocean is huge and no naval task force can ever cover the areas in which pirates 
operate. Using naval forces may be essential to show criminals the seriousness of the law and 
to impose consequences on pirates which would scare them away, but using only naval force 
is not the solution: the employment of naval force must be combined with other measures, 
including dealing with the main causes of piracy. 
 
Finally, there are writers who argue that it is cheaper to pay ransoms than to use naval force 
against pirates. For example, Gathii (2010, p. 110) “criticized the response of U.S. President 
Jefferson in the 19th century when piracy increased and attacked American commercial ships. 
The US President thought that destroying pirates and using force was the best choice to take”, 
but Gathii (2010) said that it would have been “wiser to pay a ransom of £250,000 to release 
a ship and the crew rather than paying $1 million expenses for using force and putting lives in 
danger”. However, other writers argue that paying ransoms is more expensive in the long run, 
because it encourages pirates to continue their attacks.  
 
2.4.6.2 Arming commercial vessels  
 
Pristrom et al. (2013, p. 687)  considered the proposal for arming commercial vessels in order 
to ward off pirate attacks. They “reviewed several responses against piracy such as the 
Industry’s Best Management Practices (BMP) which was contributed by the ships’ owners 
associations, special ships types associations, passenger, dry cargos associations, maritime 
insurers and navies. The BMPs aim to avoid, delay or deter piracy attacks as the BMPs 
provide guidance to the ships’ master on-board to do so”. Pristrom et al. (2013, p. 687) said 
that “the armed responses on board of the merchant ships is adopted by the International 
Association of Ports and Harbours IAPH in 2010”, and noted that “in 2012, 16,500 out of 
55,000 vessels were armed traveling through the Indian Ocean”.   However Pristrom et al. 
(2013, p. 687) said that “the IAPH believes that armed guards on board merchant ships will 
increase the violence from the pirates and they suggested that the use of weapons must be 
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restricted to the military staff on internationally agreed missions”.. The question  is whether it 
is worth  deploying armed guards on all ships despite the inevitable increase of violence.   
 
2.4.6.3 Re-routing commercial vessels  
 
For the cargo industry, Reuchlin (2012, p. 4) said “that some companies avoid the piracy 
hotspots in the Indian ocean by re-routing to avoid the danger areas, but this strategy cost the 
industry US$ 3.3 billion in 2011, while the installation of armed security cost the industry  
US$ 1.1 billion in 2012”. Clearly, then, it is cheaper for the cargo industry to install armed 
security. However, armed security is no guarantee against hostage taking and demands for 
ransom, which could make armed security more expensive than re-routing. On maritime 
passenger transport, which includes cruisers and yachts, Reuchlin (2012, p. 4) said “that 
attacks on this sector  are  relatively few because they avoid piracy hotspots, and the cost for 
the one attack that has occurred was only US$15,000”. The question why pirates do not 
favour this type of target, because there are many passengers on board who are more valuable 
for ransoms, is answered by the facts that passenger not only ships avoid hotspots, but they 
are relatively fast, and the passengers are not insured by ransom companies so it would take a 
longer time for the pirates to receive money because the ransom will be provided by their 
families. For  example, in the case of the Chandlers, the British couple who were kidnapped 
in 2009 and were held by pirates for 388 days (Aitkenhead, 2011). Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Bensassi (2013, p. 411) said “that some shipping companies decided to use the Arctic route to 
travel from Europe to Asia using the Russian coast because this route is safer and also the 
ships can avoid the expensive costs of traveling through the Suez Canal”. 
 
2.4.6.4 Establishing safe corridors   
 
Vanˇek et al. (2014, p. 3) said that “the naval forces in the area established an International 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) for the ships traveling into the Gulf of Aden. The 
IRTC is a two lane corridor for the ships of which the East lane entry A course is °072 and 
the West lane entry B course is °252”. Figure 2.1 is presented from Vanˇek et al. (2014, p. 3) 
showing the IRTC:  
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Figure 2.1 International Recommended Transit Corridor IRTC (From Vanˇek et al., 2014) 
 
Vanˇek et al. (2014, p. 3) said that “the most dangerous area of the IRTC is in the middle of 
the corridor which is recommended to travel during the dark night time”. Vanˇek et al. (2014, 
p. 3) said that “in 2010 the naval task forces recommended the GTS the Group Transit 
Schedule for the ships using the IRTC to reduce the piracy attacks and this would make the 
naval ships more effective in protecting merchant ships traveling via the IRTC”. Table 2.2 
details  the Group Transits in the Gulf of Aden GTS as presented by (Vanˇek et al., 2014):  
 
Table 2-2 Group Transit Schedule in the Gulf of Aden (Vanˇek et al., 2014) 
Speed level Entry time for EP A Entry time for EP B 
10 Kn 04:00 18:00 
12 Kn 08:30 00:01 
14 Kn 11:30 04:00 
16 Kn 14:00 08:30 
18 Kn 16:00 10:00 
 
However Vanˇek et al. (2014, p. 11) said that “using GTS into the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden 
could cause delays in shipping which can cause an increase of shipping costs”. Moreover, the 
IRTC is an effective strategy only for ships within the Gulf of Eden, but Somali pirates travel 
all the way to the Strait of Hurmuz. Furthermore, the IRTC only protects ships which 
transport oil and other bulk products, thereby safeguarding the global economy, but it does 
not protect other vessels from the risk of ransom attacks.  
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A statistical study of the effectiveness of some of these anti-piracy measures was undertaken 
by Bryant et al. (2013, p. 76), who examined “the several combinations of the Best 
Management Practice (BMP) to find out which combinations of the anti-piracy measures 
could lead to unsuccessful piracy attacks…investigating 452 piracy attacks between 2010 and 
2011, using six variables of the BMP to evaluate the effectiveness of each variable to prevent 
successful piracy attacks”. Table 2.3 displays the results of their study:  
 
Table 2-3 Descriptive Statistics for variables (N= 452 pirate attacks) (From Bryant et al., 2013) 
Variable Frequencies (%) 
 
Attack Outcome 
 
Unsuccessful  
 
Successful 
 
 
342 (76 %) 
 
110 (24 %) 
 
Watch Keeping & 
Enhanced Vigilance 
 
Present  
 
Absent 
 
 
327 (72 %) 
 
125 (27 %) 
 
 
Alarms 
 
Present  
 
 
159 (35 %) 
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Absent 
448 (64 %) 
 
Evasive Manoeuvring 
 
Present  
 
Absent 
 
 
186 (41 %) 
 
266 (58 %) 
 
Presence of Guards 
 
Present  
 
Absent 
 
 
99 (22 %) 
 
353 (78 %) 
 
Increased Ship Speed 
 
Present  
 
Absent 
 
 
 
150 (33 %) 
 
302 (66 %) 
 
Water Spray and Foam 
Monitors 
 
Present  
 
Absent 
 
 
 
9 (2 %) 
 
443 (98 %) 
 
Physical Barriers 
 
 
 
15 (3 %) 
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Present  
 
Absent 
 
437 (97 %) 
 
(Unspecified) Anti-Piracy 
Measures 
 
Present  
 
Absent  
 
 
109 (24 %) 
 
343 (75 %) 
 
From Table 2.3, we can see that 76% of the attacks were unsuccessful; that the most effective 
measure was Watch Keeping and Enhanced Vigilance which was present in 72% of the 
attacks; the second most effective measure was Evasive Manoeuvring which was present in 
41% of the attacks; the third most effective measure was Alarms which were present in 35% 
of the attacks; the fourth most effective measure was increasing ship speed which was present 
in 33% of the attacks; the fifth most effective measure was implementation of unspecified 
anti-piracy measure which was present in 24% of the attacks; and the sixth most effective 
measure was the presence of guards which was present in 22% of the attacks.   Bryant et al., 
(2013) have produced a useful set of guidelines for stopping piracy, but they omit to link any 
of the measures up with each other, and this omission is important because, for example, 
while watch keeping is very important, it is not enough to keep pirates away unless it is 
accompanied by another measure such as speeding or manoeuvring. Also, they should have 
indicated what are the ‘Unspecified anti-piracy measures’.  
 
2.4.6.5 Restoring Somalia to a healthy state 
 
Sterio (2010, p. 1452) examined “the practical responses to counter piracy”, and stated that 
“combating piracy in Somalia failed in the early stages of the problem because the 
cooperation was weak between the neighbourhood countries in the region”.  Cooperation is 
essential within the region to deal with piracy, and the most important form of cooperation in 
the region is to empower the government in the failed state. Several authors argue that the 
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best way to respond to piracy is to tackle it at source, not to deal with its manifestations. In 
other words, prevention is better than cure. In the case of Somali piracy, this means restoring 
Somalia to a healthy state. The difficult question is how to achieve this restoration – a 
question which we address below in section 2.4.8.  
 
2.4.7 Violation of international law and human rights  
The literature has more to say about pirates’ violations of international law and human rights 
than about the violation of international law and human rights committed by anti-piracy 
bodies. However, some authors do touch on the latter subject. For example, Sloan and 
Griffiths (2012, p. 80)  mentioned ‘the catch and release system’ which some naval forces 
used as a strategy in Somali waters. This strategy was employed because of most states’ 
unwillingness to bring pirates to trial because of the risk of asylum applications by pirates in 
the captive nation, and the difficulty of proving guilt in piracy cases because of lack of hard 
evidence to present to the courts. Sloan and Griffiths (2012, p. 80) said that “the naval ships 
in the Indian Ocean if they capture pirates they would destroy their equipment and weapons 
and they would leave them with little food, water and fuel and then they will send them free”. 
Such treatment is a breach of international law, whether the captured persons are pirates or 
not. If the captured persons are innocent, damaging their equipment and holding them for a 
long time in custody is a violation of their human rights. If they are guilty of piracy, releasing 
them is a violation of international law and threatens the safety of future seafarers as they 
may well attack ships later. Joseph (2010, p. 1275) discussed these issues as “the obstacles 
when dealing with third world countries…it is a big challenge to deal with third world or 
failed state countries because they do not have a reliable court system”. He gave several 
examples; for instance, “when a Danish navy captures pirates, they cannot transfer pirates to 
Denmark because according to the Danish law they only deal with crimes within Denmark’s 
jurisdiction. Since Somali law is not reliable, the Danish navy released the pirates”. Joseph 
(2010, p. 1276) explained that “some other countries such as Kenya have agreed to take 
captured pirates, but Kenya itself has a very weak court system which cannot be relied on”. 
Joseph (2010, p. 1277) pointed out that “Puntland (an unofficial region in Somalia which is 
trying to become independent from Somalia) has a better court system than Somalia (though 
still weak), and they agreed to trial pirates”. But as he said, “most of the pirates who are in 
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Puntland prisons get away after a while: either they run away or they bribe authorities to 
release them due to the corrupted government in Somalia and Puntland”. 
  
Osiro (2011, p. 14) reported on Kenyan processes of prosecuting suspected Somali pirates, 
claiming that “the Somali pirates are not treated with an adequate justice system as they 
usually take a long time to transfer and trial the Somali pirates in Somalia”. Also Osiro (2011, 
p. 14, 12) said that “the Somali pirates in Kenya are not legally advised or provided with 
lawers…a  presumption of pirates’ guilt has been the norm in the Kenyan justice system… 
many Somali pirates experienced torture and physical abuses in the Kenyan prisons…[and] 
Somali pirates inside the Kenyan prisons don’t receive sufficient medical treatment”. 
Similarly,  Etzioni (2011, p. 14) said “that the Human Rights Watch mentioned that the 
Kenyan courts can’t assure fair trials for the Somali piracy suspects…[and that]  the Kenyan 
prisons have poor conditions and the Somali piracy suspects face long detention periods 
without conviction”.   
 
Likewise, Gathii (2010, p. 112) claimed that “using force today raises important human rights 
issues because of reports of torturing and killing pirates in Kenya. Kenya is in line to 
becoming the venue for the International Piracy Court”.   Gathii (2010, p. 136, p. 120, p. 126)  
was worried that  
 
“suspected pirates may not get a fair trial in Kenya: (1) because they may not be 
allocated lawyers; and (2) because of the long length of time taken to get them 
transferred to Kenya… the law in Kenya states that the suspect must be charged 
within 24 hours after their arrest, but the Somali pirates are captured on the high seas 
which are thousands of miles away, and the procedures to hand pirates over between 
the navies and the Kenyan police can take up to 30 days long, so in such a case the 
charge will have to be dropped; (3) because witnesses must be brought to the court, 
but the attendance of a witness may take a long time to arrange, and so the trial for the 
pirates may take years;  (4) because of human rights abuses in Kenyan jails. Although 
Kenya has signed an agreement with the UN to treat pirates with respect for their 
human rights and to provide fair trials… several incidents of violations and 
torturing… have been proved to be used against Somali suspected pirates by the 
Kenyan authorities; and (5) because they may not be the most heinous pirates”.  
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My interviews with Somali pirates in  Kenyan prisons corroborated some of these allegations 
of violations of their human rights.  
 
2.4.8 Recommendations for dealing with piracy  
 
 Section 2.4.6 discussed how authors evaluated past and present methods of responding to 
piracy. In this section, we discuss authors’ recommendations for improving those methods in 
order to deal more effectively with the problem of piracy. Their recommendations fall into 
three categories: restoring Somalia to viable statehood; creating a fair legal system for trying 
suspected pirates; and more investment in, and coordination of, counter-piracy efforts at sea.   
 
 Restoring Somalia to viable statehood 
 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 109) have suggested a long-term plan to solve the Somali 
piracy problem:  “starting with the economy, developing the ports facilities, reinvigoration of 
animal agriculture, and exploitation of natural resources including mineral and fishing”. 
Sterio (2010, p. 1475) “identified the four most effective solutions that decreased piracy in 
Southeast Asia in the late 90s and early 2000s, and suggested those four solutions in the 
Somali case”. The four solutions were: “(1) a serious commitment by the affected state to 
fight pirates; (2) regional cooperation between the affected state and its neighbours; (3) law 
enforcement and diplomatic efforts to combat piracy; and (4) building the capacity of the 
affected state by the most powerful maritime nations”. Bruton (2010, Conclusion Chapter) 
said that:  
 
“the best way to end Somali piracy is to reduce the country’s internal conflicts and to 
improve its economy, law and stability… governmental stability could improve the 
Somali situation with surprising speed  … the United States must be careful and 
realistic in assessing and combatting terror and focus on the Somali reconstruction 
rather than using force… the Somalis  want  peace which means that they will use any 
opportunity in development and improvement and the efforts on peace making will 
gain its results if they are made in the proper way”. 
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Ong (2014, p. 290) stated that in order to deal with piracy effectively in Somalia we must 
“strengthen the capacities of the Somali law enforcement authorities, supports from the IMO 
to establish regional anti-piracy arrangements and strengthen the Puntland coastguards…to 
avoid making Puntland to become a piracy state we must establish a coastal investment in the 
region” . He stated that the coastal investment must include the following; “1. Developing the 
fishing industry; 2. Building up the local infrastructure in Somalia coastal communities 
through the creation of labour intensive jobs; 3. Vocational training for unemployed youth; 4. 
Support to youth groups; 5. Engagement with Somali diaspora for greater socio-economic 
benefits of Somalia; 6. Supports to pastoralists in Puntland” (Koutrakos and Skordas, 2014, p. 
290”. All of these proposals are sensible elements of a strategy to restore Somalia to 
statehood. But in addition, means must be found to prevent illegal fishing in Somali waters, 
end chemical dumpling, designate safe fishing areas, and persuade fishers to remain within 
those areas by protecting the Somali fishermen from the attacks of the Somali pirates or other 
criminals. If they do so, the fishers will not have to carry weapons because they are protected 
and the navies’ task of distinguishing between innocent fishers and pirates at sea will be 
made easier. 
 
2.4.8.1 Creating a fair legal system for trying suspected pirates 
 
Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 6) suggested that  “the GCC improves  the  effectiveness of 
the legal mechanism to charge pirates -  for example by  designating  special courts to act  in 
cooperation with international legal bodies”. However, this is an unnecessary impractical 
proposal because the GCC does not need to establish special courts since piracy in the 
Arabian Gulf is minimal. A more important proposal comes from Ong (2014, p. 290) who 
recommended that Somalia “develop and upgrade the Somali prison facilities, incorporating 
piracy offences into Somali penal law and strengthen the general legal system in Somalia”.  
 
2.4.8.2 More investment in, and coordination of, counter-piracy efforts at sea 
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While waiting for peace and security to return to Somalia, more effective efforts to combat 
piracy at sea must be taken. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 6, 3) suggested a stronger role for 
the GCC:  
 
(i) “the GCC need to address piracy directly, and shift the role of counter piracy 
from a secondary to a primary basis by starting their operations in the Gulf of 
Aden…GCC have small patrol vessels which are more suitable to operate in 
narrow waterways which make them perfectly effective to operate near the 
Gulf of Aden or near the Strait of Hormuz, but not further offshore”; (ii) “to 
deal with offshore piracy, GCC must increase their roles in the CTF-151 and 
these roles must be more strategically in command and operations, and that for 
a long-term process the GCC must increase their investment in training for 
VBSS operations and  expand their naval capabilities to more coastal vessels 
and helicopters”; (iii) “the GCC fully coordinates with U.S. to gain experience 
and quality and to coordinate with international organizations who have 
succeeded in countering piracy such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations ASEAN which reduced piracy around the Strait of Malacca; (iv) 
“GCC can't make any progress if they don't have any political commitment 
and they need to make piracy a top priority of their maritime security agenda 
otherwise the problem will keep growing till it becomes a disaster which will 
be a major threat to the GCC economy”.  
 
 Gathii (2010, p. 106), who took a harder line,  said that “the high seas belongs to all nations 
because it is still not divided between nations, and so no one has the right to prohibit any 
human or nation to pass or trade in the high seas…[and] this right to trade and commerce at 
high seas could be defended through war”. Gathii (2010, p. 107) said that “it is not necessary 
to declare war against pirates because they do not form into any part of state, but any nation 
can combat piracy if the pirate interferes with their commerce in the high seas”. However, 
although military action is essential to deal with pirates during the short-term, it is not 
effective on its own as a long-term solution. In this respect, piracy is like terrestrial terrorism: 
many states have waged wars against terrorism such as in Afghanistan, but the result of 
eliminating terrorism in one place has been to force the terrorists to move and establish 
themselves somewhere else such as Iraq (ISIS) and Somalia (Alshabab). Similarly, using only 
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force against pirates might decrease piracy in one place but simply cause the pirates to move 
somewhere else.  
 
2.4.8.3 Stop companies negotiating with pirates 
 
Another step that the international community could take is to forbid companies to deal with 
pirates directly: the negotiations and dealings with pirates must be officially directed by 
governmental and official organizations like navies and coastguards, because one of the main 
causes of the increase of piracy in Somalia is that ransoms are being paid by the companies.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1) rightly  asserted that “the anti-piracy responses have 
failed to define the roots of piracy by focusing  only on countering piracy at sea”. The goal of 
Fanning et al. (2012)’s report was to “undertake an integrated and interdisciplinary approach 
to assessing and addressing the problem of contemporary piracy and its impact on the 
shipping and coastal communities” Fanning et al. (2012). Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1)  set out 
the following objectives to meet this task:  
 “A comprehensive examination of contemporary piracy to determine the true socio-
economic costs and effects that piracy has on seafarers, coastal states and those 
communities; 
 An integrated assessment of cross-cutting policy alternatives for dealing with the 
problem in a comprehensive manner; 
 A review of the consequences associated with implementing the identified policy 
options; 
 An identification of the strategic directions that need to be adopted to implement 
corrective measures; and, 
 The development of a preliminary generalized model for predicting the emergence of 
piracy”. 
 
Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1) said that “the aim of the project is to provide an anti-piracy policy 
to governments, the private sector, agencies of the United Nations and civil society, including 
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NGOs”. This is very similar to my research’s aim presented herein. One difference, however, 
between my approach and that of Fanning et al. (2012), is that my project eschews 
generalized strategies and instead focuses on customized and context-specific prescriptions, 
tailor-made for each situation separately to try and improve effectiveness of the management 
measures introduced.  
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3 Chapter Three: Analysis of Interview Data. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I apply thematic analysis to identify key trends in the qualitative interview 
data I gathered during the two periods of fieldwork conducted for this thesis.   Field work one 
was carried out to determine the breadth of issues surrounding piracy in the Arabian Gulf and 
in Somalia.  Field work two was carried out to investigate and collect more detailed data of 
the key drivers underpinning maritime piracy. 
 
The first field work was conducted in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Dubai and Abu Dhabi in 
August 2102 to collect the basic fundamental information about piracy in the Gulf and 
Somalia and to understand the general issues around piracy and how  best to obtain  more 
detailed information during the second phase of field work. All the semi-structured 
interviews were conducted face to face.  Field work two was conducted one year after the  
field work one (August 2013)  in Kenya, as I knew from the first fieldwork round that 
detailed information could be gained from this location because key informants were  
available in Nairobi, such as the UN Office and the imprisoned pirates, with whom  
interviews could be  conducted face to face.  
 
After collecting the interview data and transcribing them, the transcripts were coded into the 
Nvivo (Wong, 2008) software, and the following seven themes emerged from the interviews: 
motives; causes; manifestations; consequences; responses; violations of international law; 
and solutions. The themes chosen to focus on were the most mentioned topics in the data, 
which corresponded   with the data most mentioned in the literature.  Some other information 
appeared in the data that was not mentioned in the literature, including personal stories from 
the pirates, which I will touch on in this chapter.  
 
Appendix E is a list of all the interviewees who have been interviewed face to face during 
field work one and two. The interviews 1 to 16 were designed to scope the breadth of the 
issues to be investigated and to test the survey instruments and the questionnaire usage, while 
the interviews 17 to 43 were designed to obtain detailed information about the specific issues 
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of maritime piracy, including its causes. Although the first field work was conducted in the 
Arabian Gulf region and the second field work was conducted in the Eastern African region, 
this does not mean that the first field work is about Iraqi and Iranian pirates only, and that the 
second field work is about Somali pirates only. On the contrary, both sets of field work are 
about understanding how pirates react and form their strategies under specific sets of 
environments and circumstances.   
  
3.2 The motives of maritime piracy 
The first theme discussed in the literature review chapter is motive. During the first field 
work, I tried to understand how the pirates in the Arabian Gulf and in Somalia behave due to 
their motives and how much motive affects the strategy of the pirates. There is a difference 
between two kinds of maritime piracy, based on two different motivations for the crime: 1) 
financial piracy, where piracy is motivated by the need or desire for money; and 2) terror 
piracy, where piracy is motivated by political, radical, ideological or religious motives. This 
distinction largely maps on to our two areas of study: the Arabian Gulf, where financial 
piracy prevails, and Somalia, where terror piracy prevails when Al-Shabab is a stakeholder.  
 
3.2.1 Motivations in the Arabian Gulf 
During the first period of field work, six interviewees claimed that piracy in the northern and 
the central areas of the Arabian Gulf is motivated by financial aims only:  
 
I believe that all the Iraqi or the Iranian pirates in the North of the Arabian Gulf or the 
Central of the Arabian Gulf are motivated by financial motives only (Interviewees 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7) 
 
 Only one interviewee claimed that Iraqi and Iranian pirates are sent by their government to 
disturb seafarers in the Arabian Gulf, because of the political conflicts between Iran, Iraq and 
the Arabian Gulf countries, and this claim is contested interviewee 1:     
 
The rate of attacks by Iraqi pirates rose between 2003 and 2007 after the fall of Saddam 
Hussain’s regime as a result of state failure - crime rates normally raise as a result of the 
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lack of security, crisis in the economy crisis and increased levels of poverty. After the 
liberation of Iraq, Iran has supported most of the Iraqi political parties who are ruling Iraq 
at the moment, and piracy in the northern Arabian Gulf decreased after 2007. This 
undermines the claim that Iran supports the pirates (interviewee 1)  
 
As stated above, six interviewees suggested that the Iranian and Iraqi pirates are motivated by 
financial motives, but one interviewee (interviewee 1) stated that they are politically 
motivated. During the interviews, I asked all seven interviewees to provide evidence to prove 
their claims, but interviewee 1 based his claim about political motives purely on supposition, 
since he produced no evidence to support it. By contrast, the six other did produce evidence 
to support their claims of financial motives – such as descriptions of the property they had 
stolen from victims of their piracy attacks. Accordingly, I have accepted the claims stated by 
the interviewees 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 that they viewed the piracy in the Arabian Gulf as a pure 
financial crime.  
3.2.2   Motivations in Somalia  
 
During the first period of field work, five interviewees (interviewee 1, 9, 10, 11and 16)   
claimed that the motivation of pirates in Somalia is financial:  
 
The majority of Somali pirates are motivated by money only because the poverty is huge in 
Somalia (Interviewee 14)   
 
 But three stated there are some political or ideological motivations besides the financial 
motivations:  
 
I think there is some link in the matter of business between Al-Shabab and the Somali pirates 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
I don’t think that the Somali pirates have direct relation to terrorism but, the people behind 
the Somali pirates are (Interviewee 15)  
 
66 
 
Some of the information gathered is that the illegal fishing has generated anger in the Somali 
society against the West:  
 
I believe that the first piracy attack was just to show anger against the Italian and Spanish 
fishing vessels in the Somali waters (Interviewee 13) 
 
I am sure that the illegal fishing and toxic waste in the Somali waters made the Somali 
fishermen aggressive against the international ships in the Somali region (Interviewee 12) 
 
  Some of the interviewees claimed that the Somali pirates are motivated by financial reasons 
because Somalia is a failed state and unable to protect its waters from illegal fishing and 
chemical waste dumping committed by foreign nations, and piracy is the only way left of 
making a living. But three interviewees claimed that there is an element of hate and anger 
which adds a revenge motivation to the financial needs. So the main initial finding from these 
key informant interviews used to scope the breadth of issues surrounding the research 
question is that Somali pirates are motivated by both money and hatred for foreign exploiters, 
and the question is which motivation is more influential: is it financial or revenge?  
 
From the official Somali perspective, the view was expressed by the Somali Ambassador that 
the violation of Somali waters has legitimized piracy as a means of protecting the Somali 
waters:   
 
The illegal fishing and the chemical waste in the Somali waters by the foreign companies….. 
The Somali fishermen had taken a stand against this violation. Also money is a motivation, 
but I think that revenge and protecting the Somali waters by piracy is the main motive for the 
Somali pirates (Interviewee 16)    
 
 This statement by interviewee 16 implies that piracy is a natural retaliatory reaction to the 
violations conducted in Somalia that in some way legitimized piracy. But a different 
interpretation came from the Yemeni Liaison Officer in Bahrain:  
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I believe that piracy in Somalia started as a reaction against illegal fishing and chemical 
waste but after a while it transformed itself into a business. So the Somali pirates now are 
just looking for the wealth gained from piracy’s ransoms (Interviewee 13)  
 
This interpretation was confirmed by three interviewees, interviewee 18, 21 and 43, who said 
that the motives of the Somali pirates are now solely for money.  Interviewee 21 
differentiated between the earlier and the later types of Somali pirates:  
 
There are two types of Somali pirates: the first type are the original pirates who are the 
fishermen who are doing piracy to protect Somalia waters from illegal fishing and chemical 
waste; the second type are the pirates who joined the pirates’ groups later… those later 
pirates are not fishermen, but people who engaged in the civil war between the Somali clans 
and learned how to use weapons (Interviewee 21)   
Interviewee 19 linked the Somali civil war and the illegal fishing to the later form of piracy in 
Somalia   
Those people became criminals and when the civil war finished they joined other criminal 
activities including piracy. the later pirates’ motivation is just money, and  that when the 
illegal fishing and the chemical waste stops in Somalia, the original pirates (the fishermen) 
will stop doing piracy but the later pirates (the ex-civil war pirates) will continue doing 
piracy (Interviewee 19)   
The perceptions of imprisoned pirates in Kenya also confirmed this division between earlier 
and later Somali pirates. In Shemola Tower prison in Kenya, I interviewed 21 pirates in   
August 2013. There were over 100 Somalis pirates accused or suspected of committing 
piracy, and I approached them all, but only 21 pirates agreed for the interviews to be 
published and used in the research – the others were worried that the interview might be used 
against them in the court.  I went to the prison library to interview the pirates while one of the 
translators was available to help if any of the pirates did not speak English or Arabic.  During 
my visit to the prison and during my interviews I noticed that most of the pirates have a 
hatred against the west because they believe that the Americans and the Europeans are the 
causes for the failure of Somalia, and that the Americans and the Europeans are committing 
illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping in the Somali waters which destroyed the fish 
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stocks and the marine environment in Somalia. Seven pirates out of 21 expressed the hate 
motive - interviewees 23, 25, 26, 28, 37, 38 and 39. One of the pirates said that his motive 
was only to get ransom from hostages but later in the interview he said: 
 
 I would not attack any Arab or Muslim ship, because the people who pushed me into piracy 
are the people who do the illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping in Somali waters.  I 
feel that I am defending my country by doing piracy, and I am ready to be killed because all 
Somali pirates are ready to be caught, die or become winners when they get ransom 
(Interviewee 23) 
This pirate was happy to answer my questions and he was more open than other pirates in the 
prison:  I will answer all of your questions because I know you are Arabic Muslim brother 
but I would not answer you if you were white or American (Interviewee 23) 
I could feel the amount of hate that this pirate harbours against the Americans and white 
people because he believes that they engage in illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping. 
Other pirates were more sectarian in their hatred. For example, Interviewee 25 said that he 
was innocent of piracy and he was just a fisherman. He claimed the Kenyan government had 
no evidence against him, but they believed anything the white people say to them. The 
interviewee said that the Danish navy captured them, and that the Danish naval ship was 
actually engaged in illegal fishing in Somalia, hence his hatred against Denmark. 
Interviewees 26, 37 and 38 believed that they have been accused of piracy because they are 
Muslims and the people who are accusing them are Christians. Interviewee 26 said that he is 
innocent but he was caught by Christians who hate Muslims. Interviewee 37 claimed that the 
French navy captured him and that the Kenyan judge is Christian who will support and 
believe his French Christian brother. He also said that because he is a Muslim, Christians 
always look at him as a criminal. Interviewee 37 claimed that if he was a Christian his captors 
would treat him better and provide him with a fair trial. Interviewee 38 made similar 
comments. Interviewee 39 expressed hatred against Americans, Germans and the French, 
claiming that the Americans, Germans and the French will take the real pirates to their home 
countries to sue them, but they will bring the innocent fishermen to Kenya to accuse them of 
piracy because they know that the Kenyan government is corrupt and will believe anything 
said by white accusers.  Interviewee 28 said that he is willing only to attack American, British 
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and western ships out of revenge against the illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping. 
He also said that he would not attack any Kuwaiti, Arab or Muslim ship. 
When evaluating the claims made by interviewees on the motivations behind piracy in 
Somalia, we note the variations of the claims as some interviewees stated that the pirates’ 
motivations are financial, whereas other interviewees stated that their motivations are 
political, while yet other interviewees stated that their motivations were anger-generated out 
of the illegal fishing and chemical waste in Somali waters. In estimating the reliability of 
those claims, I believe that the interviewees’ claims were based on their position, 
background, and experience of the type of the pirates they have dealt with. For example, the 
interviewees 1, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 16, who all claimed that the pirates in Somalia are motivated 
only by financial motives, are either naval or coastguard officers or private maritime security 
companies who deal with piracy as a pure crime and do not have further information about 
motivations and are not aware that Somali piracy is complex. By contrast, interviewees 12 
and 15, who stated that some of the Somali pirates have political motives and are linked to 
Alshabab, both had access to intelligence information, because interviewee 12 is an 
Intelligence officer who works in CTF150 who has more awareness and more evidences of 
the Somali case, while interviewee 15 stated that his claim was based on some intelligence 
reports his company been provided with. Furthermore, interviewees who claimed that illegal 
fishing and hate is behind the piracy in Somalia included interviewee 13, who is a Yemeni 
coastguards officer who worked directly on Somali piracy, as Somali and Yemen share the 
same region. Interviewees 18, 21, 19 and 43, who all claimed that the Somali pirates are 
different groups with different motives, are very close to the Somali piracy cases. For my 
own part, when looking at my Somali pirates’ interviews which I carried out in prison, I note 
that most of them claimed that they are motivated by either financial or illegal fishing hate, 
which I can explain by the fact that they are aware that any political claims would be used 
against them in court. My conclusion is that while most Somali pirates were financially 
motivated, some (especially the earliest ones) were motivated by anger against hate illegal 
fishing and chemical waste dumping.  
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3.3 The causes of maritime piracy 
 The two types of maritime crime, financial piracy and terror piracy, are dependent on causes 
which may sometimes overlap, and sometimes differ. From analyses of the transcribed 
interviews, as we shall see, the perceptions of the causes of piracy in the Arabian Gulf and 
Somalia, respectively, were as follows: 
 
3.3.1 Perceptions of the causes of piracy in the Arabian Gulf 
 
In the Arabian Gulf, two case study areas were selected for this research, the Northern 
Arabian Gulf and the Central Arabian Gulf. During my first round of fieldwork in 2012 to 
validate the research questions and survey design, I interviewed people in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Bahrain to understand the causes of maritime piracy in both areas. Five  interviewees 
commented on this issue:  two  thought that the main causes of piracy in the Gulf was  the 
economic  crisis;  two  thought it was  the state failure of  Iraq during  2003-2007; and one  
thought it was lack of security.  
 
The Qatari coastguard officer held that piracy in the Central Arabian Gulf arose because the 
Iranian fishermen are very poor: 
 
 The evidence that the Iranian pirates are into piracy because they are poor is that they only 
steal cash, goods, food and water, to satisfy their needs as poor people (Interviewee 6)  
 
The Kuwaiti Liaison officer in Bahrain held that the causes of piracy in the Northern Arabian 
Gulf are state failure and the lack of security in Iraq: 
 
I think that piracy in Kuwait was at its maximum level between 2003-2007 when Iraq became 
a failed state, and this state failure caused the lack of security which drove up the rate of 
piracy. The motives behind the Iraqi pirates are purely financial (Interviewee 8)  
 
When analysing piracy in the North of the Arabian Gulf we can notice that piracy only started 
in 2003 when Iraq was a failed state, and it decreased when Iraq became more stable and this 
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supports the claim that the main cause is state failure which leads to the lack of security. And 
when analysing piracy in the Central area of the Arabian Gulf we can see that the Iranian 
pirates travel all the way from Iran (more effective naval and coastguard forces) to Qatar (less 
effective naval and coastguard capabilities than Iran) to operate, and piracy decreased when 
Qatar enhanced their coastguard capabilities, which supports the claim that the lack of 
security is the main cause behind piracy in the Central area of the Arabian Gulf. 
3.3.2 Perceptions of the causes of piracy in Somalia 
 
During the first  field-work, I interviewed persons knowledgeable about Somali piracy cases 
in Kuwait, Bahrain, Dubai and Abu-Dhabi (Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 
and 16) (see Appendix E). The causes they mentioned are mixed between state failure and 
lack of security. Most of the interviewees thought that there is more than one cause behind 
piracy in Somalia. Eleven interviewees referred to lack of security, environmental violation 
(illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping) and state failure as the most important causes, 
followed by government support, international ignorance, lack of information, government 
corruption, the weak economy in Somalia, and lack of law enforcement.  
 
Lack of security, the most important cause according to the first field-work interviews, has 
three dimensions:  lack of the security within the Somali government; lack of security on 
board commercial ships; and lack of security from naval units in the area. Four of the 
interviewees, interviewees 17, 19, 21 and 22, believed that the lack of security units in 
Somalia is one of the causes of the increase of piracy and when considering Somali piracy as 
a purely financial crime, I believe that the lack of security is one of the most important causes 
of this type of crime. All of the interviewees said that after the state failure in Somalia, the 
Somali government became unable to protect the waters against illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumping in Somali waters, which pushed the Somali fishermen to protect their waters 
by using piracy. Interviewees 28 and 37 (the pirates) stated that the lack of security and the 
weakness of the Somali coastguards and the Somali navy is what led them to commit piracy:  
 
 The Somali government was unable to control the Somali Sea which made the foreign vessels 
invade Somali waters and practise illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping, decimating 
the fish stock and leaving nothing for the Somali fishermen to catch (Interviewee 28) 
72 
 
 
 The lack of security at sea made me change my career from fisherman to pirate. The Somali 
government is unable to defend me, so as a fisherman there is a big chance that I go to sea 
and never comes back to my family because there are chances that I would be captured as a 
suspect of piracy or he would be attacked by pirates.  This is what turned me towards piracy 
(Interviewee 37) 
 
The claims made by interviewees 28 and 37 would apply to the original fishermen pirates as 
they are directly affected by the fish stock decline, but I do not think that illegal fishing or 
chemical waste would be an important cause for other types of pirates.  
 
Most of the interviewees claimed that piracy decreased in 2012 because of the deployment of 
armed security on commercial ships. Many said that Somalia is unable to control the waters 
and unable to combat inland gangs, pirates and Alshabab, which made crime rates increase, 
including maritime piracy. But a few interviewees thought that the main reason for the 
decrease in piracy in 2012 was the increase in naval units in the area.  There is not enough 
governmental security to control the land, and the commercial ships are not well protected 
which make them attractive for pirates in a huge area in which the increase of naval forces 
will never be enough to protect all ships. Comparing the Somali case to the Arabian Gulf 
case, the Arabian Gulf countries, Kuwait and Qatar, are relatively small in the coast line and 
the population meaning that the number of ships at sea is less compared to Somalia so 
protecting the coasts in the Arabian Gulf is much easier than protecting the Gulf in Somalia. 
Security units in Somalia are required to do far more than those  in Kuwait or Qatar, yet 
Somalia is much poorer and less able to fund them that  the Gulf countries, which are among 
the  richest countries in the world. 
   
The illegal fishing and the chemical waste violations were the second most claimed cause of 
piracy according to the interviewees in the first period of fieldwork. The interviewees 
claimed that illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping in Somali waters committed by 
foreign vessels have destroyed the fish-stock in Somalia and left Somali fishermen with little 
choice other than piracy to make a living: because fishermen are experts in navigation and 
seamanship, committing crime at sea was an expected reaction to loss of fishing 
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opportunities. The Yemeni Liaison Officer in Bahrain has mentioned the problem of the 
chemical waste in the Somali waters:   
I can assure that the chemical wastes have been dumped by EU vessels since the 1990s, 
especially by Spanish and Italian companies (Interviewee 13) 
Interviewee 13 is a Yemeni coastguard officer who worked closely with the Somali piracy 
case since the start of the problem. I agree that the start of the problem was because of the 
illegal fishing which affected the Somali fishermen only, but later the piracy became a 
business which different type of pirates joined, so the main cause (illegal fishing) is not the 
main cause for all of types of piracy. 
The Somali ambassador in Abu-Dhabi also mentioned the illegal fishing in Somalia and its 
effect on the increase of piracy:   
I believe that the illegal fishing by foreign nations like Japan, India, Thailand, Pakistan, 
Korea, and some European nations resulted in a decline in the fish-stock which increased 
piracy in Somalia (Interviewee 16)  
Here the Somali ambassador named the nations who he claimed are involved in illegal fishing 
in Somalia. I believe that it is unlikely that an Ambassador would accuse named states of 
illegal fishing unless he possessed solid evidence. Moreover, the named states have been 
accused by other critics for illegal fishing.   
Five interviewees, interviewees 17, 19, 21, 22 and 43, believed that the illegal fishing and the 
chemical waste dumping in Somali waters committed by foreign shipping companies are one 
of the causes of piracy in Somalia:   
These illegal acts began in Somalia 20 years ago, and Somali officials have evidence from 
and eye witness accounts of this criminal activity. The Somali fishermen saw this criminal 
activity in their waters and that is why they began piratical attacks (Interviewee 17) 
 If the foreign ships stop their illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping, the fishermen 
pirates will stop piracy, but the ex-civil war criminals who joined the pirates’ gangs after the 
original pirates, will continue piracy (Interviewee 19)   
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 Eight of the pirates (interviewees 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 36 and 37) said that illegal fishing 
and chemical waste dumping in Somalia pushed them towards piracy (looking at Appendix I 
we can notice that all of these pirates are fishermen, except interviewee 28, which supports 
the claim that illegal fishing is the main cause behind the fishermen pirates):   
 
I don’t like piracy but I feel angry and seek to defend my country by piracy, even at the risk of 
imprisonment or even death (Interviewee 23) 
 
 The Danish navy vessel that captured me was itself conducting illegal fishing during the 38 
days I was on board it (Interviewee 25)   
 
The British Royal Naval ship that captured me and carried out illegal fishing in the Somali 
waters (Interviewee 26)   
 
 The French navy committed illegal fishing and sold what they caught to big boats in the area 
(Interviewee 27) 
 
 The Italian navy captured me and the vessel they had all kind of fish on board, caught by big 
nets engaged in illegal fishing (Interviewee 36) 
 
 I commit piracy because the Somali Sea is out of fish because illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumping in the Somali waters have killed the fish stock. The illegal fishing and the 
chemical waste pushed me to get my revenge against American, British and other Western 
ships (Interviewee 28) 
 
 I was pushed into piracy because of the low income from fishing due to other people sharing 
my fishing income by illegal fishing (Interviewee 30) 
 
The foreign fishing ships cut the nets of Somali fishermen because they want all the fish stock 
in Somali waters under their control. I have seen containers dump chemical waste in Somali 
waters which poisoned the fish stock. This pushed me to attack the American and the 
European ships to get money for my family (Interviewee 37)   
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Interviewee 43 (IMO Maritime Liaison Officer) said that illegal fishing and chemical waste 
dumping were the cause of the increase of piracy in Somalia, but he argued that this has now 
stopped. However, I told him there are reports that there is still illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumping in Somalia, and I challenged him to access the marinetraffic.com/en/ web site 
which shows all the fishing ships in Somali waters. The interviewee refused to comment on 
this, but after a few days following the interview, marinetraffic.com/en/  blocked all the 
information about shipping in Somali waters from their website.  
By contrast to the Somali case, in the Northern Arabian Gulf, there is fishery protection, so 
most of the Iraqi and the Iranian fishermen are engaged in fishing which made the Northern 
Gulf safer than Somalia from piracy threats.   
The theme of Somalia state failure was often mentioned as one of the causes of piracy in 
Somalia. The Pakistani Intelligence officer who works in Bahrain with CTF 151 stated that 
the unstable state in Somalia is one of the causes of piracy:  
 
Somalia has three different governments and the official one is with no real power in Somalia 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
The Yemeni Liaison Officer in Bahrain linked   the increase of piracy to the weakness of the 
Somali government to combat pirates in land:   
 
In Somalia there are seven  bases for pirates which the Somali government knows well but  
are unable to combat them because the government is weak (Interviewee 13)  
 
Similar statements were made by many other interviewees about state failure as a cause of 
Somali piracy. For example,   
 
The state failure of Somalia is one of the most important causes of piracy in Somalia. Since 
1991 Somalia became a failed state, and this made the government unable to control the 
country’s security (Interviewee 43)  
 The failed state created a civil war in Somalia between the clans which led to piracy later as 
a form of criminal activity (Interviewee 17) 
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   The civil war in Somalia produced criminals who had learned how to use weapons and 
joined the piracy gangs when the civil war ended in Somalia and created a new type of pirate 
from the original pirates who were fishermen. So now in Somalia there are two different 
types of pirate: the fishermen, and the ex-civil war criminals that joined piracy to practice 
their criminal activities to gain money (Interviewee 19)  
Likewise, interviewee 28 said that Somali is a failed state and that is why they cannot control 
the sea and why the Somali waters have been invaded by foreign companies for illegal 
fishing and chemical waste dumping, so state failure pushed him into piracy.  
 
The theme of the governmental support for piracy raised several interesting issues related to 
the maritime piracy in the area. Five out of 16 interviewees mentioned governmental support 
provided for the Iranian and Somali pirates:   
 
The Iranian government actively supported the Somalia pirates, and that the Omani navy 
gave passive support to Somali pirates by not pursuing them in Omani waters, where they are 
very active (Interviewee 1)  
 
This claim of government support was put forward by the Pakistani intelligence officer in 
Bahrain, and it was supported by the Yemeni coastguard officer in Bahrain:  
 
 The Punteland regain in Somalia is trying to gain independence from Somalia, and that is 
why they are sending pirates from their region to other regions to show the world that the 
Punteland region is secure because the Punteland authorities are capable of keeping the 
waters safe whereas the other regions in Somalia cannot (Interviewee  13)   
 
The Yemeni Officer also claimed that Al-qaddafi of Libya had supported the Al-Shabab 
group in the past, and since Al-qaddafi’s death in 2011, Iran might be supporting Al-Shabab 
and piracy in Somalia. The Yemeni officer asserted that Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to make 
Somalia a failed country because it is not in their interest for the Somalis to become a 
powerful state in the region for political, military and economic reasons, so he claimed that 
they might be supporting pirates in some ways. The Somali ambassador in Abudhabi added 
his voice to the claim about Ethiopian support for continued instability in Somalia:    
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 Ethiopia is working on remaining Somalia as a failed country which also brings attention to 
this issue (Interviewee 16)  
 
This claim made by interviewee 16 was not supported by any evidence. Moreover, apart from 
the Yemeni officer named above, the claim was not mentioned by any of the other 
interviewees and has never appeared in the literature, which makes it an unreliable claim.   
 
As for international ignorance and indifference as a cause for the increase of piracy in 
Somali, four interviewees asserted this. For instance, the Yemeni Coastguard Officer in 
Bahrain and the manager director of a private maritime security company in Dubai both said 
that commercial shipping companies are not taking seriously the need for protection of their 
vessels:  
 
 There is some truth in this assertion, because ship owners prefer to insure their ships and 
pay ransoms to free the crews rather than deploy armed guards all the time which is more 
expensive. Indeed, some shipping companies paid ransom directly to pirates without 
reporting the incidents, meaning that the claim of the compensation money would be between 
the ships’ owners, the pirates and the insurance company only (Interviewee 13) 
 
 I heard this claim when I attended a maritime piracy conference in London in January 2013 
(BTM Group, 2013):  an insurance company speaker stated they would pay ransoms very 
quickly to the pirates.  
 
The Somali ambassador said that the UN does not care about the Somali problem:  
 
 Since 1991 the UN has not built a single clinic in Somalia - and that the only thing Somalia 
gets from the UN and the Arab League are promises but no action (Interviewee 16) 
 
 The Singaporean maritime security expert in Kuwait mentioned international ignorance as a 
cause of the increase of piracy:  
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International community, the EU, the Americans and the Chinese will not take piracy 
seriously until piracy severely impacts the price of oil (Interviewee 4) 
 
 In general, it seems that the international community turns a blind eye to the Somali case, in 
that the country has been a failed state since 1991 but few significant actions have been taken 
to restore it to a successful state.    
 
Two interviewees (with backgrounds in naval experience and private maritime security) 
claimed that lack of control by the authorities over information about vessels vulnerable to 
piracy is a cause of increased piracy in Somalia. For example, Interviewee 43 (the IMO 
regional Officer in Mombasa) said that such information enables pirates to find out about 
ships’ locations, destinations and types. Likewise, interviewee 15 said that 
 
 People in the ports and other insiders provide pirates with information about ships.  Also the 
Automatic Identification System AIS is a very useful source for the pirates to get information 
about ships.  Pirates have expanded the sources of getting information, and as a result, 
piracy has expanded geographically (Interviewee 15)   
 
Other interviewees referred to other ways in which information fuelled piracy. For instance,  
Hostage negotiators play a major role in supplying pirates with information (Interviewee 13) 
Interviewee 17 (the Somali Ambassador in Nairobi) mentioned the false information posted 
in the media about the Somali piracy case:  
 The non-Somali pirates operate in Somali waters, but the media have focused exclusively on 
the Somalis, giving them the oxygen of publicity which stimulated recruitment, and led to 
increased levels of piracy in Somalia (Interviewee 17) 
 
Four interviewees, interviewees 18, 19, 21 and 22, asserted that the economic crisis in 
Somalia was one of the causes of the increase in piracy in Somalia. However, most of them 
believed that Somalia’s economic crisis was itself caused by other factors, such as illegal 
fishing, civil war and state failure.  
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Interviewee 22 claimed that governmental corruption is one of the reasons for the increase in 
piracy in Somalia.   
 
 
3.4 Manifestations of the two different kinds of maritime piracy  
 
This section identifies ten different ways in which financial piracy and terror piracy, 
respectively, manifest themselves in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia:   
  Areas  
 Timings 
 Level of violence  
 Amount of ransom  
 Targets selection  
 Ethnicity, religion, language and body type 
 Type of weapons, ships and manoeuvres 
 Pirate ships recognitions 
 Other manifestations 
 
3.4.1 Manifestations of financial piracy in the Arabian Gulf  
 
For the interviews, the questionnaire was designed to obtain information on how pirates act in 
the Arabian Gulf and Somalia and identify what strategies are used by naval forces to detect 
pirates at sea, including how to distinguish pirates from other seafarers in the area.  
 
 The areas: 
 
Interviewee 5, who is a commanding officer of one of the Kuwaiti naval ships, said that Iraqi 
pirates are usually villagers who live near Shat-Alarab, while  Iranian pirates usually come 
from a place called Khorom-Shahar which is in the west side of the Iranian coast.  
Interviewees 6 and 7, who are officers in the Qatari coastguards, said that the most dangerous 
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area is 50NM north of Qatar in the area between Qatar and Iran, but the rest of the areas are 
safe. Interviewee 8, who is the Kuwaiti liaison officer in Bahrain (CTF 152), said that the 
northern part of the Arabian Gulf is the most dangerous area of piracy because it is very close 
to Iran and has a high intensity of fishing dhows and commercial ships. All of those claims 
were supported by the official piracy reports and also written in the piracy case files stored in 
the Kuwaiti and Qatari coastguards’ records.  
 
 Timing of piracy attacks  
 
The commanding officer in the Kuwaiti Navy said that day time is the most dangerous time 
for piracy in the north of the Gulf and with a wave height less than 3 metres (the 3 meter 
wave height is also a criteria for the Somali pirates attacks as will be illustrated in the next 
chapter when I analyse the piracy attacks in Somalia):   
 
Day time is better for pirates to recognize ships and to know if the ships are protected or not. 
Also I think that the wave height limits the capabilities of boarding ships (Interviewee 5) 
 
 By contrast, in the Central Arabian Gulf, interviewees said that night time and the month of 
Ramadan were the most dangerous times for piracy:   
 
The night time is the most dangerous time of day for piracy, while Ramadan is the most 
dangerous month for piracy because people are fasting and the Qatari coastguards reduce 
their manpower which the Iranian pirates use to their advantage to carry out piracy 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
 Interviewee 8 (The Kuwaiti coastguards Liaison officer in Bahrain) said that summer time is 
the most dangerous season for piracy because the wind is calm thus navigation conditions are 
good. However, winter in the Arabian Gulf is not much different from the summer in the 
matter of visibility or wind speed, so I don’t think that the piracy increase in the summer is 
because of those factors. More significantly, according to interviewee 6, the most dangerous 
time for piracy is Ramadan, and Ramadan shifts 11 days earlier every year meaning that 
Ramadan might be in summer or winter. Also by looking at the piracy attacks in Kuwait I 
have noticed that the attacks occur at any time of the year, not just in summer.    
81 
 
 
 The level of violence associated with piracy attacks 
 
Seven of the interviewees (Interviewee 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) linked the level of violence by 
pirates to the strategy followed by the pirates:  
 
 The level of violence in the Arabian Gulf is minimal because the pirates are not kidnapping 
people for ransom; pirates are just after cash, goods and food (Interviewee 8)   
 
The low level of violence committed by the Iranian and Iraqi pirates compared to the high 
level committed by Somali pirates in kidnapping for ransom, supports the claim that the 
motive for piracy in the Arabian Gulf is purely financial, however that does not mean that the 
Somali pirates who use violence are motivated by other motives than money.   
 
 The amount of ransom 
 
In the Arabian Gulf during the first field work, Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 said that 
there is no kidnap for ransom and those interviewed confirmed the pirates are after only cash, 
goods or food which means that this issue is not applicable in the Arabian Gulf.  
 
 Selection criteria of targets  
 
The maritime security officer in Kuwaiti Oil Company mentioned what targets the pirates 
usually attack in the Arabian Gulf:   
 
The pirates in the north usually approach with two boats and attack ships at anchor 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
 The Qatari coastguard officers stated where the Iranian pirates attack the ships in the Central 
of the Arabian Gulf:  
 
 In Central Arabian Gulf who is interested in ships at anchor within the EZ usually tie the 
fishing ships and drag them away out of the EZ (Interviewee 7)  
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The liaison Kuwaiti officer in Bahrain indicated which ships the Iraqi pirates usually attack in 
the North of the Kuwaiti waters:  
 
 The Iraqi pirates are capable of boarding ships either at anchor or underway (Interviewee 
8) 
 
 Type of weapons, ships and manoeuvres 
 
In the Northern Arabian Gulf, the liaison Kuwaiti coastguards’ officer stated what type of 
boats the Iraqi pirates usually use:  
 
The Iraqi pirates usually have small boats of 21 feet in length and speed of 30 to 35 knots 
(Interviewee 8)   
 
But the Kuwaiti naval captain expressed a different view.  
 
 The Iraqi pirates usually have Sawari class boats, which are 33 feet in length and 30 knots 
speed (Interviewee 5) 
 
On weapons, the maritime security officer in Kuwait Oil Company said 
 
The Iraqi pirates use small callipers 7.62 mm, rocket propelled, grenades and RPGs 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
 Ethnicity, religion, language and body type 
 
The captain in the Kuwaiti navy and the liaison coastguard officer in Bahrain said that all the 
pirates in the Northern Arabian Gulf are Iraqis:  
 
They have Arab ethnicity, Arabic is their native language, and they are Muslim Shiaas. Also 
the interviewees said that the pirates are very healthy slim (Interviewees 5) 
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 The Qatari coastguards’ officers said that the pirates in Central Arabian Gulf are Iranians. 
 
 They speak a broken Arabic language which is very easy to detect, they have Persian 
ethnicity which is similar to the Arabic ethnicity, but a darker skin than Arabs, and they are 
Muslim Shiaas. The Iranian pirates are very slim (Interviewees 7)   
 
 Pirate ships recognitions 
 
 The commanding Officer in the Kuwaiti Navy said that the Kuwaiti navy train their officers 
to distinguish between pirates and fishermen in Northern Arabian Gulf by the location of 
their vessels. 
 
 So if a ship lies outside the fishing area, it would be regarded as a suspect ship until and 
unless travels to the fishing area and remains there … Also the times of day and month are a 
way to know if it is a fishing ship or not:  there are specific times for fishing according to sea 
tides and fish seasons… The regularity of the presence of Iraqi ships is another signifier, in 
that if they see a new ship in the area, they consider it as a suspect ship until it is observed 
regularly doing fishing (Interviewee 5) 
 
 The Kuwaiti Coastguards’ officer in Bahrain said that the way Kuwaiti coastguards identify 
pirate ships depends on the direction, speed and manoeuvres of vessels:   
 
A ship coming from outside the 12 NM with high speed, or is on a zigzag course or is moving 
randomly is categorised as a suspect ship (Interviewee 8)   
 
In Central Arabian Gulf, the Qatari coastguards’ officer said that they recognize Iranian pirate 
ships by their speed, direction and manoeuvres. 
 
 If a ship remains a long time in one location, it would be a fishing ship, but if the ship travels 
randomly from one location to another, it would be a suspect ship. Also if the Radar spots a 
small boat moving fast this would be a suspect, because fishing boats do not need to be fast. 
Also most pirates come from the north of Qatar; any ships coming from the north would be 
suspect (Interviewee 8)   
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 Other manifestations 
 
In Northern Arabian Gulf, the Kuwaiti Commanding Naval Officer said that in Kuwait waters 
there are two types of pirates:  
 
 Pirates who are fishermen and pirates who are smugglers. Most of the fishermen pirates are 
Iraqis, but the smugglers are a mixture of Iraqi and Iranian pirates. The Iraqi smugglers 
usually smuggle alcohol, but Iranian smugglers usually smuggle drugs. Iraqi illegal 
immigrants who try to enter Kuwait sometimes attack ships in the area (Interviewee 5)  
 
He also said that Kuwaiti naval officers are trained to recognize pirates in the area from the 
regularity of the presence of the ships:  
 
  New ship in the area is considered as suspect, but if it is seen again doing fishing it is 
considered as neutral (Interviewee 5)   
 
In Central Arabian Gulf, the Qatari Coastguards’ Officer said that the Iranian pirates in the 
area numbered 40 in total and formed one gang:  
 
 They use a mother ship to support them with food and fuel and shelter during the rough sea 
and windy conditions. Also some of the Iranian ships raised the Qatari flag to fish in the 
Qatari waters or to undertake piracy (Interviewee 7)  
 
3.4.2 Manifestation of financial piracy in Somalia  
During the first round fieldwork; I tried to understand the distinctions between Somali pirates 
and Somali maritime terrorists. But it is a very difficult issue, and the findings from the 
interviews showed that significant overlaps between the two groups exist.   
 
 Areas  
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Five interviewees agreed that the Gulf of Aden is the most dangerous area infected with 
piracy (interviewees 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15).  Interviewee 21 said that the most dangerous 
area in Somalia is the Gulf of Eden (from the Yemeni side) because of instability in Yemen.  
So dangerous it is, according to interviewee 21, that the Yemeni coastguards are not expected 
to combat piracy any more:  
 
I think that the naval existence in the Somali coast made pirates to move away from the 
centre of the Gulf to the Yemeni side which made the Gulf of Eden more dangerous from the 
East side (Yemeni side). I also think that Punteland is the region from which most of the 
pirates originated, but they are now more organized and have built bases and camps all over 
Somalia (Interviewee 21) 
 
 Interviewee 43 said that every location in the Somali basin is now dangerous, but pirates 
have moved to the North, which has made the Arabian Sea the most dangerous area infected 
with piracy.  
 
 However, US Naval Officer in CTF 152 in Bahrain held that the Somali basin was even 
more dangerous than the Gulf of Eden:   
I think that the least dangerous area in Somalia is the Gulf of Eden because it is well 
protected by the navies, and the most dangerous area is the Somali basin in the Indian Ocean 
because it is huge and very difficult to be covered by the coalition forces (Interviewee 9) 
Three interviewees (9, 11 and 12) mentioned the land piracy bases which the Somali pirates 
use as logistic camps and where they keep hostages. (See Appendix F for the map of these 
bases:  Eldannan, Haraadhere, Garacad, Hobyo and Ceel-Hur). The Somali Ambassador in 
Abu-Dhabi explained where the pirates in Somalia live:  
 
 The living areas of the Somali pirates range from Hobyo, which is in the centre of Somalia, 
to the Punteland region, which is outside the control of the Somali government authorities 
(Interviewee 16)    
 
Appendix G illustrates the areas from which the pirates originated, and the areas where the 
pirates have been captured.  In Appendix G, we can see that most of the pirates came from 
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Punteland (4 pirates) and Maqadisheo (4 pirates). Three pirates came from Bosaso; and one 
each from the Somali desert, Somaliland, Adaley, Hafoon, and Galkaeyo. Also from the table 
we can see that three of the pirates were caught near Maqadisheo, three were caught near the 
Somali coast, two were caught in the Gulf of Eden, one was caught 60 nm from the Somali 
coast, one was caught in Puntland, one in Alhoor, one in Baraw, and one near Yemen. 
 
 Timings of piracy attacks 
 
Interviewee 23 said that 20 minutes is enough to capture a ship. Interviewees 28, 31 and 37 
said that they have been captured during the day time which means that pirates are more 
likely to attack ships during the day. Interviewee 28 confirmed that the day time is the best 
time to attack ships. Some interviewees explained that daytime makes it easier for pirates to 
recognize ships and know whether they have armed guards on board (Interviewees 2, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14 and 15). Interviewee 4 said that  
 
Somali pirates do not have technology such as night vision googles or radar, and that is why 
they prefer to attack during day time (Interviewee 4)  
 
Eight interviewees (2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) linked the increase of piracy to the 
monsoon season:  
 
 Piracy would increase in Somali during monsoon time which is from May to September 
(Interviewee 15) 
 
Three of these interviewees said that during the monsoon season, Somali pirates move their 
activity to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean: 
  I think that the Somali pirates will move to the Strait of Hurmuz (Interviewee 14)   
 I think that the Somali pirates will move towards the Strait of Bab-Almandab, the Strait of 
Hurmuz, the Seychelles islands and Madagascar (Interviewee 15) 
Most of the claims made by interviewees match with the statistical analyses of the piracy 
attacks in Somalia in the next chapter, as the Somali pirates prefer day-time to night-time. 
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Also the weather state, wind speed and wave heights effect the success of operations of 
Somali piracy in the region.  
 
 Level of violence  
 
The Yemeni liaison officer in Bahrain said that at first, Somali pirates used to sell fish to the 
ships in the area, and when the ships stopped to buy the fish, the pirates boarded them to steal 
money, cell phones and other goods, but later they became more violent:   
 
The ships did not report those incidents because they were not supposed to stop in the first 
place. However, later Somali pirates changed their strategy to kidnapping for ransom, and 
they became more violent (Interviewee 13)  
 
The regional officer CTF152 in Bahrain also said that the Somali pirates are now more 
dangerous:  
 
 They are dangerous because they have become more organized, powerful and increased in 
numbers (Interviewee 9) 
 
Interviewee 21 said that the Somali pirates now use more violence against hostages because 
they have become habituated to criminality, and have started to show their strengths against 
victims. 
 
 I think that the Somali pirates lived in a criminal environment for a long time which made 
them more violent and more disrespectful to humanity (Interviewee 21)  
 
However, interviewees 23 and 28 said that they would not use any violence against hostages, 
and they had never abused or killed anyone. Interviewee 28 also denied he had committed 
any harm against a hostage who had not engaged in illegal fishing or chemical waste 
dumping, which implies that he was willing to use violence and to harm crews of ships who 
engaged in illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping.  
88 
 
Interviewee 15, the manager of Envoy 360 maritime security company, said that Somali 
pirates are the only pirates who use the strategy of kidnap for ransom: all other pirates in the 
world only commit robbery, which was true in the times during this interview but, other 
pirates in Africa such as some of the pirates in Nigeria now are following the ransom 
strategy.  
 
 Amount of ransom  
 
This theme was not mentioned in relation to the Arabian Gulf, but it figured highly in relation 
to Somali pirates. For example, interviewee 21 said that: 
 
In 2004 the Somali pirates were asking for small amount of ransoms, but now they demand 
much more ransom for the victims (Interviewee 21)  
 
Interviewee 23 said that the amount of ransom depended on the nationalities and the type of 
jobs of the crews.  
If they are fishermen they would ask for less ransom, but if the target ships were from the 
west, the pirates will ask for more ransom, while if the attacked ship had engaged in illegal 
fishing or chemical waste then they would ask for a huge ransom…I was one of a group of 
seven pirates, and that the ransom money was shared between us with and some pirates 
taking $2 or $3 million (Interviewee 23) 
Interviewee 28 said that he would get $25,000 to $30,000 from the ransom money and his 
bosses were going to take $10 million.  
 
 Targets selection  
 
Interviewee 43 said that Somali pirates are not interested in a specific target:  
 
They travel at sea to seek for easy and available targets to attack. So they are random in 
selecting targets to attack (Interviewee 43)  
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But the US naval Officer in Bahrain explained how Somali pirates select their targets to 
attack:   
 
The Somali pirates travel randomly in the ocean and seek for easy targets to attack, which 
means that they do not plan their attacks in advance on land. However, they are selective in 
that they usually look for bigger targets such as tankers, cargos and big ships or anything 
bigger than 300 feet freeboard (Interviewee 9)   
 
Interviewee 23 said that he would look for available and easy targets to attack, but only if 
they engage in illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping, since he has no issues with other 
ships:    
 
I was caught because I tried to attack a large American ship (Interviewee 23)   
 
 Interviewee 28 said that he was only interested in attacking American, British and Western 
ships and he would not attack any Kuwaiti, Arabic, Iranian or Muslim ships:  
 
 I can differentiate between ships according to their flags (Interviewee 28)   
 
To conclude the claims made by interviewees I have noticed some differences between the 
claims and other sources of information. By looking at the data in the next chapter of the 
piracy attacks analysis we can see that Somali pirates attacks ships based on the type of the 
ships, not the flag, according to the easiness of the target.  
 
 Type of weapons, ships and manoeuvres 
 
Several interviewees (Interviewees 1, 2, 3 and 4) revealed that the Somali pirates carried 
deadly weapons:   
 
 The Somali pirates use RPGs Kalashnikovs and grenades to attack ships (Interviewee 3) 
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Appendix H shows the types of weapons and technologies used by pirates, from which we 
can see that five pirates admitted they were carrying guns at the time they were captured by 
the navies, three of them acknowledging the guns were AK47s. One pirate said that he was 
carrying a big knife at the time he was captured.  
 
Four pirates said that they were using GPS at the day they were captured but 10 pirates (50%) 
said that they did not need to use GPS because they were familiar with the area. Some pirates 
said they use GPS only when they go to the deep sea. One pirate said they used cell phones 
for communications.  
 
Interviewees also explained the boats used by Somali pirates:  
 
The Somali pirates use dhows as mother ships - the dhows used are the Jalboot type which is 
a Yemeni wooden style dhow (Interviewee 15) 
 
Also the skiffs and hijacked ships used for mother ships were mentioned. 
 
The Somali pirates use hijacked large ships as mother ships (Interviewee 4) 
 
The Somali pirates use skiffs to attack (Interviewee 12) 
 
Interviewee 21 said that Somali pirates use skiffs to attack targets and sometimes they use 
mother ships for command purposes. Interviewee 43 said that Somali pirates sometimes use 
one skiff to attack and at other times three or four. Interviewee 21 said that Somali pirates are 
more advanced now (in 2012 than in 2004) in tracking target ships and also more capable of 
hiding hostages.  
 
On the methods of attack, interviewee 11 said that pirates usually attack with two skiffs: one 
from port and one from starboard, and they will use a ladder to board the victim’s ship. 
Interviewee 12 said that pirates may use one or two skiffs and they would approach from the 
stern and use the ladder to board the victim’s ship. Interviewee 13 said that pirates usually 
approach from the stern, but  if the ship has a security team on-board then the pirates will use 
several skiffs to distract the team and then one skiff will board the victim’s ship from any 
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part. Interviewees 4 and 14 said that pirates use the skiffs to attack from the side because it is 
easier for them to deploy the ladder and climb the ship. Interviewee 13 said that sometimes 
ships report that skiffs are approaching them, but when the navy arrives at the scene they 
discover that they are just fishing boats, which shows that the approaches of the pirates and 
the fishermen are very similar and can be easily mistaken for one another.   
 
On the speed of the mother ships (dhows) used by the Somali pirates, interviewees varied in 
their calculations:   
 
I believe that it was about 10 knots (Interviewee 11) 
 
I believe that the skiffs’ speeds vary between 20 and 35 knots (Interviewees 13) 
 
On the technologies used by Somali pirates, interviewees again varied in their answers:   
 
I believe that Somali pirates use GPS on the mother ships and the skiffs (Interviewee 3) 
 
 I think they only use GPS on the mother ships (Interviewee 12) 
 
 I believe they use radar on the mother ships (Interviewee 14)  
 
I believe they use AIS on the mother ships (Interviewee 15) 
 
 I believe they use cell phones as a communication method (Interviewee 11)   
 
 I believe they use satellite communications on the skiffs and mother ships and radio 
communication on the mother ships (Interviewee 3)     
 
 
 Ethnicity, religion, language and body type 
 
Several interviewees (Interviewee 1, 2, 9, 10. 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) were agreed that all 
pirates in the Somali area were Somalis:  
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 I believe that all of the pirates in the Somali region come from Somalia (Interviewee 10) 
 
However, interviewee 14 said that there are also Iranian pirates in the Arabian Sea and 
Yemeni pirates in the Somali basin:  
 
The Somali pirates are black-skinned and Muslims, but the other pirates, the Yemenis and the 
Iranians, have Arabic ethnicity. The Somali and Yemeni pirates are Sunni Muslims but the 
Iranian pirates are Shiaa Muslims (Interviewee 14) 
 
Interviewee 43 said that most of the Somali pirates are black Somalis who originated from 
fishermen. Appendix I shows that all of the pirates are Muslim Sunnis, black and Somalis. 
Interviewee 35 admitted that he was from the Al-Shabab organization so I have removed him 
from the financial piracy list and added him to the terrorism piracy list. Appendix I shows 
that the average age of pirates is 31 years old:  one pirate is 19 years old; five pirates are in 
their twenties; nine are in their thirties years old, and four are in their forties. All of the 
pirates speak the Somali language: three of them also speak English (one fluently); two speak 
Arabic; one speaks Awahili; and another speaks the Habashi Language. Sixteen pirates work 
as fishermen, one of whom transports people from Somalia to Yemen, and another transports 
people from Maqadisheo to Yemen, using their boats. Two other fishermen have extra jobs as 
drivers, while one pirate has no other job than piracy. On educational background, eight  
pirates ( can only read and write in Somali language; three can also read  in Arabic; five  are 
illiterate;  four  have primary school education; and two  have secondary school education.  
 
On marital status, 13 pirates are married with children; the number of children they have 
varies from 1 child to 9 children, and the average number is 4.4 children per pirate. One 
pirate is married with two wives; four are single; and two are divorced, one of whom has 2 
children and the other has no children. On income, four pirates said that they make $100 to 
$200 monthly, and eight said their income from fishing is enough to make a good living in 
Somalia, but one said his income from fishing is not enough to live. One pirate said he can 
make $30,000 as a reward from one piracy operation. A pirate who works transferring people 
from Somalia to Yemen said that he can make $8,000 per transfer and he said that sometimes 
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he makes two transfers in a month, earning $16,000. One driver said that he makes enough 
income to live from driving. 
On the ages of the Somali pirates, interviewees 10, 11, and 12 believe that the Somali pirates 
are aged between 12 and 50 years old, where the younger pirates are the attackers and the 
older pirates are the seniors who give the orders:  
 
 Each group of pirates there would be one older person and the others would be about 12 or 
13 years old (Interviewee 11)   
 
Most pirates are less than 30 years old, but the seniors who give orders are more than 40 
years old (Interviewee 13) 
 
The ages are between 16 and 40 (Interviewee 14) 
 
Interviewee 2 said that the attackers are between 18 and 25 years but the warlords are older.  
Interviewees 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 said that some Somali pirates hold Yemeni 
Somali nationality:  
 
 There is a new tactics for Somali pirates to hold Yemeni nationality because most of the 
Yemeni fishermen are allowed to carry guns for protection and this will help the Somali 
pirates to carry guns too (Interviewee 11)   
 
Interviewees 11, 12, 13, 14 and 2 said that Somali pirates speak both Somali and Arabic, but 
interviewee 9 said that they speak only the Somali language. Interviewee 14 said that the 
Iranian pirates in the Arabian Sea speak Persian and the Yemeni pirates in the Gulf of Eden 
speak Arabic.  
 
Interviewees 10, 11, 13 and 14 said that the Somali pirates are very thin but interviewee 9 
said that most of them have a good athletic body shape.   
          
 Pirate ships recognitions 
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Appendix J demonstrates how to recognise pirates’ boats by an analysis of the pirates’ ships’ 
type, size, speed, colour, and crew numbers. From Appendix J we see that nine pirates used 
only skiffs at the time they were captured; one pirate said they were using three skiffs;  
another said they were using 2 skiffs; three said they were using big ships and skiffs together 
at the time they were captured two of whom were using one big ship and two skiffs and the 
other was using one big ship and 1 skiff; three said that they were using big ships only; two  
said that they were using fiberglass boats  one of whom  said  they were using two fiberglass 
boats at the same time; and one said that he was using a speedboat. 
 
On the sizes of the ships, the skiff sizes varied from five to 35 meters in length, the average 
size being 10 meters.  One pirate said that his big ship is 15 meters in length and another one 
said that the capacity for the big ship is 10 tonnes of fish. One pirate said that he used a 
fiberglass boat length of 35 meters, and another said that his speedboat length is 10 meters. 
On the engines used for the pirate boats, the engines’ sizes for the skiffs vary from one 40 to 
100 horse power. On the engines for the big ships, one pirate said they used a car engine for 
their big ship, and another said their big ship has a Yamaha 4 pistons engine. One pirate said 
he used a fiberglass boat with 2 engines with 40 horse power each. 
On the colours of the ships, seven pirates said that they have white skiffs; two pirates said 
they have blue skiffs, and one pirate has a red skiff. Three pirates said that they have white 
big ships and one pirate said that he had a green big ship. One pirate said that he had a white 
fiberglass boat and another said that he had a blue one. One pirate said that he had a white 
speedboat.  
On crew numbers, skiff crews varied from 3 to 11, with an average of 7.5. On big ships, the 
number of crew members varied from 9 to 28, averaging 18. On fiberglass boats the crew 
varied from 5 to 9, averaging 7. One pirate said that the number of pirates on his speed boat 
was nine.  
Interviewees reported that:  
  
Seeing two skiffs or more nearby a Dhow (mother ship) is a sign of piracy activity 
(Interviewee 3) 
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 Interviewees 11, 13, 14, 15 and 3 said that the number of crew on the skiffs is a good sign to 
detect piracy activity: the normal number is two or three. 
 
  So if a skiff has more than four people on it, it will be suspected of piracy (Interviewee 11) 
 
Interviewee 43 asserted that the crew number on each pirate skiff is six to eight people. 
Interviewee 21 said that if you see a skiff 100 nm away from the coast then it would be a 
suspect. Also he said that you can sometimes intercept radio signals of skiffs far away from 
the coast. However, Interviewee 21 admitted that it is very difficult to distinguish between 
pirates and fishermen at sea, and that many mistakes were made by the navies in the area.   
 
Interviewees 3, 9, 11 and 14 said that when a skiff approaches a ship at high speed and/or 
comes up close to it or follows it, then it will be considered as suspicious. Interviewees 14 
and 15 said that they would suspect a skiff if it does not have fishing nets on board.  
Interviewee 14 said that carrying guns is another sign for pirates, but interviewee 15 said that 
most fishermen in the Somali area carry guns for protection, though seeing an RPG would be 
a definite sign of piracy. Interviewee 1 said that detecting radar on dhows, visually or 
electronically, is a suspicion of piracy. Interviewees 11, 14, 15 and 3 said that seeing a ladder 
on a skiff is a sign of piracy, while interviewees 3, 13, 14, 15 and 21 said that seeing a large 
fuel tank or an extra fuel tank on skiffs is another sign of piracy. Finally, interviewee 13 said 
that a skiff far away from the fishing area and close to the commercial ship lane would be a 
sign of piracy activity.   
 
3.4.3 Manifestations of terror piracy in the Arabian Gulf   
 
During the first fieldwork in August 2012, only interviewee 1 claimed that piracy in the 
Northern Arabian Gulf is motivated by political drivers. 
 
 The Iraqi and Iranian pirates in the north are motivated by their governments to attack 
Kuwaiti ships. Piracy increased in the north between 2003 and 2007 but after 2007 it 
vanished because the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has ended (Interviewee 1)  
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 Interviewee 1 said that the northern Kuwaiti sea was the most dangerous area because it is 
close to Iraq and most of the pirates are Iraqis. He said that the most dangerous time in the 
North Kuwaiti Sea is between August to October which is the fishing season when the 
density of the victims is at its highest:  
 
  The wind is calm; the visibility is clear; and the wave height is low, so pirates find it easy to 
attack ships (Interviewee 1)   
 
Interviewee 1 reported that pirates in the North do not use the strategy of kidnap for ransom.   
He said that in the north, the pirates are Iraqis and Iranians who have Arabic ethnicity, and 
are all Muslim Shiaa. The Iraqi pirates speak Arabic and the Iranians speak Persian and 
sometimes broken Arabic.  Interviewee 1 said that in the north the Kuwaiti coastguards 
distinguish between fishermen and seafarers who are suspected of being pirates by applying 
the following criteria:  
a. The location and the type of ships: in the fishing seasons, most of the fishing ships 
will remain within the fishing zones. 
b. For ships using long nets they normally lay the nets during the day and at night 
will be at anchor and the crew will not be seen at night because they go to bed till 
the morning and the crew of this type must be 12. So if the ship is not at anchor at 
night or the crew is only five or six, then the ship will be suspect. 
c. For the trolling fishing ships, they must navigate in a straight track and the crew 
must be four or five, so if the ship is traveling in an irregular course or the crew is 
more than 8, then the ship will be considered as suspect. 
d. Iraqi and Iranian vessels are less luxurious than Kuwaiti vessels because Kuwaiti 
citizens have more income than the Iraqis and the Iranians. . 
e. Speed:  any ship doing more than 20 knots or having two engines is suspected of 
piracy or smuggling.  
f. Radar:  Interviewee 1 said that any ship in the north, except the Kuwaiti luxury 
ships, which have got radar, is a pirate suspect, because radar is expensive and 
fishermen do not need it.   
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Interviewee 1 said that after 2007, Kuwait was more concerned that pirates might come from 
Iran rather than Iraq, because Kuwait has political conflicts with Iran but not with Iraq any 
more. I asked interviewee 1 for evidence to support this claim such as piracy attacks reports, 
but he did not provide any evidence. I visited the court’s library in Kuwait to look for piracy 
attacks by Iranian pirates after 2007, but there was no record of them, meaning that this claim 
is unreliable.    
 
3.4.4  Manifestations of terror piracy in Somalia   
 
Interviewee 13 (Yemeni Coastguard Liaison Officer in the Coalition Forces (Bahrain)) and 
interviewee 16 (Somali Ambassador in Abu Dhabi (UAE)) believed that Somali pirates were 
linked to the Al-Shabab group and that Iran is supporting the activities of Somali pirates in 
the area. Interviewee 13 said that Somali pirates have seven bases in Somalia (See Appendix 
F):  
 
Al-shabab are controlling the militias which are more powerful than the Federal 
Government… After the war on Afghanistan in 2001, Alqaedah members moved to Iraq and 
after the war on Iraq in 2003, they have moved to Somalia and that is why piracy increased 
there since 2004 (Interviewee 13)   
 
Interviewee 16 said that he received a report saying that there are links between Al-shabab 
and pirates in Somalia.  
 
Al-shabab needs money to fund their activities and power, while pirates need information, 
weapons, port facilities, land camps and men. I can assure that Al-shabab in Somalia are 
controlling sea ports, markets and telecommunication companies which all pirates need, 
which is another reason  why they are working together. The fact piracy decreased in 2011 
because of the death of Al-Qaddafi who was supporting Al-shabab with funds, confirms that 
Al-shabab are a major stakeholder in piracy (Interviewee 16)   
 
Interviewees (Interviewee 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 43) claimed there are links between Al-
shabab and the Somali pirates:    
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There are two groups of pirates in Somalia - the fishermen pirates and the ex-civil war 
criminals - Alshabab has links with the latter if not with the former pirates (Interviewee 19) 
 Al-shabab controls huge areas of land and ports, and pirates needed access to those 
protected ports and land, for which they paid Al-shabab (Interviewee 19) 
 The closest link between Al-shabab and pirates is in the business of trading and buying 
hostages (Interviewee 20) 
Piracy and terrorism in Somalia is a combined business, and terrorists are exploiting piracy 
for the money it generates (Interviewee 43)    
 
Interviewee 35 admitted at the beginning of the interview that he was a member of Al-shabab 
group, but he denied this later in the interview.  
Interviewee 35 is from the Kismayo area in Somalia. He said that they caught him in the land 
in a place called Ras Kambooni. The Figure 3.1 Shows Ras Kambooni in the south of the 
Somali coast, very close to the Kenyan boarder.   
 
 
Figure 3.1 Ras Kambooni map, Somalia 
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Interviewee 35 said that they accused him of illegal immigration to Kenya, and of piracy. The 
interviewee also mentioned the word ‘Da’awa’ to the translator, which means Islam 
breaching in Arabic. Interviewee 42 was also accused of terrorism at the beginning because 
he was caught with other Yemenis on the ship, but then of piracy. He is from Bosaso and they 
caught him 15 km away from Bosaso.  Appendix K describes these two pirates who were 
accused of terrorism and then piracy by the Kenyan government; they are both black Somali 
pirates.  
 
 Interviewee 35 said that they caught him on land while he was walking across the Kenyan 
border. At first in the interview he admitted they caught him transferring weapons from 
Kenya to Somalia, but he denied this later in the interview. Interviewee 42 said that when 
they caught them they did not find any weapons or any sort of technology.  Interviewee 42 
said that they had a big ship with a 10 ton capacity to carry fish:  
 
 We use skiffs attached to the big ship and the crew number was 18, mixed Somalis and 
Yemenis (Interviewee 42) 
The claim of interviewee 42 that the crew number was 18 supports the tactic adopted by the 
pirate’s ships recognition section, that the crew number is an effective way to recognise the 
pirate’s ships.  
 
3.5 Consequences of the two different kinds of maritime piracy 
This theme will rehearse respondents’ perceptions of the differences in the consequences of 
financial piracy and terror piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia. The perceptions are 
explained in the following categories:  
 Financial losses (ransoms, insurances, security) 
 Losses of human life  
 Injuries 
 Losses of units [ships] and goods  
 
3.5.1 Consequences of piracy in the Arabian Gulf  
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 Financial losses 
 
Interviewee 3 said that the economic situation in Iraq does not push Iraqis into piracy, but if 
they have decided to commit piracy, they would only attack fishing boats to steal cash. 
Interviewees 6 and 7 said that the Iranian pirates in Central Arabian Gulf only steal cash, 
mobile phones, food and water, which are not really dangerous attacks, and the financial 
consequences are not serious.  
 
 Human lives lost  
 
Interviewee 3 said that Iraqi pirates in the North are harmless - they have never killed or 
kidnapped fishermen, so they are less dangerous than other pirates. Interviewees 6 and 7 said 
that in Central Arabian Gulf, Iranian pirates are harmless to people because they are unlikely 
to use violence. Interviewee 1 provided me with the below table 3.1 of a published report 
containing all the piracy incidents between 2003 and 2008 in Kuwaiti waters:  
Table 3-1 Piracy attacks in Kuwait 2003-2007 (Source: The Kuwaiti Coastguards) 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 total 
Piracy attacks 1 31 24 6 5 0 67 
Piracy attempts  4     4 
Piracy with 
murder 
 1     1 
Captured pirates  1     1 
 
As we see from table 3.1 only one person was killed during this period - by Iraqi pirates in 
2004. When I went to Qatar to interview Qatari coast guards officers’, interviewee 7 provided 
me with the table in Appendix L of all the piracy attacks that occurred in Qatari waters 
carried out by Iranian pirates in the Central Arabian Gulf.  This shows that 37 attacks 
occurred in Qatari waters between 2008 and 2012, which is the peak of the attacks that have 
ever taken place in Qatari waters, according to interviewee 7. However, none of these attacks 
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has been recorded in the IMO’s official records of piracy attack reports, and when I asked 
interviewee 7 why they are not reported, he replied that the Qatari government do not  
publicise  piracy attacks for two reasons:  first,  because the attacks are not serious and their 
consequences are minimal ; and second, because publicising the attacks would lead to an 
increase in vessel insurance rates and voyage wages in the Arabian Gulf, and this would 
reduce the level of international investment in the area. 
 Injuries 
 
Interviewee 8 said that although pirates in the Northern Arabian Gulf do not kidnap, they do 
board ships and harm sailors.   
 
 Losses of goods  
 
Several interviewees described the theft of goods by pirates in the Arabian Gulf:  
 
Pirates in Northern Arabian Gulf are looking for electronics and cash and personal 
belongings to steal (Interviewee 3) 
 
 Interviewees 5, 6, and 7 agreed, saying that pirates in the North are only looking to steal 
electronics, food, water and cash.  
 
3.5.2 Consequences of piracy in Somalia  
 
   Financial losses (ransoms, insurances, security) 
 
Interviewee 1 said that ransoms in Somalia increased in 2012 which means that pirates are 
more selective about targets now. 
 
  The pirates prefer to do one attack worth $15 million than attack 10 targets each worth $2 
million (Interviewee 1)  
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Interviewee 15 said that people think that piracy has decreased but the ransom amount has 
increased and the duration of capture for ships has increased, so the danger and consequences 
of piracy have risen in Somalia. Interviewee 4 claimed that the amount of ransom asked by 
the Somali pirates is affecting the global economy. Whether or not this is true, Interviewee 17 
said that piracy adversely affects Somalia in that pirates attack ships carrying goods, food and 
products to Somalia, and this increases the prices of those products in Somalia. Interviewee 
16 said the security situation inside Somalia has not improved during the last 20 years and the 
economy is declining – evidence that the UN and the international organizations are not 
helping Somalia to overcome their failed state condition.  
 
Interviewee 22 said that piracy in Somalia affects Kenyan tourism because tourists come to 
Kenya via the Red Sea to the Gulf of Eden and then to Kenya, and pirates in the Gulf of Eden 
and in the Somali waters block this tourism route.  
Other countries had also been affected, including Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia and 
Nigeria. Piracy, terrorism and the civil war in Somalia resulted in one million refugees 
fleeing from Somalia into Kenya, which has seriously affected the Kenyan economy 
(Interviewee 22) 
Interviewee 21 said that Somali piracy money has been invested in the construction sector in 
Kenya, and laundered through the money exchange market in Kenya, which has distorted the 
financial markets in Kenya.   
 
 Loss of human life  
 
Interviewee 15 said that the number of attacks has decreased but the level of violence has 
increased, so the situation in 2012 was more dangerous than in the previous year. Interviewee 
4 said that the Somali pirates are using more heavy weapons than in the past which means 
that they are capable of killing more people.  
 
 Injuries 
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Interviewee 15 said that pirates are more willing and capable of harming victims than in the 
past, although the number of attacks decreased in 2012. On the other side, Appendix M 
shows the number of pirates killed or injured during piracy attacks, according to the pirates I 
interviewed in Shemola Tower prison in Kenya:  12 pirates were killed during combat 
operations against them. So out of 20 operations, 12 pirates were killed - meaning the pirates 
had a 60% chance of being killed in the piracy combat operations. 
 
 Loss of ships and goods  
 
Interviewee 17 said that Somali businessmen suffered because the pirates stole their ships, 
goods, food and money. Interviewee 3 said that pirates in Somalia kidnap the ships and then 
negotiate for ransom. Interviewee 15 said that the average time for the pirates to hold the 
victim ships is 90- 120 days.  
 
3.6 Different responses to counter the two different kinds of maritime piracy 
This theme will describe the interviewees’ perceptions of the responses that have been made 
so far to counter 1) financial piracy; and 2) terror piracy, in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia. 
The perceived responses will be reviewed under two categories: political responses; and 
military responses.  
 
3.6.1 Political responses in the Arabian Gulf 
 
Both Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 8 said that piracy decreased in Northern Arabian  Gulf 
after 2007 because there was close cooperation between the Iraqi and the Kuwaiti 
coastguards after Iraq was  settled politically from inside, and because the settled Iraqi 
government decreased crime rates in general. Interviewees 5, 6, 7, and 8 referred to Kuwait’s 
efficient legal system and robust approach to ransom demands as the reasons for this 
decrease:    
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Piracy is not a huge threat in Kuwait because Kuwait has a very good court system to which 
all the captured pirates would be transferred officially by the coastguards and the court with 
all recordings (Interviewee 5) 
 
  The Kuwaiti policy is to use force against kidnappers and not to pay ransoms (Interviewee 
8)   
 
3.6.2 Political responses in Somalia  
 
According to interviewees, there is a wide variety of political responses to Somali piracy. For 
example, interviewee 4 said that there are many policies and treaties to deal with piracy in 
Somalia, but the problem was limited international commitments and the lack of funds to 
implement them.   
 
In Maqadishuio, private shipping companies now took responsibility for their own protection 
by deploying lookouts, water cannons and armed guards (Interviewee 4)  
 
Interviewee 10 said that when dealing with kidnappers the decision will be made by the 
nation of the captured ship whether to pay ransom or use force.  
 
 If a British RN ship capture pirates they will set them free because in the UK there is no 
court to deal with international pirates and the court in Somalia is not capable of doing so 
(Interviewee 10) 
 
 Interviewees 11 and 12 said that the Korean and Pakistani strategy is to use force against 
kidnappers and not to pay ransom. By contrast, interviewee 14 said that in dealing with 
kidnappers, companies will negotiate to reach suitable solutions with kidnappers in paying 
ransom. Interviewee 15 said that if the ship is insured, the average time before paying the 
ransom is between 90 and 120 days. Some interviewees referred to the UN’s response to 
Somali piracy. For instance, interviewee 13 said that in 2008, the IMO and UN established 
the IRTC International Recommended Transfer Corridor which is 5 nm north of the Yemeni 
territorial waters. He said that 70% of commercial ships are using this lane which is protected 
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by several navies, and has been successful in reducing piracy in the area. Interviewee 16, the 
Somali ambassador, said that the UN had forbidden Somalia from using or buying weapons 
for its army, navy and coastguards, which meant that pirates, gangs, militias and war lords 
became more powerful than the government.  
 
Somalia tried to prove to the UN that it was capable of countering piracy by re-establishing 
its navy through recruiting 900 seamen and asking the UN to fund this establishment, but the 
UN refused, on grounds that the Somali Government was corrupt, and as a result the 
government abandoned the project because it was unable to pay the seamen’s salaries 
(Interviewee 16)  
 
Many interviewees were critical of the response of international organizations such as the UN 
in combatting Somali piracy:   
The Somali government appealed to the UN against illegal fishing and chemical waste 
dumping in Somali waters, providing medical reports of children who had been affected by 
the chemical waste (Interviewee 17) 
 The UN said that they would investigate the matter, but no action was taken (Interviewee 22) 
 The UN efforts in Somalia are not very effective, partly because international organizations 
are afraid to enter Somalia because of the lack of security, partly because it suffers from lack 
of capacity to solve the piracy issue, and partly because the Somali government and the civil 
society in Somalia are very corrupt, which slows the process of implementing development in 
Somalia (Interviewee 21) 
 The UN policy is below standard and they pay the salaries for the next seven years for the 
security units in Somalia, arm the new federal government and fund the Somali investments 
(Interviewee 22) 
 Interviewee 18 said that there were many deficiencies in the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS): (1) it restricts the actions and procedures so much for the navies when 
they capture the pirates that they sometimes release them; (2) its definition of piracy is very 
wide and unclear; and (3) it requires naval officers to apply the civil and criminal law of their 
own state to captured pirates, which is often inappropriate. 
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On the other hand, other interviewees defended the UN’s efforts. For instance, interviewee 17 
said that the UN had now started to empower the Somali government and this is the reason 
why piracy decreased in 2013, because the Somali government now is more stable:  
Piracy would increase again if the UN stopped its efforts on empowerment (Interviewee 17) 
 Interviewee 19 said that the UN office in Kenya is only able to provide advice to the nations 
close to the piracy area like Somalia and Kenya, because the UN does not have not have 
sufficient resources to provide funds for Somalia. The UN’s work is to organize conferences 
and coordinate with international organizations such as the United Nations International 
Children's Emergency Fund UNICEF and the World Bank. The UN is also dealing with 
Somali refugees, providing them with help, and it now has a plan to organize and manage 
funds for the Somali government to make it more stable, and to help it with several 
construction projects. Interviewee 20 said that the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crimes (UNODC) started in 2009. She said that because the navies in the area refused to take 
captured pirates to their home lands or to Somalia to prosecute them, the UNODC partnered 
with Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to transfer the captured pirates to them and to 
prosecute them there.  She said that UNODC supports these nations to make sure they have 
minimum international justice standards and that the pirates are given fair trials and 
investigative processes, and that the pirates’ imprisonments meet minimum international 
standards. Interviewee 20 said that UNODC pays fees for the lawyers, costs of 
transportations for the witnesses and the prosecutors; provides training on the law of the sea 
and Somali culture; gives infrastructure support to those nations to improve their prisons and 
police stations; and has built additional courts in those countries.  She said that the UNODC 
program is also expanding prisons in Somalia and Puntland so they can transfer the Somali 
convicted pirates to Somali from Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius. Interviewee 20 said that 
the trial process in the three countries is currently very slow because of the low capacities 
they have - in Kenya the average time for a trial is more than one year – but UNODC is 
helping those countries to speed up the trial processes for the pirates. She said that Kenya, 
Seychelles and Mauritius are very cooperative and helpful because the UNODC is providing 
them with funding to build their own prisons and courts. She provided the three tables in 
Appendix N showing the numbers of the Somali pirates captured and transferred to Kenya, 
Seychelles and Mauritius. Interviewee 20 also said that the UNODC is aware of the illegal 
fishing and the chemical waste dumping in Somali waters, and the office is working now to 
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resolve this issue. She said UNODC sent an engineer to Somalia to teach the security forces 
how to maintain and fix their coastguard boats, though this process is very slow at the 
moment.  
Interviewee 21 is the Training Coordinator Djibouti Code of Conduct Project Implementation 
Unit in the UN office in Kenya. The Djibouti Code of Conduct is a program set up to support 
countries in the West Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Eden affected by piracy to build a proper 
counter piracy response. He said that since 2011, they have three regional information 
sharing centres, one of which is in Mombasa, so reports of any piracy attack will be sent to 
one of these information centres and will be distributed to all seafarers in the area, including 
commercial ships and the navies so they can be aware of the situation.  The interviewee’s role 
is coordinating training activities for naval officers, coastguards, maritime lawyers and 
enforcement officers to teach the best ways to combat piracy. Interviewee 43, IMO’s 
Maritime Liaison Coordination Officer in the security regional marine rescue coordination 
Centre (Mombasa, Kenya), commented on the work of the IMO in combatting Somali piracy. 
He said that the IMO office in Kenya shared information about Somali piracy incidents with 
the whole world via the Mercury system which is a data link connecting all the warships with 
the centres in the region.  He explained that if they get a report about a piracy incident, they 
input this into the system so that all naval ships will know about the location and type of the 
ship that has been attacked, its name and all other relevant information.  This will enable the 
naval operation centre to determine within less than one minute which warship is closest to 
the reported location, and to instruct it to proceed to that location. Interviewee 43 said that 
there are 10 people working in the centre, which is not enough:  the required number is more 
than 20 people. 
Some interviewees commented on the political response of Kenya to Somali piracy. For 
instance, interviewee 22 explained how Kenya is dealing with one million Somali refugees, 
including many officials and governors, by housing, feeding and organizing charities 
provided for them by the UN, Arab League and from Kuwait.  
 
Kenya encouraged Somali investors who are willing to invest in Kenya, referring to a place 
called Eslee in Kenya where many Somali investors have established their investment and 
banking businesses. He said that Kenya also hosted the Somali peace process in Nairobi 
(Interviewee 22)   
108 
 
 
Interviewee 43 said that Kenya is one of the countries who signed up with the UN to trial the 
Somali pirates. He said that when a naval ship captures pirates it will take less than 24 hours 
to be transferred to Kenya. When I said that some navies held pirates in their custody for over 
two months before transferring them to Kenya, he denied this claim and said that sometimes 
the media fake those reports.  I said to him that most of the pirates stay in Kenyan prisons for 
years without being convicted, but he also denied this and said that the maximum period for 
conviction is 2 months.  
 
3.6.3  Mmilitary responses in the Arabian Gulf 
 
Interviewee 3 said that piracy is an international crime and the responses must be 
international not national or individual.  Interviewee 9, a US officer in CTF 152 (Bahrain), 
whose role is to maintain maritime security against piracy and terrorism in the Arabian Gulf, 
said that there are 15 people working under his command in the office, and that CTF 152 has 
access to destroyer classes from the US and the British Navy, and patrol classes from the US 
and French frigates, whose average speed varies from 25 to 35 knots. However, Interviewee 3 
claimed that such international initiatives were inadequate:   
Although many forces are participating in collective efforts to combat piracy (such as CTF 
150, 151, 152 and NATO), those efforts suffer from a lack of commitment (Interviewee 3)  
Other interviewees commented on the military responses of individual states, especially 
Kuwait and Qatar. On Kuwait, interviewee 1 said that since 2007 there has been close 
cooperation between the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi coastguards. Kuwaiti coastguards validated the 
radar system which enabled Kuwait to monitor the sea and report any suspicious action to 
Iraqi and Iranian coastguards and to the CTF 152 in Bahrain. Interviewees 5 and 8 said the 
intelligence maritime cell in the Kuwaiti naval base gets information about pirates from 
sources in Iran and Iraq. The Kuwaiti navy liaises well with coalition forces such as CTF 150, 
CTF58 (specialized in the Northern Arabian Gulf), CTF 151, CTF152, U.S. Navy, and all the 
GCC Navies and intelligence, and it receives information from the sea units (naval and 
coastguard) who are physically in the area all the time and monitor the sea by both radar and 
visual means and sends information and reports all the time. Interviewee 1 explained that 
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Kuwaiti coastguards have two sources from which to obtain information about pirates: (1) the 
media, especially the BBC regional office in Abu Dhabi which provides the GCC with up-to-
date information about danger zones and threats; and (2)   information and intelligence 
reports shared daily between the six GCC countries, supplemented by a report every three 
months on all maritime and piracy incidents.    
Interviewee 8 listed the following ships under the Kuwaiti coastguards command:  
 Cougar class, 41 feet length, 50 knots speed, armed with two 50 Cal, RADAR, GPS, 
Echo sounder, HF and VHF (?? Boats) 
 Fabio class, 41 feet, 60 knots speed, armed with two 50 Cal, RADAR, GPS, Echo 
sounder, HF and VHF (6 boats) 
 Concept class, 38 feet, 45 knots speed, one 50 cal gun, RADAR, GPS, Echo sounder, 
HF and VHF. (25 boats). 
 The Gulf Master class, 43 feet, 50 knots, speed, M16 and personnel weapons. (3 
boats). 
 
Interviewees 1 and 8 said that in  addition to the above ships, the Kuwaiti coastguards  have 
12 patrol boats (Sabahi class) with a speed of 30 knots and a crew of ten  including two  
officers, attached to which are French Cougar intercepting boats used for intercepting and 
boarding. Interviewee 8 said that the Kuwaiti coastguards have one patrolling ship and 4 
speed boats in the north 24/7. He said that the average time to arrive at the location of an 
attack is 10 minutes because the area is small in Kuwait, as the coastguards only operate 
within the 12nm area. The ships have navigation radars, GPS, and AIS both on the ships and 
in the operations centre. Interviewee 1 and 8 said that the allowed armaments for the 
coastguards are 50 calliper, m16 and 9mm Pretta gun. The Kuwaiti coastguards have two 
bases (one in the south and one in Warbah islands in the North), from which vessels respond 
to any distress message within the 12nm territorial waters of the country, and are at sea 
within 10 minutes of receiving such messages.  
 
Interviewee 2 said that oil tankers are given a briefing about security and piracy before 
leaving the Kuwaiti harbour.  Information in this briefing comes from the government’s 
security agencies in Kuwait (the Armed Forces Intelligence Service and the Ministry of the 
Interior). The Kuwaiti coastguards monitor data provided in international organizations’ 
reports such as IMO’s notice to mariners, and they follow all the broadcasts of international 
organizations. Interviewee 5 said that the Kuwaiti navy have navy SEALS who can deal with 
kidnappers. Interviewer 8 said that Kuwait had never faced a kidnap situation, but if it did, 
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it’s very qualified SWAT team in the coastguards and SEALS in the Kuwaiti navy would 
deal with kidnapper without paying ransoms. They have several different types of ships from 
small boats to patrol and missile ships; 50 calliper guns and m16s; navigation and 
surveillance radar, GPS and NAJAIR systems; and night vision cameras. Interviewee 8 said 
the naval presence depended on the danger level:  at the moment, when it is very safe, the 
Kuwaiti navy has one ship at sea. The Kuwaiti navy is not large, and the average time to 
reach a distress location is one hour, but in emergency, the navy can contact the Air Force for 
helicopter support. However, Interviewee 8 said that Kuwait coastguards suffer from a lack 
of manpower because the military is not attractive to people to join anymore because of the 
hard work in the military. 
 
In Qatar, I noticed there were many people working in the Qatari coastguards division: the 
operations department alone contained about 450 staff under the command of interviewee 6. 
Interview 7 said that when piracy increased in 2008 to 2011, the Qatari government made 
piracy one of its priorities and increased the coastguards’ manpower and arms.  Interviewee 6 
said that Qatari coastguards are at sea on full alert 24/7; they get data about pirates from the 
dhows and oil ships at sea that provide up-to-date and reliable information; and they share 
information about pirates with GCC coastguards. Interviewees 6 and 7 said that the Qatari 
coastguards have a SWAT team that is responsible for dealing with kidnappers and they are 
very reliable and highly qualified. The interviewees added that Qatari policy is to use force 
against kidnappers and not to pay ransom. Interviewee 6 said that piracy decreased in Qatar 
because the Qatari coastguards increased their manpower and started an education campaign 
to inform seafarers at ports and jetties about the threats and how to prevent and report pirates 
at sea. Moreover, all seafarers, before leaving the jetties, must fill in a form about the time of 
their return, and their destination at sea, so the coastguards can track them and understand the 
maritime scene more fully.  Interviewee 7 said that the reason for the decrease in piracy is 
that Qatar established a new unit called the Duties department containing 40 intercepting 
boats (33 feet) with 70 knots speed, and had validated a new radar system which has 18 
people working to analyse the maritime scene 24/7. Interviewees 6 and 7 said that the Qatar 
coastguards have 150 powerful speedboats, 33 feet in length, with a speed of 75 knots from 
three outboard engines, equipped with radar and GPS.  They also have seven patrol ships, 20 
meters in length, with a speed of 25 knots, which can stay at sea for two days, and seven 
Cougar type boats whose speed is 45 knots, used to escort the patrol ships on every 
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patrolling, mission, and they have also four Tug boats. Interviewees 6 and 7 said that the 
permitted weapons for use against pirates are the m16, 9mm gun and GBMG machine gun, 
and that all of the Qatari coastguard boats have GPS, navigation radars, electronic charts on 
the patrol ships, and Navtex (the weather forecast System) and AIS on the patrol ships. 
Interviewee 7 reported that the Qatari coastguards had two patrol ships in Qatari waters and 
17 speed boats in the North working 24/7. Interviewee 7 said that the Qatari coastguards will 
respond immediately to any distress message and if the location is far they will send a 
helicopter to the location.   
 
3.6.4 Military responses in Somalia  
 
Interviewee 1 said that Omani international waters is  the most dangerous area infected with 
Somali pirates and  naval presence is very low in comparison   to the huge area, because  the 
Omanis are not deploying enough naval units. 
 So naval responses to distress messages are very slow (interviewee 1) 
Nevertheless, Interviewee 17 believes that naval presence in the Somali waters is the main 
reason for the decrease of piracy in 2013. Interviewee 18 claimed that piracy decreased in 
2013 because of the naval presence in the Gulf of Eden. The naval presence was extended 
because the Somali pirates were threatening the global economy in the Gulf of Eden. 
Interviewee 19 said that Western countries, India and Japan have all established naval forces 
in the Somali area to protect their interests against piracy.  Interviewee 2 said that oil tankers 
facing piracy attacks near the strait of Hurmuz successfully follow the anti-piracy procedures:  
Commercial ships keep watch in high risk areas either by crew or dummies, and they also 
have water cannons and barbed wire on their sides to keep pirates off if they tried to attack. 
If they see a suspect (i.e. any boat within 3 nm) they directly report it to the naval ships in the 
area, and if the suspects come close they will try to communicate with them through 
loudspeakers to find out their intentions (Interviewee 2)   
However, interviewee 4 pointed out that Somali waters are huge, and no matter how great the 
naval presence, it will never be enough:   
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The UN assigned to CTF 151 the responsibility for dealing with piracy in Somalia, and some 
countries like Spain and France have their own naval units in the area to protect their ships, 
and the US navy is working very hard because the fifth fleet is close to this area.  But naval 
coverage is still very limited because of the huge area involved (Interviewee 4) 
Interviewee 21 said that although there are many international naval units in the Somali area, 
including frigates, destroyers, patrol ships and aircraft, and his UN office in Nairobi shared 
all piracy information with units at sea via radio and internet communications, military 
responses to piracy are only a temporary solution which just stalls piracy for a while and 
displaces it to different areas.  
Interview 19 said that deploying armed guards on commercial ships had reduced piracy, 
though he expressed his opposition to this measure for two reasons: first, it is contrary to 
international law; and second, it leads to some pirates becoming more heavily armed and the 
risk of serious confrontation at sea which could result in explosions of oil and consequent 
pollution of the sea.  
Interviewee 9 explained the role of his ship, USS Bainbridge, in countering piracy in the 
Somali basin. He said that the crew of the ship numbered 250, and they received information 
about pirates from the US intelligence department, which has a very wide range of sources of 
such data, including other naval and commercial ships in the area, other forces’ intelligence 
departments, the Somali government, fishermen, and international documents such as IMO 
piracy reports. Interviewee 9 said the most dangerous area of piracy is between the east of the 
Somali coast and the top north of the Seychelles Islands, and there are four naval ships 
deployed to protect that area, which he thinks is sufficient, because the ships respond 
immediately after receiving a distress message, or they would send a HELO if the location is 
far away. He claimed that piracy had decreased because of the tactics used by the naval 
presence, including the following: the US navy  negotiates with kidnappers, but not for 
ransoms, to secure the release of hostages;  the US navy had not increased the number of 
units at sea, but instead concentrated  on protecting a specific route through the Gulf of Eden 
and made the ships follow this route under  US protection;  the boarding team use m16, 9mm 
guns, M4 and assault rifles to deal with pirates, and the ship has 50 Calliper and a 762 
machine gun to provide  cover fire if needed, while the HELO has a 762 machine gun; and . 
USS Bainbridge uses radar, GPS, and hand radios for the boarding team. However, 
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Interviewee 9 admitted that Somali pirates responded by travelling further into the Indian 
Ocean. 
Interviewee 10 is a British RN officer in CTF 151 (Bahrain), whose role is to analyse piracy 
trends in the region, from the Suez Canal through the Somali Basin up to the Gulf of Oman, 
and then to report to the UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC). He said that they 
collect information about pirates from the Combined Maritime Forces CMF reports, naval 
and commercial ships in the area, aircraft in the area, and distress messages. He explained 
that when they capture pirates they take away their weapons and transport them to their 
homeland (Somalia), because the UK does not have any procedure to trial pirates in UK 
courts, while the Somali Government has no capacity for keeping them in custody or put 
them on trial, so the only option is to set the pirates free.  Interviewee 10 said that piracy had 
decreased in Somalia because of the armed guards on board the commercial ships, despite the 
fact that naval responses to distress messages may take hours or days, depending on the 
location of the attack.  
Interviewee 43 said that Kenya is taking effective steps to deal with Somali pirates. For 
example, the Mercury system used in the security regional marine rescue coordination centre 
(Mombasa, Kenya) logs piracy incidents and informs warships in the area so that the closest 
naval ship will proceed to the location of the attack. The information provided in the Mercury 
system includes the coordinates of the suspected piracy location, the name of the pirate ship, 
and how many skiffs are involved. He claimed that  
Both NATO ships and Kenyan naval ships are countering piracy in Somali waters…the 
Kenyan government sent the Kenyan navy into Somali waters without UN permission to 
protect Kenyan ships and kill Somali pirates who came very close to Kenyan waters 
(Interviewee 43) 
 Interviewee 43 held that this is the main reason for the decrease of piracy in 2013, though it 
may be that Somali pirates merely moved to the North of Somalia from the South. 
Interviewee 22 said that the Kenyan navy is successful at keeping Somali pirates out of 
Kenyan waters, and the Kenyan army has had some success on land against Al-Shabab:  
 The Kenyan navy protects Kenyan waters from Somali pirates. On land, however, Kenya has 
established the AMSON African Mission Forces which are Kenyan troops who entered 
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Somalia to counter Al-shabab militias. AMSON fought Al-shabab in Kismayo, freeing the 
Kismayo port in 2012 which AMSON forces now control and protect (Interviewee 22) 
However, he acknowledged that the Kenyan navy cannot counteract piracy in Somali waters 
because that would require travelling more than 600 km to travel and the Kenyan navy does 
not  have the  capacity  and resources to do this.  
Another tactic employed by Kenya was reported by interviewee 43 - namely that Kenyan 
naval units in Somali waters now capture anyone with weapons and transfer them to Kenya, 
Seychelles or Mauritius for investigation and trial. He said that suspects must prove their 
innocence in carrying guns – i.e. prove they are fishermen not pirates – and if they failed to 
do so, they face up to 20 years in jail. The court will not even need witnesses to charge the 
captured pirates, because carrying weapons is enough evidence for charging them with 
piracy.  
Interviewee 11, the CTF 151 Korean liaison officer said that they get information about 
pirates from Korean naval and commercial ships and aircraft in the area, and their policy is 
very hardline:   
 The Korean policy is not to negotiate with pirates but to use force to release hostages. 
Interviewee 11 said that the Korean navy has one destroyer in CTF 151 with HELO and a 
speed of 30 knots; that the Korean navy usually use sniper guns, personnel machine guns and 
50 callipers against pirates; and that the Korean navy use IR cameras, navigation  radar, 
surveillance radar and tracker radar. But the Korean destroyer is only allowed to help 
Korean ships, and to do that, one destroyer is enough.  If it received a distress message while 
escorting a Korean ship, it would not respond to the message but continue escorting the 
Korean ship (Interviewee 11)  
Interviewee 12 is a Pakistani intelligence officer who works in CTF 150, which specializes in 
counter maritime terrorism. He believes that piracy decreased in 2012 because of the 
deployment of armed guards on board commercial ships.  
 The CTF 150 uses the internet to get information about pirates, because the internet gives 
very good data. Pakistan has two destroyers in the area, one with CTF 151 that counters 
piracy, and one with CTF 150 that counters maritime terrorism, both with a speed of 35 
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knots. The two destroyers have radar and GPS, but they depend more on visual methods than 
radar, because they cannot distinguish between targets by radar (Interviewee 12) 
Interviewee 13 is a Yemeni Coastguards Liaison officer in Bahrain. He said that the Yemenis 
get information about pirates from Yemenis in Somalia and from Somalis in Yemen.  
 There is a good relation between Somalis and the Yemenis because of their geographical 
closeness, social ties, and trade exchanges between the two countries (Interviewee 13) 
 Interviewee 13 explained that Yemeni fishermen are a very good source of information 
because they can detect any strangers in the area and report them to them.  Indeed, he called 
them the front line for information; though he pointed out they have to trust us first in order 
to give us information. On dealing with kidnappers, he reported that the Yemeni strategy is to 
use extreme force against them, including killing them.   
There was an incident  in 2008 when a Yemeni ship – called Qanah – was kidnapped by 
Somali pirates 62 nm outside Yemeni waters, and the Yemeni coastguards  received an order 
from the Yemeni president to use force, as result of which, two pirates were  killed but all the 
crew was released (Interviewee 13) 
The interviewee 13 said that the Yemeni coastguards have 10 patrolling ships, Australian 
made, 35 meters in length with a speed of 35 knots and a crew of 15; they use navigation 
radar, GPS, satellite communication, HF and VHF; the weapons they use are Russian, and 
they include a 30 mm gun, a 12.7 mm gun, Kalashnikovs and 9 mm guns for both officers 
and crew.    
Interviewee 14 is manager director of a maritime security private company in Dubai. He said 
that his company gets information about pirates from UK intelligence reports, ships in the 
area, Navtex System and the internet.  His company has one ship for escorting and protecting 
client ships: it is a 1959 mine sweeper with battle grey colours, a speed of 22 knots, and a 
crew of 12. The weapons used are a 7.62 gun, sniper rifles and semi-automatic rifles, and the 
technology they use includes radar, GPS, IR night vision, range finder and binoculars. The 
interviewee said that they turn the AIS off because pirates can track them from the pirates’ 
mother ships. The interviewee said that because pirates normally attack from the sides, the 
counter-piracy procedure is increased speed, zigzag manoeuvres, water cannon and, finally, 
the armed guards. However, all these moves only serve to give them more time.  Interviewee 
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15 talked about a real case he dealt with: at 1000 hrs, six skiffs attacked a ship from the stern 
and the victim ship fired flares at the pirates which caused three of the skiffs to go away, but 
the other three skiffs came closer – within 300 meters - so the victim ships fired warning 
shots which caused the remaining skiffs to go away. Interviewee 15, also an executive officer 
of one of the maritime security companies in Dubai, said they get information about pirates 
mainly from the UK maritime transport office and a number of open source websites.  He 
explained that his company’s main job is to protect oil tankers and the strategy is to deploy 
four armed guards on each ship, though he would prefer six. The weapons they use are 556 
semi-automatic gun, AF 15 and water cannon, and the technology used includes navigation 
radar, IR, night vision equipment and binoculars. Interviewee 15 said the company uses the 
following procedure if the ship faces an attack: 
  Report the case and try to avoid being boarded 
 Increase to full speed 
 Use zigzag manoeuvres to avoid attackers  
 Shoot flares if they approach closer 
 And then fire warning shots 
 
Interviewee 15 said that most of the navies in the area are not capable of negotiating with 
pirates. They can use and deploy force but they are not capable of establishing and 
conducting negotiations.  
Interviewee 43 said that piracy has decreased in Somalia because the Kenyan Defence Forces 
KDFs entered Somalia in October 2011 to clamp down on pirate camps. Interviewee 20 said 
that the UNODC office sent an engineer to teach Somali coastguards how to fix and maintain 
their boats; but she said that this initiative is ineffective because only one engineer is working 
on the project. As for the response of Somalia itself to Somalia piracy, Interviewee 16 said 
that the Somali government tried to re-establish the Somali navy in 2012, but the UN refused 
to arm the navy or fund it, claiming that the Somali government is still corrupt, which 
resulted in a failure of this initiative. Although the Somali government managed to recruit 
900 people to work in the navy, they could not be paid because the UN refused to provide the 
necessary funding and the effectiveness of the Somali coastguards and the navy remained 
poor.  
From Appendix O, we can see that the French and German navies have captured the most 
Somali pirates - each of them having captured four piracy groups in the Somali area. The 
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U.S., Danish and the British navies are next, having captured three groups of pirates; the 
Italian navy captured 2 groups; and the Kenyan army captured one pirate. Appendix O shows 
that the Danish navy kept three pirates for three months, two months, and 38 days, 
respectively, which means that the average time for the pirate to stay on board the Danish 
naval ships until he is transferred to Kenyan courts was 62 days. The average time for the 
Italian navy was 43.5 days; for the U.S. navy 30 days; the British Royal navy 16 days; the 
German navy 10 days; and the French navy six days.  
3.7 Violations of international law perpetrated against pirates  
Pirates may commit violations of international law, but they may also suffer from violations 
of international law committed against them. This theme will focus on the perceptions of 
interviewees of violations of international law perpetrated by naval and coastguard forces on 
pirates who have been interviewed in Mombasa. Such allegations of violations include the 
following:  keeping pirates in prison for long periods before trial; failure to provide defence 
lawyers for accused prisoners; capturing pirates on land; and capturing pirates who are under 
18 years of age. Less serious violations include not reporting piracy attacks to the authorities 
or the IMO, thereby concealing the full extent of piracy threats.  
3.7.1 Violations of international law in the Arabian Gulf  
 
Interviewee 7, Security and Safety Officer in the Qatari Coastguards, said that the reports 
which the Qatari coastguards possess about piracy are not very accurate. This is partly 
because cases where there is no serious harm are not considered worth recording; partly   
because cases that are outside Qatari’s EEZ are ignored; and partly because the Qatari 
government advised the coastguards not to report any of the piracy incidents to the IMO for 
fear of scaring away foreign investments.  Interviewee 7 provided me with a list of 37 piracy 
attacks in the Qatari waters between 2008 and 2012, none of which was mentioned in the 
annual IMO piracy reports for those years. Similarly, Kuwaiti authorities had records of 67 
piracy attacks between 2003 and 2008, none of which appeared in the IMO piracy reports, 
making Kuwaiti and Qatari waters appear to be completely safe from piracy.  
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3.7.2 Violations of international law in Somalia  
 
Interviewees 10, 11 and 12 said that when their navies capture the pirates they would take 
away their weapons and set them free. Interviewee 10 said this was because the UK law   
does not allow pirates caught abroad to be tried in UK courts. Interviewee 11 said that 
Korean jails do not have the facilities capabilities to try Somali pirates. Interviewee 12 said 
that the Pakistani navy releases pirates because Pakistani law does not define maritime 
piracy. Such release of pirates is, however, a breach of international law. Another breach is 
the failure of Yemeni fishers to report to their government kidnappings they suffer from 
Somali pirates: they make settlements with the pirates, including payments of ransoms for the 
release of crews without informing the Yemeni government.  
 
A more serious breach is the allegation that the Indian navy uses violence against fishermen, 
stealing their phones and fish, and this is why Somali pirates say they use more violence 
against Indian hostages than against other country’s hostages. It is also why Somali and 
Yemeni fishermen say they do not trust naval forces in the area, and give support to pirates, 
hiding information about them from the hated men in uniforms. Interviewee 13 suggested, 
somewhat conspiratorially, that the Indian navy uses violence against seafarers because India 
wants coalition forces to fail to protect the area so the UN will withdraw them from the area, 
and thus provide an opportunity for nations such as India, Iran and China to control the area.  
Interviewee 43 said that the naval forces in Somalia now arrest everyone carrying guns 
because it is impossible to distinguish between fishermen who carry guns and pirates:  
  
 After they arrest them, they will investigate their purposes in carrying the guns. These 
investigations take place in Kenyan courts and will last for only for two months at a 
maximum (Interviewee 43) 
 However,  but when I visited the Shemola Tower prison in Mombasa, I read all the pirates’  
case files and interviewed a number of pirates and discovered that most of them were 
detained in the prison without any conviction for between four and  five years. Interviewee 20 
claimed that the trials in Kenya always take over one year because the court and justice 
system are very slow in Kenya. But one year is still much shorter than the four to five years 
experienced by the pirate suspects. Appendix P shows that 17 pirates stayed in Shemola 
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Tower prison without conviction for time periods varying between two and six years, the 
average time is four years. Thirteen pirates have been convicted, but the court did not take 
into account the time spent in prison before conviction.  The prison sentences imposed varied 
from four to 20 years, with an average of almost 11 years. The total time (i.e. pre-sentence 
plus post-sentence) scheduled for Somali pirates to spend in Kenyan prisons varies from 
seven to 25 years – an average of 15.5 years.  Interviewee 40 said that he was brought to the 
prison when he was 17 and stayed for five years without being convicted of any offence. 
Interviewee 35 is a 16-year old who was held in Shemola tower prison.  
 
Interviewee 43 sought to defend Kenya’s naval forces arrest of Somali fishermen simply for 
carrying guns on grounds that even if they are not pirates, carrying guns is against the law.  In 
any case, he asserted, all the Somali fishermen who claim that they are not pirates are lying:  
in reality, all of them are pirates, and they would be given 20-year jail sentences unless they 
could prove they were fishermen by identifying the fishing company they work for or the 
ports they come from. He said the Kenyan court does not need a victim or witnesses to charge 
armed fishermen with piracy.    
Interviewee 23 claimed that the U.S. navy used violence against him and his fellow pirates:  
they tortured them to get information, and they opened fire against them, killing and injuring 
some of them. Interviewee 28 asserted that the U.S. navy tortured him on board its vessel. 
Interviewee 31 said he had his leg severed by the Danish navy. Interviewee 38 claimed the 
German navy used violence against him and tortured him, while interviewee 39 said that the 
U.S. navy treated them with violence on board their ship, and forced him to admit that he was 
guilty of piracy. Interviewee 40 said that he was held on a French naval ship when he was 17 
years old and was tortured on board the ship, while interviewee 42 claimed the British navy 
tortured him on board their ship. However, when I asked the interviewee for evidence of 
injuries caused by torture, such as marks or scars on his body, he claimed that those marks 
had healed as the torture was a long time ago.   
 
Interviewee 28 stated that he did not have a lawyer in the court when his case was heard, 
while interviewee 24 said that the Kenyan court did not provide them with a lawyer but the 
Muslim community in Mombasa did, and paid the lawyer’s charges. Interviewee 24 claimed 
that many Somalis in Shemola Tower prison died because they have not had sufficient 
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medical care in the prison – a claim emphatically endorsed by other prisoners, including the 
pirates who refused to be interviewed.   Interviewee 26 asserted that in Kenya they were 
discriminated against because they are Muslims: for example, they are not allowed to have 
any visitors or make phone calls to their families. When I asked some of the Kenyan guards 
in the prison, they stated that it is true that some of the pirates died in the prison because of 
many reasons, some of which were medical, but I have not been provided with official 
reports from the prison authorities.  
 
Several interviewees told of irregularities in their treatment. For instance, Interviewee 35 said 
that he was caught on land, accused firstly of illegal immigration but then convicted of 
piracy. Interviewee 34 said that he was released by the Kenyan court after being found 
innocent, but the Kenyan government appealed this decision, convicted him of piracy and 
sentenced him to five years in prison. Interviewee 32 said that the Italian navy did not 
understand their language, so they captured them and took them to Djibouti whose authorities 
refused to receive them, so they were taken to Oman whose authorities also refused to receive 
them, and eventually they were taken to Kenya. 
 
3.8 Solutions 
This theme will rehearse the solutions suggested by the interviewees for dealing with 
financial piracy and terror piracy more effectively.  
 
3.8.1 Solutions for the Arabian Gulf  
 
Interviewee 1 recommended increasing awareness of seafarers about the danger zones and the 
safety procedures, which could be accomplished via media and social networking. 
 
I recommend giving more power to the coastguards to deal with pirates, because at present 
there are too many limitations on them – including limitations of their areas of operations; 
limitations in their rules of engagement; and limitations on their authority to get involved in 
international waters (Interviewee 1)     
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Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 said that increasing naval forces in areas of intense pirate 
activity is very important. Interviewee 1 argued that GCC states were short-sighted in 
ignoring the need to increase the number of security units at sea because they judged that 
piracy had not yet impacted their national economies.  Interviewee 5 suggested increasing the 
number of small fast boats with guns in the North of Kuwait, while interviewee 7 
recommended deploying naval mother ships in the intense areas to work as stationary supply 
ships. On the other hand, Interviewee 2 claimed that in the Arabian Gulf the naval presence is 
sufficient, and instead he suggested increasing naval forces at the entrance of the Strait of 
Hurmuz. 
   
Interviewees 1, 5 and 6 suggested that increasing coordination, especially in exchanging 
information about pirates, in the GCC is very important to counter piracy, and  interviewee 1 
recommended having one central naval command in the GCC.  Interviewee 6 suggested 
involving Iran in the GCC’s efforts to combat piracy in the Arabian Gulf.    
 
Interviewees 3 and 4 claimed that armed guards are the most effective way to combat piracy, 
and interviewee 3 recommended having a standard procedure for all the companies for the 
deployment of armed guards. Interviewee 4 suggested using USV (Unmanned Security 
Vessels).  Interviewees 5, 6, 7 and 8 held that using force and not paying ransom is the best 
way to deal with kidnappers, because paying ransoms will simply encourage more pirates to 
kidnap for ransom.  Interviewees 7 and 8 suggested negotiating first with pirates and then 
using force to release the hostages. 
 
Interviewee 8 said that assigning a specific route for commercial ships to follow, monitored 
by naval forces and radar was the best solution to counter piracy, and it worked to protect 
ships in the Kuwaiti waters.    
 
3.8.2 Solutions for Somalia  
 
Eight interviewees (1, 2, 10, 12, 9, 17, 18, and 19) held that increasing the presence of 
international navies in Somali waters will help to decrease piracy. However, interviewees 17, 
18 and 19 said that although the presence of international navies is good to deal with piracy 
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in Somalia, the roles of those international navies must change from protecting commercial 
ships to ridding Somali waters of illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping. For 
interviewee 9, having international naval forces in Somali waters  would only help in the 
short term, while interviewee 14 held that having navies in Somali waters was a waste of time 
and money because the area was too large to protect it from piracy by military means.    
 
Ten interviewees (1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2 and 9) suggested that developing Somalia 
from inside and rebuilding the country is the most important solution to deal with piracy and 
crime in general.  For interviewee 15, developing Somalia starts with establishing a powerful 
government.  Interviewee 43 recommended action to tackle piracy inside Somalia because the 
commanders and the war lords are the core of the piracy problem. Interviewees 18, 21 and 22 
said that developing Somalia from inside is very important to stop Somali piracy at source.  
For instance, interviewee 21 said that developing Somali’s infrastructure and providing it 
with maritime investment will help to reduce poverty and improve the Somali economy. 
Interviewee 22 recommended that the international community provides Somalia with funds 
to build its own infrastructure. Interviewee 21 recommended that the African Union (AU) 
participate and provide training for the Somali governmental forces and police.  He said that 
this participation would increase discipline in Somali security units which will provide more 
security to the country and decrease the crime rate in Somalia including piracy. Interview 22 
recommended action by the UN to reduce the levels of corruption in Somalia, which would 
improve the Somali economy, providing more job opportunities and thereby reduce piracy. 
For interviewee 16, the best way to develop Somalia and grow the economy is to start 
building the Bardair Water Dam project which will enable Somalia to increase agricultural 
production and increase jobs. For interviewee 16, developing Somalia also required arming 
the Somali navy and coastguards to safeguard the country’s security. Interviewee 22 
suggested that the international community should arm the Somali government and pay the 
salaries of the Somali police and army for at least seven years, because this would reduce 
crime rates in Somalia, including piracy. Interviewee 17 said that the presence of foreign 
navies is important, but Somalia needs its own navy and coastguards to protect its own 
waters, because, said interviewee 18, these will be permanently in the area. Interviewees 17, 
18 and 21 said that arming and developing the Somali navy and coastguards will greatly help 
to solve the piracy problem in Somalia.  Interviewee 28 recommended training the Somali 
coastguards and navy to deal with the problem of illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping 
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in Somali waters. He also suggested recruiting Somali fishermen into the navy and 
coastguards service because they know the area well and where the illegal fishing occurs, and 
they have seamanship and navigation skills. Interviewees 24 and 37 said that Somalia needs 
to provide schools for its children so when they grow up they can have decent jobs and do not 
have to practice piracy. 
 
Another suggestion was deploying armed guards on ships (interviewees 4, 10, 11, 14 and 3). 
However, interviewees 18 and 19 rejected the idea of arming commercial ships, because 
arming ships will transform them from civil vessels to military vessels and push pirates into 
using more heavy weapons which will lead to more violence. Interviewee 19 added that 
because most commercial ships carry chemical products and oil, if pirates use heavier 
weapons against them, there will be a higher risk of sea pollution and fires or explosions on 
board. 
 
Interviewees 1, 2, 3, and 15 suggested increased cooperation and exchange of intelligence 
data between organizations, including navies, ports, and shipping companies. Interviewee 20 
recommended more partnerships from countries in the region to agree to prosecute pirates in 
their courts. She said that at the moment there are only three countries signed up to this 
partnership (Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius), but if Tanzania and other nations signed up, 
this would significantly speed up the process of dealing judicially with suspected pirates. 
Interviewee 18 recommended that international navies in the Somali waters be obliged to 
exchange information about pirates with the Somali government to keep them up-to-date with 
information. He said that this will allow the Somali government to deal with pirates on land 
because, he said, the main problem of piracy is inside Somalia.    
Interviewee 18 pointed out that the current law of the sea is not clear in defining piracy, and 
he recommended an improvement in the current definition to clarify which bodies can 
capture or prosecute pirates in order to end arbitrary arrests and curtail the length of time 
before prisoners are tried in court. 
 
Interviewee 24 recommended that the Kenyan prison authorities provide educational services 
and workshops for Somali prisoners to train them in working skills so when they are set free 
they can obtain decent jobs. He also insisted that the Kenyan government provide better 
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medical care, because many people died in Kenyan prisons through lack of medical 
treatment. Interviewee 37 called for an end to Kenyan governmental corruption so the pirates 
and fishermen would get fair and fast trials in Kenya, claiming that because of the corrupt 
Kenyan justice system, most pirates are free and most fishermen are in the prisons. 
 
Further suggestions included  using force rather than paying ransom (interviewees 11, 12, 13 
and 5); using USV (Unmanned Security Vessels) (interviewee 4); attacking and combatting 
the land bases of pirates - the six land bases are shown in Figure 1) (interviewee 11); and 
avoiding dangerous routes (interview 2).  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The picture that emerges out of this qualitative data from interviewees’ responses is that there 
is a significant difference between piracy in the northern and central Arabian Gulf, on the one 
hand, and piracy in Somalia, on the other hand. The most important fact which differentiates 
the two forms of piracy is kidnapping for ransom, which the Somali pirates do, but the 
Arabian Gulf pirates do not do. Kidnap for ransom satisfies two motives - the financial 
motive and the revenge motive which is generated from hatred against the west. It was 
obvious that some pirates expressed hatred against the west and white people when they said 
they had no intention to attack Arab or Muslims ships. From the interviews, it seems clear 
that this hatred was generated by the illegal fishing and the dumping of chemical waste in 
Somali waters by the western community, and this legitimized piracy in the eyes of pirates 
from Somalia. As we shall see, however, kidnapping exists where several factors coincide, 
including not only hatred, but also failed state and geographical advantage, both of which 
exist in Somalia. In appendix E, there is a list of all the interviewees who participated in the 
two periods of field work. In the next chapter, we analyse quantitative data from reports of 
piracy incidents to develop an understanding of how and where such incidents are likely to 
occur.  
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4 Chapter Four: Analysis of Official Records of Somali Piracy Data 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter three, I analysed qualitative interview data about stakeholders’ perceptions of 
piracy in both the Arabian Gulf and Somalia to determine trends underpinning motives for 
piracy from empirical evidence. In this chapter, I analyse quantitative official data recorded 
in archives such as IMO files in order to better understand the nature of piracy in Somalia. 
There is very little official data available and accessible on piracy in the Arabian Gulf, partly 
because of poor (and in some cases, non-existent) reporting, and partly because piracy 
incidents are now rare in the Arabian Gulf. So this chapter focuses exclusively on Somali 
piracy data from the IMO official piracy reports. The method of study employed was to 
analyse all the individual piracy reports in official records to determine the characteristics of 
the Somali piracy type. A descriptive model was built on SPSS to determine the frequencies 
of each factor. In investigating the Somali piracy type characteristics in more detail, my 
analysis will facilitate the forecast of future threats, and recommend the selection of the most 
appropriate action to take to avoid future attacks in the area. The following variables were 
identified from the modelling in SPSS as the most relevant piracy factors:  
1. Location 
2. Victim’s ship type 
3. Pirate’s ship type 
4. Month 
5. Day of the week 
6. Daytime or night time 
7. Time of day or night 
8. Wave height 
9. Wind speed 
10. Success or failure 
 
SPSS was used to record the above variables with input of all the piracy incidents in the 
Somali region which were officially reported by IMO during Jan 2010 to March 2015 (IMO, 
2015). To find out the historical data for the wave heights and the wind speeds in the region, 
the www.buoyweather.com was used to input my data, which gives an accurate data based on 
locations. The IMO reports assume that all the attacks carried in the Somali region are by 
Somali pirates but, from the interviews I  have made, it was discovered that some other 
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nationalities exist in the Somali region such as Yemeni and Iranian pirates.  Nevertheless, to 
avoid over-complicating the picture, for the purpose of the analyses in this chapter I will 
assume that all the pirates in the Somali region are Somali.    
4.1.1 The  location variable 
 
 I have categorized the locations similar to the location s categories used by the IMO for 
comparative purposes. This variable is important for analysing the threat level in each 
location and also the quality of security units in each location: 
a. The Gulf of Aden 
b. International waters, Yemen 
c. Territorial  waters, Yemen 
d. International waters, Oman 
e. Territorial waters, Oman 
f. International  waters, Somalia 
g. Territorial waters, Somalia 
h. International waters, Kenya 
i. Territorial waters, Kenya 
j. International  waters, Djibouti 
k. Territorial waters, Djibouti 
l. International waters, Seychelles Islands 
m. The Red Sea 
n. International  waters, Iran 
o. Bab Elman dab Strait   
p. Strait of Hurmuz 
 
4.1.2 The victim’s ship type variable 
 
I have categorized the variables in a similar way to the categories used in the piracy report by 
IMO, recording the type of the attacked ship as follows: 
a. Dhow 
b. Bulk carrier 
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c. Tanker (oil and product tankers) 
d. Supply ship 
e. Chemical tanker 
f. Gas carrier 
g. Special purpose ship 
h. Cargo 
i. Auxiliary ship 
j. Container ship 
k. Fishing vessel 
l. Yacht 
m. Barge carrier 
n. LPG carrier 
o. Passenger ship 
p. Vehicle carrier 
q. Tug 
r. Heavy load carrier 
s. Research ship 
t. Cement carrier 
 
4.1.3 The pirate’s ship variable 
 
 I have categorized the pirate’s ship types similar to the categories used by the IMO reports as 
follows: 
a. Skiff 
b. Mother ship 
c. Speed boat 
d. Skiff and mother ship together 
 
4.1.4 Month; Day of the week; Daytime or night-time; and Time of day 
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These timing variables are recorded to understand the frequencies of attacks so we can 
understand the most favoured time for pirates to attack ships so linkages between other 
parameters can then be considered. 
 
4.1.5 Wave height; and Wind speed and direction variables 
 
These variables are important to help forecast threat types dependent on weather conditions. 
 
4.1.6 Success or failure variable 
 
This variable is important to understand the outcomes of different reactions from attacked 
ships regarding the pirates’ ship type, wave, wind and location. 
 
4.2 Similar studies  
There are several studies that have analysed piracy attacks in Somalia.  For example, Hansen 
(2012) analysed the types of ships attacked in Somalia, and how these types of targeted ships 
have changed over the years. Marchione et al. (2014, p. 3) published an interesting article 
which modelled  piracy attacks in Somalia, claiming   that “naval units radius area of action, 
naval units radius of influence, number of pirates, pirates radius of action, pirate inactivity 
time, number of zones in which pirates operate and pirates radius of influence are the 
parameters to simulate and forecast the piracy behaviours in Somalia”. Marchione et al. 
(2014, p. 6]) provided a timescale table of the probability of pirates attacks around the Gulf of 
Aden for the period 1999–2009, showing that “the months that the Somali pirates are mostly 
active are November, March and April and the least month is July”.  Also Marchione et al. 
(2014) provided a table on the density of the types of the ships passing through the Gulf of 
Aden every year, stating that bulk carriers, cargos, oil tankers and containerships are the most 
common ships that travel through it, and therefore the most vulnerable to pirates.  
Madsen et al. (2014, p.2) analysed piracy attacks that occurred in Somalia in 2013, reporting 
that  “486 seafarers were  attacked by the Somali pirates in the region in 2013 where 60 
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commercial ships were  boarded by the pirates. Around 111 hostages were  taken from 
fishing and commercial vessels in 2013 and 54 hostages were still held in 2014”. Madsen et 
al. (2014, p. 3) stated that “out of the piracy attacks in 2013 the most common vessels  
attacked are the tankers (8 attacks: 193 seafarers), cargos (3 attacks: 52 seafarers), containers 
(1 attack: 34 seafafrers), bulk carriers (1 attack: 24 seafarers), fishing vessels (3 attacks: 54 
seafarers) and dhows (2 attacks: 24 seafarers)”.  
Esher et al. (2010) produced a model which simulates the effects of the winds, waves and 
currents on the pirates’ skiffs when they depart a mother ship or a land base. Esher et al. 
(2010, p. 1331) stated that “if the pirates forecast the weather [accurately] then their attack 
would be successful but if they don’t then their attack would fail and they would return to the 
base or to the mothership because the wind and the current would drift them away from the 
target until they run out of supplies”. Esher et al. (2010, p. 1334) presented the results of the 
model by concluding that “wind speed and waves are the most significant variables in the 
model as well as the number of the bases or mother ships around the skiff”. Comparing this 
study with my findings herein, this issue is explored in more depth in my analysis, to find out 
specifically what is the threshold of the wave height and the wind speed that would determine 
the failure or the success of the piracy attack.  
Tsilis   (2011) completed  a masters’ thesis providing a model of regression to analyse  how 
effective  a group  of warships is in protecting a convoy of commercial ships based on the 
variables of the warships’ speeds, convoy’s speed and the pirates’ numbers and speeds.  This 
study is important in finding out what are the best distances between the warships and the 
convoy in order to arrive in time at the attack location, however, there are more variables that 
play significant roles in determining the possible outcomes from these scenarios, as the next 
section shows.  
 
4.3 Findings of descriptive data 
From analysis of the official IMO data on Somali piracy and armed robbery against ships, 
503 reports of incidents (including the successful and the failed attacks) between January 
2010 and March 2015 committed by the pirates in the Somali region were identified.  The 
following  are all the terms shown in the tables and their meanings:  “Valid = the numbers of 
non-missing variables, the Missing = the number of all missing cases which their information 
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were not provided” (IDRE, 2015, p. 1) for example by looking at all of the piracy attacks 
reports and when recording the locations of the attacks, if the location were provided of the 
attack then this would be consider as valid but, if the locations wasn’t provided then the 
number would be added to the missing part. The “Valid present = the sum of only the valid 
cases while the cumulative present row presents all the cases recoded including the valid and 
the missing cases”  (IDRE, 2015, p. 1). 
 The following findings in Table 4.1 shows the frequency statistics tables and charts focusing 
on the ten variables in the introduction to this chapter identified from the IMO piracy attacks 
reports: 
4.3.1 Location 
 
Table 4-1 Locations of the piracy attacks by Somali pirates between 2010 to 2015 
Location 
Sea area of incident  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid International Waters, 
Oman 
129 24.9 25.0 25.0 
International waters, 
Gulf of Aden 
95 18.3 18.4 43.3 
International waters, 
Somalia 
90 17.4 17.4 60.7 
International Waters, 
Yemen 
67 12.9 13.0 73.7 
 Red  Sea 47 9.1 9.1 82.8 
Bab Almandab 43 8.3 8.3 91.1 
 Strait of Hurmuz 11 2.1 2.1 93.2 
International Waters, 
Kenya 
10 1.9 1.9 95.2 
International Waters, 
Seychelles 
9 1.7 1.7 96.9 
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 International waters, 
Iran 
6 1.2 1.2 98.1 
 Territorial waters, 
Yemen 
5 1.0 1.0 99.0 
Territorial Waters, 
Kenya 
2 .4 .4 99.4 
Territorial Waters, 
Oman 
1 .2 .2 99.6 
Territorial Waters, 
Somalia 
1 .2 .2 99.8 
Territorial Waters, 
Djibouti 
1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 517 99.8 100.0  
Missing System 1 .2   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From Table 4.1, we can see that the most dangerous locations of piracy between January 
2010 to March 2015 are the following: 
a.  Omani international waters, 129 attacks 24.9% 
b.  Gulf of Eden, 95 attacks 18.3% 
c. Somali international waters, 90 attacks 17.4% 
d. Yemeni international waters, 67 attacks 12.9% 
e. Red Sea, 47 attacks 9.1% 
f.  Strait of Bab Al-Mandab, 43 attacks 8.3% 
 
Oman has one of the most advanced and effective navies in the region as Oman is wealthier 
than other countries in the region such as Yemen and Somalia, yet as Table 4.1 shows,  the 
most dangerous areas for piracy were Omani international waters. Oman is not a member of 
CTF 150, 151 or 152, demonstrating a head-in-the-sand attitude to the problem of piracy in 
the region. This table reflects supports the claims made by some of the interviewees in the 
causes of piracy in Somalia section as they stated that international ignorance about piracy is 
one of the causes of is increase in certain areas.  
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4.3.2 Victim Ship types 
 
Table 4-2 Victims' Ship Types by Somali pirates between 2010 to 2015 
type 
Type of ship Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid tanker 136 26.3 26.4 26.4 
bulk carrier 105 20.3 20.3 46.7 
chemical tanker 76 14.7 14.7 61.4 
container ship 63 12.2 12.2 73.6 
cargo 62 12.0 12.0 85.7 
fishing vessel 20 3.9 3.9 89.5 
dhow 11 2.1 2.1 91.7 
LPG tanker 8 1.5 1.6 93.2 
 vehicle carrier 8 1.5 1.6 94.8 
yacht 5 1.0 1.0 95.7 
barge carrier 5 1.0 1.0 96.7 
gas carrier 3 .6 .6 97.3 
tug 3 .6 .6 97.9 
heavy load 
carrier 
3 .6 .6 98.4 
supply ship 2 .4 .4 98.8 
special purpose 2 .4 .4 99.2 
auxiliary 1 .2 .2 99.4 
passenger ship 1 .2 .2 99.6 
research ship 1 .2 .2 99.8 
cement carrier 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 516 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 .4   
Total 518 100.0   
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From the table 4.2, we can see that the types of ships most attacked are the followings 
making other ships less desired by the Somali pirates: 
a. Tankers, attacked 136 times 26.3% 
b. Bulk carriers, attacked 105 times 20.3% 
c. Chemical tankers, attacked 76 times 14.7% 
d. Container ships, attacked 63 times 12.2% 
e. Cargo ships, attacked 62 times 12% 
 
The most desired ships chased by the Somali pirates are categorised by type (not flag) as 
shown in Table 4.2, indicating that Somali pirates are motivated to attack the ships based on 
the easiness of the target, not the nationality of the flag. This table supports the claim that 
some of the Somali pirates (not all) are not motivated by political or radical motives, as they 
do not target specific nation’s vessels. However, in earlier chapters I have mentioned that 
some of the literature and the interviewees stated that there are already three types of pirates 
in Somalia the fishermen, Alshabab and ordinary criminals meaning that this table might 
reflect a type of pirate who seeks easy and valuable targets rather than targeting specific 
nations. 
4.3.3 Pirates’ Ships 
 
From table 4.3 we indicate the types of ship that pirates used to commit piracy. Each type of 
pirates’ vessel used in the attack is recorded within its frequencies. 
Table 4-3 Pirates' ships types for the Somali pirates between 2010 to 2015 
Pirate ship types 
Type of ship Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid skiff 399 77.0 88.5 88.5 
mother ship 6 1.2 1.3 89.8 
speed boat 33 6.4 7.3 97.1 
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Dhow 3 .6 .7 97.8 
skiff and mother 
ship 
10 1.9 2.2 100.0 
Total 451 87.1 100.0  
Missing System 67 12.9   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From table 4.3, we see that the skiffs and the speedboats are the most used by the Somali 
pirates when attacking ships. Comparing this table to the claims in the literature and the data 
from the interviews we can see that it supports those claims that the main ships used by the 
pirates are skiffs, speedboats and mother ships.  
 
4.3.4 Month 
 
The table 4.4 explains which months of the year were more dangerous for piracy between 
January 2010 and March 2015: 
Table 4-4 Months of the attacks by the Somali pirates between 2010 to 2015 
month 
Month Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid March 76 14.7 14.7 14.7 
January 59 11.4 11.4 26.1 
April 52 10.0 10.1 36.2 
February 49 9.5 9.5 45.6 
May 48 9.3 9.3 54.9 
November 48 9.3 9.3 64.2 
June 41 7.9 7.9 72.1 
October 35 6.8 6.8 78.9 
August 30 5.8 5.8 84.7 
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July 25 4.8 4.8 89.6 
December 21 4.1 4.1 93.6 
September 18 3.5 3.5 97.1 
Total 517 99.8 100.0  
Missing System 1 .2   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From table 4.4, we can see that the most common month for attacks committed by pirates is 
March, and the safest months are September, August, December and July. 
One reason why piracy attacks are less frequent in August, September and July is because of 
the monsoon season from May to September. Another reason is Ramadan: the month of 
Ramadan is based on the Moon calendar which is a holy month for Muslims who fast during 
Ramadan from sunrise to sunset. The followings are the attacks during Ramadan: 
a. Ramadan 2010 was from 11 August to 10 September, during which there were 10 
attacks, all of them during the day time, but nine of the attacks were in the early 
morning between 0400 to 0800 when the pirates can cope with piracy and fasting 
by avoiding the high temperatures in the afternoon. 
 
b. Ramadan 2011 was from 1 August to 1 September, during which there were 16 
attacks, four of which were during night time. Six of the 12 day time attacks were 
in the early morning between 0600 and 0700 when the weather is not very hot and 
pirates can cope with piracy and fasting. 
 
c. Ramadan 2012 was from 20 July to 18 August, when there was only one attack, at 
1200. 
 
d. Ramadan 2013 was from 9 July to 7 August, when there was also only one attack, 
at 1500.  
 
e. Ramadan 2014 was from 28 June to 28 July, when there were no attacks   
 
 Ramadan is one of the significant reasons which the Somali pirates decrease their activities 
during this month. Somali pirates fast during Ramadan, and they have no energy to be at sea 
all day and looking for targets.  
 
4.3.5 Day of the week 
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Table 4.5 indicates which day of the week is the most dangerous day for piracy and which 
day is the safest day for target ships to travel: 
Table 4-5  the numbers of the attacks occurred on each day of the week conducted by the Somali pirates 
between 2010 to 2015 
Day of week 
Day of week Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Wednesday 90 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Saturday 80 15.4 15.5 32.9 
Tuesday 77 14.9 14.9 47.8 
Thursday 69 13.3 13.3 61.1 
Sunday 68 13.1 13.2 74.3 
Monday 67 12.9 13.0 87.2 
Friday 66 12.7 12.8 100.0 
Total 517 99.8 100.0  
Missing System 1 .2   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From Table 4.5 Wednesday is the most dangerous day of the week and Friday is the safest. It 
may be that there are marginally fewer attacks on Fridays compared to other days because 
Friday is the holy day for Muslims, and Somalis will be in their mosques at noon (Friday 
prayers are compulsory for Muslims to practice).   
4.3.6 Day-time or night-time 
 
Table 4.6 explains the number of attacks committed during daytime, and the number of 
attacks committed during night-time: 
 
Table 4-6 Numbers of the attacks occurred based on the (Day or Night) which the Somali pirates operated 
between 2010 to 2015 
Day / Night 
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 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Day 390 75.3 78.2 78.2 
Night 108 20.8 21.6 99.8 
Total 499 96.3 100.0  
Missing System 19 3.7   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From the table and the figure above we can see that daytime is more dangerous than night- 
time for piracy attacks - 390 attacks being committed during day-time (75.3%) and 108 
attacks being committed during night-time (20.8%). From the findings of field work 
interviews with Somali pirates in section (3.4.2 Manifestation of financial piracy in Somalia), 
I learned that pirates are more likely to operate during  day time because it is easier to 
recognize ships in daylight, and Somali pirates do not usually use GPS or radar which make it 
difficult to operate during the night. Also from the interviews’ finding with private ships 
companies, maritime security companies and naval officers, I learnt that the commercial 
ships’ strategies were to switch off their navigation lights at nights when they travel through 
dangerous areas, which makes it harder for  pirates  to spot them.   
4.3.7  Time of day or night  
 
The Table 4.7 shows the times of the attacks and the peak times for the attacks during the day 
or night, indicating the most dangerous and safest times during the day and the most 
dangerous and safest times during the night.  In table 4.7 which show the times of the day in 
the form 24 hours and the frequency of the attack during the specific time of the day. 
Table 4-7 Time of the attacks conducted by the Somali pirates between 2010 to 2015 based on the time of 
the day 
Time 
Time of day/night Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0100 5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
0200 15 2.9 3.0 4.0 
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0300 31 6.0 6.2 10.2 
0400 26 5.0 5.2 15.4 
0500 36 6.9 7.2 22.6 
0600 39 7.5 7.8 30.4 
0700 32 6.2 6.4 36.8 
0800 32 6.2 6.4 43.2 
0900 34 6.6 6.8 50.0 
1000 23 4.4 4.6 54.6 
1100 31 6.0 6.2 60.8 
1200 39 7.5 7.8 68.6 
1300 32 6.2 6.4 75.0 
1400 33 6.4 6.6 81.6 
1500 23 4.4 4.6 86.2 
1600 14 2.7 2.8 89.0 
1700 13 2.5 2.6 91.6 
1800 8 1.5 1.6 93.2 
1900 7 1.4 1.4 94.6 
2000 7 1.4 1.4 96.0 
2100 6 1.2 1.2 97.2 
2200 5 1.0 1.0 98.2 
2300 5 1.0 1.0 99.2 
2400 4 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 500 96.5 100.0  
Missing System 18 3.5   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From table 4.7, we can see that the number of attacks starts to increase at 0300 and the peak 
time for the attacks is 0600 then the number of the attacks remains high from 0600 till 1500. 
After 1500 the number of the attacks decreases rapidly; after 1800 the piracy attacks remain 
very low till 0100, then the attacks start to rise again after 0200, but increase rapidly again 
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after 0300. So during the day the active piracy time is from 0500 to 1400, but during the night 
time the most dangerous times are between 0200 and 0500. 
4.3.8   Wave Height   
 
The following table and figure will show the wave heights when piracy attacks were 
committed, from which we can understand the effect of the sea’s state on maritime piracy. 
The wave height column on the left shows the actual wave height in feet and next to each 
height the frequency of the numbers of the attacks been committed to that height. At the end 
we will be able to understand what is the maximum practical wave height for the pirates to be 
able to board the ship which cannot operate in higher wave heights: 
Table 4-8 Wave heights which the Somali pirates conducted their attacks in between 2010 to 2015 
Wave height 
Wave height in 
feet Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .00 11 2.1 2.3 2.3 
.50 111 21.4 23.3 25.6 
1.00 25 4.8 5.3 30.9 
1.50 13 2.5 2.7 33.6 
2.00 50 9.7 10.5 44.1 
2.50 7 1.4 1.5 45.6 
3.00 140 27.0 29.4 75.0 
3.50 2 .4 .4 75.4 
4.00 46 8.9 9.7 85.1 
4.50 2 .4 .4 85.5 
5.00 40 7.7 8.4 93.9 
6.00 11 2.1 2.3 96.2 
6.50 1 .2 .2 96.4 
7.00 5 1.0 1.1 97.5 
8.00 2 .4 .4 97.9 
140 
 
9.00 4 .8 .8 98.7 
10.00 2 .4 .4 99.2 
13.00 1 .2 .2 99.4 
15.00 3 .6 .6 100.0 
Total 476 91.9 100.0  
Missing System 42 8.1   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From the table 4.8 we can see that 357 (68.9%) piracy attacks were committed when the 
wave heights were 3 feet and below. At wave heights of between 3.5 and 6 feet, there were 
101 piracy attacks (19.4%), and between 6.5 and 15 feet there were 18 piracy attacks (3.4%). 
The wave height factor is a very important issue that restricts the movement of the pirates. 
The pirates use relatively small skiffs to attack bigger ships in order to board them, and this 
technique needs experience and good seamanship skills. If the waves are high, this hinders 
pirates from making an approach, and makes it difficult for the pirates to deploy ladders to 
climb the ships.   
4.3.9 Wind speed   
 
Table 4.9 identifies wind speeds when the piracy attacks were committed.   
Table 4-9 Wind speeds which the Somali pirates conducted their attacks in between 2010 to 2015 
Wind speed 
Wind speed in 
knots Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 76 14.7 16.0 16.0 
2.00 76 14.7 16.0 31.9 
3.00 8 1.5 1.7 33.6 
4.00 15 2.9 3.2 36.8 
5.00 71 13.7 14.9 51.7 
6.00 12 2.3 2.5 54.2 
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7.00 14 2.7 2.9 57.1 
8.00 26 5.0 5.5 62.6 
9.00 2 .4 .4 63.0 
10.00 138 26.6 29.0 92.0 
11.00 1 .2 .2 92.2 
12.00 2 .4 .4 92.6 
14.00 1 .2 .2 92.9 
15.00 22 4.2 4.6 97.5 
17.00 2 .4 .4 97.9 
18.00 2 .4 .4 98.3 
25.00 8 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 476 91.9 100.0  
Missing System 42 8.1   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From the above table and figure, we can see that 438 attacks (84.5%) were committed when 
the wind speeds were between 0 to 10 knots, but only 38 attacks (7.3%) were committed 
when the wind speeds were between 10 and 25 knots. This means that the pirates are more 
effective and able to operate when the wind speeds are 10 knots and below, but they are much 
less able to operate if the wind speed is more than 10 knots. Again, this is related to boarding 
techniques.  
4.3.10  Success or failure 
 
Table 4.10 identifies the rates of success of the attacks, evaluated according to the boarding 
of the victims’ ships. If the pirates managed to board the ship, this will signify a successful 
attack, but if they fail to board the ship, this will be considered a failed piracy attack.  
Table 4-10 the number of the attacks which the Somali pirates failed or succeeded to board the ships 
between 2010 to 2015 
Success/failure 
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Success or failure Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 106 20.5 20.5 20.5 
no 411 79.3 79.5 100.0 
Total 517 99.8 100.0  
Missing System 1 .2   
Total 518 100.0   
 
From table 4.10, we can see that pirates failed to board the victim ships 411 times (79.6%), 
and they managed to board the victim ships 106 times (20.4%). The reasons for the failure of 
pirates’ attacks are different in every case, depending on such factors as armed guards, naval 
ship proximity, wave heights, wind speeds and other variables.  Later in this chapter I will 
analyse whether some of those variables are significant in relation to the failure of the attacks, 
specifically the wave height or wind speed factors.  
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
From the analyses presented in this chapter, firstly, pirates are observed to be restricted by  
marine environment conditions such as  high wave height and fast wind speeds as presented 
in section 4.3.8 and 4.3.9, so commercial ships can take advantage  of this information  when 
planning their routes or forming their security watches to minimise risk of attack. On a 
cautionary note, in practice it is difficult to prove a direct link between the decision-making 
of pirates of whether to attack or not and the prevailing weather conditions.  However, the 
latter influences the implementation of approach and boarding a targeted vessel to be 
attacked. Secondly, Somali pirates prioritize tankers, bulk carriers, chemical tankers, 
containers, cargos, and then fishing vessels in terms of vessel type to attack. This suggests 
that Somali pirates select targets based on the type of vessel, not its flag (i.e. the nationality of 
its owner or crew).  In other words, pirates are not motivated by ideological motives because 
if they were, they would attack specific flags.  Therefore, this data suggests they are more 
opportunistic, which contradicts some of the data provided by pirates in chapter 3. Thirdly, 
we find that fishing vessels come in at sixth place, which suggests that illegal fishing is not 
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the most significant factor for piracy in Somalia.  However, this assumes   that fishing vessels 
have similar security to the other vessels, but some of the data provided by pirates in chapter 
three stated that most of the fishing vessels in the area are protected by the navies. To 
conclude, from this synthesis of data analysis, Somali pirates select targets which are slow, 
with low free board, little protection, and potentially provide high prices for successful 
ransom negotiations.  
When analysing the different variables identified in Chapter 3 to highlight relationships from 
analyses performed in this chapter, the results show that Somali pirates appear to work at 
specific times which means that if ship owners take note of those times, they could avoid 
most of the attacks. Pirates prefer to operate in daytime because of the visibility advantage, 
which also can be an advantage for the naval units and armed guards to spot the pirates. This 
is in contrast to Iraqi and Iranian pirates in the Arabian Gulf who prefer to operate at night so 
they can avoid being detected by navies in the area. Ramadan also plays a significant role in 
Somali piracy activities: pirates being of Muslim religion operate less in Ramadan time 
because of the fasting time which is from sunrise to sunset for one month every year during 
which time they are too weak to mount pirate attacks. Ramadan affects only Somali pirates 
because they operate during the daytime:  it does not affect Iranian pirates in the Arabian 
Gulf who operate during night-time which is not fasting time. Iranian pirates are more active 
than Somalis in Ramadan also because Qatari navies and coastguards reduce their patrols 
during Ramadan.  
Somali pirates also work in specific locations: they are more active in Omani international 
waters, despite Oman having one of the strongest navies in the region. But, as we noted 
earlier, Oman is not yet a member of any of the Task Forces in the region to combat piracy 
such as CTF 150, 151 and 152.  
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5 Chapter Five: Thematic Discussion 
 
5.1  Introduction to key themes categorising piracy behaviour 
In this chapter, the nine themes that have emerged from the analyses presented in the 
previous two chapters arising from empirical and secondary data collected during 
fieldwork and extensive reviews of grey literature will be discussed. The purpose of this 
thematic analysis is to build the first categorisation of piracy behaviour to aid 
development of formulating future policy to tackle piracy.  These themes are as follows:  
1. Old and new piracy;  
2. Definition  of piracy; 
3. Motivation  of pirates;  
4. Causes of piracy;  
5. Manifestations of piracy;    
6. Consequences of piracy; 
7. Responses to piracy;   
8. Violations of human rights of suspected pirates, and;   
9. Proposed solutions to piracy problems. 
 
These nine emergent themes help address the research questions proposed at the beginning of 
the research. The main research question for this thesis is “are the current anti-piracy policies 
and responses able to eradicate piracy?” This question was broken up into the following sub-
questions: 
a. Do the current definitions of piracy define piracy in the best way?   [Theme 2] 
b. What are the consequences of piracy on the economy, human rights and security 
in the two research areas? [Themes 6 and 8]  
c. What are the differences between the two types of piracy in the two research 
areas? [Themes 1 and 5] 
d. What are the motives of pirates to undertake acts of piracy in the two research 
areas? [Theme 3 ]  
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e. What are the reasons for and causes of piracy in the two research areas? [Theme 
4]  
f. What are the current responses and policies for countering piracy?  Are they 
effective? [Theme 7]  
g. What are the links between pirates and terrorists, if any? [Theme 5]  
h. What are the effects of environmental variables such as sea state and weather 
conditions on the efficacy of piracy tactics? [Theme 7] 
i. What is the best way to mitigate piracy? [Theme 9] 
The overall aim of this research is to answer these questions in order to suggest an effective 
maritime policy to deal with piracy in both the Arabian Gulf, where the pirates are Iranians 
and Iraqi, and in the Somali basin, where the pirates are Somalis and who have recently 
expanded their areas of operation far away from the Somali coast, near to the Strait of 
Hurmuz. 
 
5.2 Old and new piracy  
 
Several authors (Mejia et al., 2009; Baniela, 2010 and Haywood & Spivak, 2012) seek to 
distinguish between old and new piracy. For instance,  Mejia et al. (2009, p. 1) said that 
“piracy nowadays is much bloodier in terms of being more violent, as the Somali pirates for 
example kill use heavy weapons to attack, than the old form of piracy”. Findings from the 
research reported herein do not support this statement in relation to piracy in the Arabian 
Gulf, because during the first field work in Kuwait and Qatar, the interviewees stated that 
Iraqi pirates and Iranian pirates used minimal violence. For example, Qatari Coast guard 
officers said that Iranian pirates used a very low level of violence against seafarers because 
they were only looking for food, cash and mobile phones, and this suggests that piracy in the 
Arabian Gulf was less violent than Somali piracy. However, I agree that the statement of  
Mejia et al. (2009) is applicable to contemporary Somalia, because Somali pirates use  
heavier weapons than pirates in the past have used,  which are capable of inflicting much 
more damage on the victims. Also naval forces in the Somali area are willing to use force to 
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detain pirates which means that pirates must act fast and effectively because capture might 
mean death for them. Most of the naval officers and private security company  managers that 
were interviewed during the  first period of field-work  claimed  that Somali pirates usually 
carry lethal weapons such as Kalashnikovs, grenades, and RPGs, which meant that they 
themselves were obliged to use heavier arms in order to successfully detain pirates. During 
the second period of fieldwork in Mombasa’s prison, I observed injuries on pirates’ bodies 
and saw several pirates with arms and legs amputated due to their combats with the naval 
units. Most of the pirates claimed that they had business partners who had been killed in 
combat with the naval units in the Somali area.  
Baniela (2010, p. 192) compared the old form of piracy with  the new form by saying “that 
piracy in the past was more as adventures in novels but nowadays it’s a business which 
makes profits from merchant ships which have limited defence capabilities”. I disagree with 
Baniela (2010), because  piracy was always a business which sought profit from merchant 
ships.  Also I disagree that piracy is a business benefiting from low defence capabilities of 
merchant ships, because Somali pirates are willing to attack all type of ships whether they are 
armed or not. Indeed, the reasons why the Somali pirates now are more armed and more 
brutal is because the merchant ships started to use armed guards on board, which influenced 
pirates to develop their weaponry capabilities to compete with merchant ships’ increased 
defence capabilities.  
Haywood & Spivak (2012, p. 7) offered a different historical perspective, saying that 
“through history, states have three different views for pirates (allies, criminals or 
enemies) and each view will define the way to treat with pirates, if the state viewed 
pirates as criminals then they will deal with them similar to other  kinds of criminals with 
formal courts and justice, but if the state viewed pirates as enemies then they will apply 
the rules of war on them and use lethal force against them and when they capture them 
they will be dealt as a prisoners of war without rules and requirements of evidence and 
judicial process... [In] this century the states generally view pirates as criminals and not 
enemies nor allies”.  
I agree with Haywood & Spivak (2012) that contemporary states do not regard pirates as 
allies because most of the states in the region are participating in countering piracy. Although  
interviewee one (the Kuwaiti  Coastguard Officer) said that Iran might support Iranian pirates 
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in the Arabian Gulf for political reasons to disturb international shipping in the area,  there is 
little  evidence to support the idea that governments treat  pirates as allies. It is true that some 
of the interviewees suggested that the Somali government supports piracy in some way, but I 
think that although there are some corrupt government members in Somali who might deal 
with pirates, I do not believe that the Somali government would benefit from treating Somali 
pirates as allies, because it would be seen as sponsoring state terrorism.  
In my view, the history of piracy shows a divergence between traditional piracy which is 
financially motivated and modern piracy which may be either exclusively motivated by 
financial gain or partly motivated by financial gain and partly motivated by terrorism. The 
Iranian and Iraqi pirates in the Northern Arabian Gulf exemplify the former category, while 
the Somali pirates in the Southern Gulf area exemplify the latter category. 
5.3 The definition of piracy 
Defining maritime piracy is the first step to deal with it in an appropriate and effective way 
because all the responses (military and political) depend on the way it is understood, and by 
its definition we can understand and address the causes, motives and categorizations of 
pirates, Also from a legal point of view, without an agreed definition, especially 
internationally, it makes formal governance difficult to implement. In this section, we shall 
see how helpful the different definitions that have been offered are in answering the research 
question: “Do the current piracy definitions define piracy in the best way?”  Haywood and 
Spivak (2012, p. 7) pointed out that the oldest piracy definition is from Plutarch (the Greek 
historian): “any attack on sea and coastal land without any authority”. Plutarch’s definition 
leaves the decision to the state to decide whether pirates are enemies or criminals so they can 
declare war against them (if they are deemed enemies) or not (if they are deemed criminals), 
so the definition of piracy was essential to determine the correct governmental response. 
Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 10) themselves assert that “the definitions must differentiate 
between maritime piracy, maritime terrorism and maritime crime”: “(1) maritime piracy 
means an act or attempted act of boarding a vessel to obtain financial gain from objects on 
board, and/or from kidnapping hostages and/or seizing the vessel for ransom; (2) maritime 
terrorism means an act or attempted act of boarding a vessel to commit some offence which 
draws the world’s attention to a religious/ideological cause; (3) and maritime crime means 
any criminal act committed against any sea-going vessel”. However, Haywood and Spivak, 
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(2012, p. 10)’s analysis is based mainly on the motives behind the piracy in differentiating 
between the three types of attack on ships, and as shown next, motives are not a helpful 
means of defining piracy.  
The most common contemporary piracy definitions are those issued by the IMB and 
UNCLOS.  IMB (2009, p. 3) defines piracy as “the act of boarding any vessel with intent to 
commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of 
the act”. The piracy definition provided by UNCLOS (1982, p. 60) is “(a) any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft. (ii) 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) 
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge 
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
an act described in the above sub-paragraphs”. There are two critical factors here – location 
and motivation.  
 
5.3.1 Location 
 
According to the UNCLOS definition, “piracy can only take place on the high seas”, 
otherwise (i.e. if it takes place in a state’s territorial waters) it is maritime crime. But the 
IMB’s definition of piracy has no location limits. Ryan (2010, p. 3) has pointed out that this 
means we must interpret piracy in territorial waters as armed robbery when using the 
UNCLOS definition, but as a piracy crime, which is an international crime, when using the 
IMB definition. The UNCLOS definition has an unfortunate consequence in practice – that it 
makes the task of capturing pirates more difficult. For example, in Somalia there is no 
government, security, coastguards or navy, which means that Somali pirates sometimes attack 
ships in international waters and drag them into Somali territorial waters where under 
UNCLOS’ definition, international warships would not be able to chase them. This situation 
leaves international naval ships with two options: either they violate international law by 
chasing the pirates inside Somali territorial waters; or they stop the chase operation. Both 
options may well result in setting the pirates free, for example some navies release pirates 
after they capture them in territorial waters because they know that the territorial nation’s 
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court will set the pirates free because of the navies’ violation of international law (see section 
3.7.2). Conversely, Iranian pirates attack Qatari ships inside Qatari territorial waters and drag 
them outside the 12 nm territorial waters, where, under UNCLOS, Qatari coastguard ships 
cannot chase them and have to contact the Qatari navy which takes time, to the advantage of 
the pirates. Another practical disadvantage of using the UNCLOS definition is that it would 
allow states like Oman to escape their international obligations to combat piracy. Oman has 
the most organized and capable navy in the region yet Omani territorial waters are among the 
waters most frequented by Somali pirates, and the country could escape its obligation to 
combat piracy in its territorial waters by using the UNCLOS definition. Oman is the only 
GCC country which is not part of the Combined Task Forces to counter piracy either in the 
Arabian Gulf or the Somali region, despite it being the only country located in both the 
Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (CMF, 2002).  
 
 The IMB definition is preferable to the UNLCOS definition because it gives more flexibility 
in the matter of location, at least in waters close to weak or failed states (weak like Iraq after 
the second Gulf War, and failed like Somalia), and to states that have limited naval capacity 
such as Qatar to allow them to act against pirates. However, unlike Hastings (2009), I would 
not dismiss the UNCLOS definition altogether. Hastings (2009, p. 217) argues that 
“distinctions between the exact same crimes by location have led to misunderstanding the 
real cause behind piracy in Somalia”, and that “he prefers to use the IMB’s piracy definition 
because it defines piracy as crime committed in both the territorial and the international 
waters”. But in places like Kuwait and Qatar who have successful navies and coastguards 
they must be careful about allowing their officers to chase pirates into successful states’ 
territorial waters as this would violate the territorial borders of those states. So it would be 
practical for international navies traveling into those regions to use the UNCLOS piracy 
definition and respect the location limitations of the definition by contacting the local 
authorities of these states in the case of piracy attack within their territorial waters or if the 
pirates escaped and entered the territorial waters of states such as Qatar or Kuwait. Thus an 
integrated approach to defining location that covers both territorial and international waters 
would allow greater flexibility by allowing both state and non-state forces to chase pirates 
and take action regardless of the location. This could also deter pirates who have previously 
relied on countering this loophole in current maritime law. 
 
150 
 
In other words, the issue of piracy location has to be interpreted according to circumstances:  
flexibility is a key issue to counter pirates taking advantage of current weaknesses in the legal 
system.  Using the UNCLOS (1982) definition exclusively could release the obligation of the 
international task forces to combat piracy in the territorial waters of weak or failed states. But 
using the IMB definition exclusively could legalize international states invading others’ local 
waters by using the excuse of combating piracy. The only way to resolve this conundrum is 
on a case-by-case basis, by assessing the relative risks of using the UNCLOS or the IMB 
definition in each situation.    
 
Haywood and Spivak, (2012, p. 10) mention another issue with the location element of the 
UNCLOS piracy definition - that considering piracy as armed robbery or crime if it is 
committed in the territorial waters of any country might give an inaccurate picture of the 
piracy rate in that country. For example, if all the piracy attacks are committed in Somali 
territorial waters, then Somalia could claim officially that Somalia is clear of piracy as the 
attacks would be considered as armed robberies which are local crimes. This reporting issue 
was raised by Qatari coastguard officers as they reported that some governments in the 
Arabian Gulf countries recommend the coastguard authorities do not report some of the 
piracy attacks because the high rate of piracy crimes might scare off investors and raise 
insurance premiums which may impact the economies in some countries. A Kuwaiti 
coastguard officer provided me with a report of 67 piracy attacks committed in Kuwaiti 
waters between 2003 and 2007, and the Qatari coastguard officer provided me with a report 
of 37 piracy attacks committed in Qatari waters between 2008 and 2012, but none of these 
reports appeared in the subsequent official IMB’s world piracy and armed robbery reports 
(IMO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). The reason for these 
omissions, I understood from the interviewees in the Arabian Gulf, was that the local 
authorities did not report these piracy attacks because they thought they were not serious - i.e. 
not damaging the national economy or injuring the seafarer. It seems that defining and 
reporting attacks is left to local authorities, ships masters or the companies to decide whether 
or not to report all piracy attacks (see section 3.7.1) this is not a satisfactory state of affairs 
because these actions would provide a false trend of piracy in the Arabian Gulf region.  
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5.3.2 Motivation 
 
The second issue raised by the UNCLOS piracy definition is piracy motivation, since 
UNCLOS states that piracy has to be motivated by private ends. However, Joseph (2010, p. 
1283) rightly stated that “political and ideological motives (defending the waters from illegal 
fishery by doing piracy is one of the ideological piracy examples) can pose the same threats 
at sea as pirates with private financial motives”.  The requirement of private ends motivation 
in the UNCLOS definition would distract security units and justice systems into looking for 
different motives behind exactly the same types of crimes with the same dangers and the 
same impacts on safety and economy As Sterio (2010, p. 1485) pointed out, some of the 
Somali pirates’ ransom money goes to support terrorism activities in Somalia which means 
that pirates with financial motives are also supporting terrorism.  Moreover, most of the 
Somali pirates motivated by money are also linked with political goals, so it is very difficult 
to distinguish between pirates and terrorists. Like Sterio (2010), I believe that pirates and 
terrorists have much of their goals in common (as they all seek for kidnap for ransom), and 
there is no point in trying to distinguish between their motives when defining piracy. From 
my second field work findings in Kenya with Somali pirates, it was clear that their hatred 
against the West for illegal fishing and dumping chemical waste was mixed up with their 
financial motives, thereby making piracy overlap with terrorism. Because of this overlap 
between Somali pirates and maritime terrorists in Somali I think that it is wise to remove the 
private ends element from the UNCLOS piracy definition when defining Somali piracy.  The 
practical difficulty of distinguishing at sea between motives might leave the issue turning on 
the subjective estimation of motivations by the naval warships’ masters.  
 
Young (2007, p. 11) correctly stated that the IMB piracy definition - “piracy is an act of 
boarding or attempting to board any ship with intent to commit theft or any other crime and 
with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of the act” - is more reliable than 
the UNCLOS definition as it defines piracy purely according to its impact on victims, not 
upon its motivation.  Moreover,   if the naval units in the area use the UNCLOS definition 
which is based on motives, they can make wrong estimations which can lead to extreme 
violations of human rights, resulting in a worsening of the piracy problem. 
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5.4 The motivations behind piracy  
 Although the case is put forward based on evidence gathered for this research that the 
definition of piracy should not include motivation, this does not mean that pirates’ 
motivations are unimportant to our understanding of piracy. On the contrary, it is essential to 
study pirates’ motivations to grasp the nature of piracy. However, pirates’ motivations are 
often complex. Many authors have suggested that the pirates in Somalia are driven by 
ideological (Whitman, 2012, p. 31) or political motives (Dillon, 2005, p. 161; Joseph, 2010, 
p. 1273; Sterio, 2010, p. 1459) and that the pirates’ groups in Somalia are organized and 
cooperate with the Alshabab organization. However, these claims lack hard evidence, and 
other authors have suggested that the pirates in Somalia are motivated only by financial ends 
and that the pirates have no links with terrorist groups (Haywood and Spivak, 2012, p. 16;  
Gathii, 2010, p. 107;  Leeson, 2010, p. 1220). For example, Ong (2014, p. 268) said “there is 
no strong evidence that Al-Shabab in Somalia has a connection with piracy”. The truth is 
more complicated than either of these explanations suggests. Pirates in Somalia can be 
categorised into three different groups with different (and sometimes mixed) motivations:  (1) 
the original pirates who were fishers, and engaged in piracy because their fishing 
opportunities areas were degraded by foreign vessels; (2) the later pirates who were ordinary 
criminals and joined piracy for the high ransoms; and (3) the latest pirates who belong to the 
Al-Shabab group and have some ideological motivations.   
 
At first sight, the first group seems to have no political motives: the original pirates, the 
fishermen, were pushed into piracy because of illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping in 
Somali waters which decimated the fish-stock and left them with no other alternative way of 
living. However, their resentment against the foreign vessels which were responsible for this 
marine degradation added a political twist to their financial motives. Some pirates whom I 
interviewed claimed that they only attack Western ships because they think they are engaged 
in illegal fishing, and that they would not attack any Muslim or Arabic ships in the area. In 
the case of the second group - the later pirates who were ordinary criminals and joined piracy 
to cash in on the high ransoms – they were overwhelmingly motivated by financial profit and 
manifested no political motives. The third group, however, had both financial and ideological 
motives. Some of these pirates are related to organized criminal gangs such as Al-Shabab, 
who have some non-financial motives for their piracy.  Others, even if they are not working 
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in a gang or with Al-Shabab, have some ideological or radical motivations in addition to their 
financial motivations.  
 
In the Arabian Gulf, however, piracy is motivated by purely financial gain, even in the case 
of the Iraqi and the Iranian pirates; otherwise terrorism or ideological crimes would occur in 
places such as Kuwait or Qatar. Although some of the interviewees claimed that the Iranian 
pirates are motivated and supported by the Iranian government to attack the ships in the area 
of the interviewees, no solid evidence was collected during this research to support these 
assertions. On the contrary, evidence of the decline of piracy in the Arabian Gulf seems to 
show that pirates operated in the area only because of the financial crisis arising out of state 
failure.     
 
 Liss (2011, p. 157, 158) provides an interesting parallel between the first group of Somali 
pirates and piracy in SE Asia, discussing “the different motivations between pirates who have 
private, political or radical ends in the South Asian Region”. She explained the different 
drivers behind terrorist, guerrillas and other criminal organizations that use piracy, claiming 
“there are some links between Alqaueda and piracy in the Southeast Asia and Bangladesh”, 
and explaining how “piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh resulted from a variety of 
factors including the impact of ecological degradation and overfishing”. Evidently, the 
situation in Southeast Asia bears some similarity to the Somali case, in that violation of the 
marine environment as a cause of producing a motive for the pirates to cooperate with 
terrorists is common to both. This may be why both the Somali and the South Eastern Asian 
pirates are much more brutal than the Iranian and Iraqi pirates in the Arabian Gulf as the 
violation of the marine environment factor does not exist in the Arabian Gulf region because 
the Arabian Gulf states have a very powerful and effective fishery and marine environment 
protection sector which effectively eliminated such acts in the maritime sector (see section 
3.3.2).  
 
Sterio (2010, p. 1458), somewhat similarly, said that “modern pirates in general, not only in 
Somalia, resort to violence because of ideological and political aims”. She mentioned piracy 
in South Asia and said that “piracy there is carried out by terrorist organizations such as, the 
Jemaah Islamiya and the Mumpulan Mujahideen in Malaysia; the Moro National Liberation 
Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; and Laskar 
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Jihad in Indonesia”, and she gave examples of some of those groups hijacking ships and 
asking for ransoms. The author used the term “piratization of terrorism,” and applied it to 
Somalia. She said that “terrorism already has a foothold in Somalia” and she gave examples 
of “terrorism attacks by the Islamist rebel group: 23 people died from a terrorist attack in a 
medical school graduation ceremony in Maqadishuio, in December 2009”. Sterio (2010, p. 
1455) stated that “pirates are linked to terrorist organizations, with whom they exchange 
weapons and finance”. She said that “Al-qaueda engaged in maritime attacks in USA and 
France (e.g. the attack on USS Cole in 2000), and that Osama Bin-laden had almost twenty 
fighters who are called the Alqaueda Navy”, showing how terrorists can mobilize at sea. 
Sterio (2010, p. 1460) gave an example when “Osama Bin-laden forced a merchant vessel to 
deliver explosives used to bomb the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998”. 
Sterio (2010, p. 1460) suggests that  
 
“modern pirates in South Asia and Somalia are very similar to terrorists because they 
are very well organized; that they discriminate between targets according to their 
nationalities; that they prefer to take hostages from several states and demand ransoms 
from their countries because it gives them more than one chance to get ransoms; and 
that like terrorist operations, piracy operations are managed by war-lords who live in 
the land and the dirty work is conducted by youths who suffer  from poverty”.  
 
This is exactly the method of working adopted by Osama Bin-laden and the Al-qaueda 
organization. Furthermore, Sterio (2010, p. 1455) suggests that “piracy and terrorist 
organizations may be  working together as allies, and thus  piracy in general and in our 
research areas serves  political ends  either in a direct or indirect way”. I agree with much of 
Sterio’s argument. From my fieldwork findings, some of the interviewees claimed that 
Alshabab and pirates are working together and there is a high level of cooperation between 
the two groups.  
  
Joseph (2010, p. 1273) focuses on the third group of Somali pirates, suggesting that “modern 
piracy is organized and structured”, and promotes terror and has “the same safety 
consequences on the international scene as terrorism”. Joseph (2010, p. 1283) stated the 
following claims to support the idea that piracy in Somalia has a political end: (1). “The 
ransom money used by pirates to advance their extremist political objectives”; (2). “Members 
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of the Somali region of Puntland administer piracy activities”. This claim also was mentioned 
by interviewee 13 in my first field work who said that the Puntland region supports piracy in 
some level to get its own independence from Somalia by showing the world that the Somali 
government is unable to stop piracy. Also from interviews with pirates, I found that most of 
the pirates are from Puntland; (3). “In one incident, when the US military fatally shot down 
three Somali pirates, the Somali pirates threatened to kill all the American sailors. This gives 
us a hint that there is a general hatred against a specific nationality” (CNN, 2009). I agree 
with this claim because from my interviews with the pirates in Mombasa I noted that most of 
the pirates expressed hate towards America and the West because they believe that they are 
behind the Somali state’s failure and behind the illegal fishing and the chemical waste 
dumping. One of the pirates said clearly that he would only attack American ships and would 
not attack Arab or Muslim ships. But again, not all of the Somali pirates are fishermen 
meaning that some of them would not be affected by the illegal fishing or the chemical waste, 
but still they engage in kidnap for ransom similar to those pirates who hate the West. This 
suggests a link between the first and third group of Somali pirates: both have elements of 
political or ideological resentment in their motivations.   
 
In fact, Joseph (2010, p. 1267) goes farther than this, claiming  that “piracy everywhere in the 
world is not rational or free choice, it is an organized crime and structured with political 
objectives”. Joseph (2010, p. 1283) suggests that “pirates everywhere are driven by political 
motives, even if only indirectly when money from ransoms is used to support political 
objectives”. If this implies that all pirates are politically or ideologically motivated, I do not 
agree with Joseph, since the second group of Somali pirates appears to have only financial 
motives, as do many of the Iranian and Iraqi pirates.  
 
Other authors such as  Young  (2007) and Joseph  (2010) have linked the third kind of Somali 
piracy to the international political economy, asserting that  one of the motivations behind 
terrorism is to seek for targets which will most damage the global economy, especially in the 
west. These authors argue that evidence for this motivation comes from 9/11 when terrorists 
attacked the World Trade Centre in 2001 aiming to damage the most important economic 
organization in the world, and they say we should expect the same motive from terrorist 
piracy.  Reuchlin (2012, p. 3) in ‘The Economic Impacts of Piracy on the Commercial 
Shipping Industry: A Regional Perspective’, explained “the impacts on the costs of vessels/ 
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fleet management adjustments, the impacts on the cost of the security measures, the impacts 
on the cost of insurance, the impacts on the costs of uninsured ransoms and the impacts on 
the uninsured damages and losses”, and that “pirates prefer cargo ships and fishing vessels”. 
Reuchlin (2012) pointed out that “cargo vessels are the most important shipping industry for 
the west because they transport 75% of the goods to Europe, which is another reason why 
pirates select them”. However, my  data suggests there are many other reasons for this: cargo 
boats  are slow, with low freeboards (easy to board); fishing vessels are not protected, and  
pirates do have grudges against fishing vessels who violated the Somali waters and decimated 
the fish-stocks so the crime of piracy now in Somalia has become a hate crime.  It is true that 
most ships attacked by Somali pirates are tankers (25% of attacks), second are the bulk 
carriers (20%), third cargo vessels (11%), and fourth fishing vessels (4%). However, it is not 
the case that Somali pirates target more valuable vessels to damage the international 
economy: they seek out ships which are easy to attack with low free board and relatively slow 
speed, rather than the most prestigious vessels with the greatest economic clout. Moreover, 
the fact that fishing vessels are so seldom attacked indicates that the hate motives against the 
West and protecting Somali waters against illegal fishing/dumping are not the main drivers. 
In summary, the literature is divided over the issue of whether Somalis pirates are terrorists. 
Some authors have stated that pirates in Somalia are motivated by political (Dillon, 2005; 
Joseph, 2010; Sterio, 2010) and ideological (Whitman, 2012) objectives; others have stated 
that piracy in Somalia is motivated by money only (Gathii, 2010; Leeson, 2010); and yet 
others have stated that there is some sort of cooperation between pirates and Alshabab groups 
in Somalia indicating organized crime (Ong, 2014; Liss, 2011). Those who claimed that 
Somali pirates have cooperated with the Alshabab group evidenced their claim by saying that 
the piracy in Somalia became more organized and reached a huge area in the ocean and this 
could not have happened without extensive cooperation with other groups who are experts in 
crime such as Alshabab, since the original pirates do not have the skills and capabilities to 
reach this level of organization. Some authors like  Liss  (2011) claimed that Alqaeda groups’ 
involvement in piracy in other parts of the world -  for example, in South Asia, and in the 
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 - is evidence that Alqaeadah has already showed 
some interest in attacking the West at sea. However, when I interviewed the pirates 
themselves in Mombasa I noticed a great hatred from the pirates against the West, especially 
the Americans, because of the illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping in Somali 
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waters and also because all the pirates believe that the USA is the reason for Somalia’s failed 
state. But although most of the pirates stated that they would only attack American or 
Western ships and not any Arab or Muslim ships, which is consistent with a terrorism 
strategy, the fact is that the targets attacked by the Somali pirates are from every flag and 
clearly selected randomly. So even if some of the pirates are driven partly by hatred, or 
religious, radical or political motivations, I believe they are engaging in piracy primarily for 
money not to satisfy their ideological motivations. The difference between financial piracy 
and terror piracy is not between the exclusively financial motivation of financial pirates and 
the exclusively terror motivation of terror pirates, but between the exclusively financial 
motivation of financial pirates and the mixed motivation of terror pirates, partly financial and 
partly political/ideological/religious.  
 
5.5 The causes of maritime piracy  
Having determined the differences in the types of maritime piracy in the Arabian Gulf and in 
Somalia - financial piracy and terror piracy, respectively - I assumed that each type of threat 
in the two case areas is derived and caused by different causes based on the strategy followed 
by the pirates, causes which might overlap in some points such as the causes of economy 
crisis, but differ in other respects. During this research, I have come across many causes of 
financial piracy and terror piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia, and noted the variety of 
those causes. . The causes behind  financial piracy included  state failure, economy in crisis, 
lack of law enforcement, governmental corruption, international ignorance, lack of security, 
environmental damage, media over-focusing and the lack of information control; while the 
causes behind terror piracy included state failure, lack of law enforcement, lack of education, 
media over-focusing, international conflicts, violation of human rights and lack of security. 
Interestingly, four of the causes are common to both types of piracy, though where the causes 
overlap, they exist in different proportions. As stated earlier, pirates in Somalia are 
categorized into three types, and so it is not surprising that there are different causes behind 
each type of piracy.   
 
The main cause of the increase of Somali crime, including maritime piracy and terrorist 
activity, is state failure or state weakness which entails lack of law enforcement (Gathii, 
2010, p. 108; Baniela, 2010, p. 195; Sterio, 2010, p. 1451; Whitman, 2012, p. 1; Liss, 2010 
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chapter 2). State failure was also the main cause of piracy in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. As 
noticed, Iraqi piracy increased in the north of the Arabian Gulf when the Iraqi state failed 
between 2003 and 2007, and seriously affected shipping in the Kuwaiti sea. State weakness in 
dealing with poverty and economic crisis was also the main cause of piracy in the central area 
of the Arabian Gulf which affected shipping in the Qatari waters by Iranian pirates at a time 
when Iran, because of international sanctions imposed as punishment for its nuclear policy, 
suffered poverty and an economic crisis. After Iraq was stabilised in 2007, piracy rapidly 
decreased, though Iranian piracy might increase again if any decrease of security occurs in 
the Arabian Gulf. However, in Somalia the causes of piracy are more complicated than are 
the causes of piracy in the Arabian Gulf. In both cases, state failure is the main factor, but 
state failure in Somalia is much more deep-rooted and long-lasting than is state failure in Iran 
and Iraq, and has different consequences for piracy. According to Sterio (2010, p. 1451) 
“Somalia is a failed state with a very weak and unstable government and a police force which 
allows pirates to operate from the coastal towns very easily”. It is true that weakness of the 
police force caused an increase in piracy, but the increase was in piracy in general not in the 
particular type of piracy which took the form of kidnap for ransom, which was endemic in 
Somali piracy. The findings illustrated in chapter four with regard to Iraq between 2003 and 
2007 showed that Iraq was a failed state and the police forces were almost eliminated from 
the country, causing piracy to increase, but, the type of piracy that existed in the Gulf was not 
kidnap for ransom, and so the epidemic of Somali kidnap for ransom needs some additional 
explanation beyond state failure.  
 
According to Baniela (2010, p. 192), “piracy in Somalia is not a new phenomenon: the 
problem had been growing since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in January 2001”. 
Baniela produced a table of piracy attacks in Somalia since 2005 stating that piracy began 
four years after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 2001. But the Siad Barre regime 
collapsed in 1991, and Somali piracy only began in 2001, so state failure was not the trigger 
for Somalia piracy, though  state failure did increase  the crime rate including piracy (if not 
necessarily kidnap for ransom). Piracy is a complex phenomenon, and cannot be expected to 
occur straight away after state failure, but needs time for other problems to build up after 
state failure including crime in general. When Iraq failed in 2003, piracy occurred in the  
north of the Gulf one year after the failure, but this fast piracy forming was because Iraq was 
under UN sanctions for 13 years before the failure and the Iraqi economy was in economic 
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crisis, and after the state’s failure, security was suddenly eliminated which allowed  crime to 
increase,  including piracy.  
 
According to Diaz and Dubner (2010, p. 4) the critical factor in Somali piracy was “the 
illegal fishing and the toxic waste in the Somali waters started since the Somali failure in 
1991 which caused an extreme decline in the fishery sector”. They pointed out that 
“international fishing vessels travelled thousands of miles to Somali to take advantage of the 
unprotected waters to hunt for fishes and lobsters alongside other vessels which dump 
chemical and toxic waste into Somali waters”. Diaz and Dubner (2010, p. 5) also said that 
“the U.N., NATO forces, the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, Egypt and Yemen are in 
the Somali area to protect their own merchant ships and also to protect them while they are 
doing the illegal fishing”. From my field work in Kenya I heard the claims from the Somali 
pirates that the naval forces in the area are protecting their own fishing vessels while they 
engage in fishing in Somali waters and keep Somali fishermen and pirates away from them: 
some pirates even claimed that some of the naval ships in the Somali waters would actually 
participate in illegal fishing themselves. Diaz and Dubner (2010, p. 5) claimed that “the 
foreign trawlers enter the inshore Somali waters causing collisions with the local fishermen 
resulting in damage to the local fishermen’s gears and also caused casualties and deaths”. 
Also from my interviews with the Somali pirates in Kenya and the Yemeni coastguard officer 
in Bahrain, I was told that the merchant ships and the navies in the Somali area (especially 
the Indians) used violence against Somali fishermen and stole their fishing gears, trying to 
scare them away from the fishing areas so the international illegal fishing vessels could fish 
freely in the Somali waters without any interruption. So for Diaz and Dubner (2010), it was 
not the failed Somali state, but the illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping in the 
Somali waters causing a decline in the fish stock that led to piracy: the Somali pirates used 
piracy as an alternative, or their only alternative, means of  survival. However, Diaz and 
Dubner fail to note that the original cause of the illegal fishing and illicit dumping of 
chemical waste was the failed state: Somalia waters were unprotected from such predatory 
activity by foreign vessels because there was no effective Somali naval force. Diaz and 
Dubner also fail to note that Somali pirates used piracy against the illegal fishing and 
dumping as revenge and this is why Somali piracy developed into kidnap for ransom.  
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On this last issue – kidnap for ransom - according to Liss (2010, p. Chapter one) “in South 
Asia the increase of piracy may be related to an increase in environmental violations or 
decrease in fish stocks because of illegal fishing”, and although in South Asia the pirates 
usually do not use kidnap for ransom, they are extremely brutal and dangerous and they 
usually kill the victims. From my findings, comparing piracy in the Gulf and piracy in 
Somalia, I believe that when both factors exist, the hate factor and the failed state, the pirates 
usually use kidnap for ransom because to kidnap victims, pirates need a lawless place to 
detain the victims for a long time. In Iraq between 2003 and 2007 the failed state factor 
existed and the pirates could use the kidnap for ransom, but the hate factor was not there, 
which led the pirates to inflict minimum violence on the victims. By contrast, in South Asia 
the hate factor existed from the illegal fishing and the chemical waste as stated by Liss 
(2010), but the failed state factor did not exist, so the pirates could not detain victims on land 
for a long time, which is why they killed the victims and scrapped the target ships. So the 
illegal fishing and the chemical waste cause in Somalia not only increased piracy, but it also 
transformed piracy from an ordinary piracy attack to a kidnap for ransom event because of 
the hate generated against the international illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping 
vessels in Somali waters. Also in the north of the Kuwaiti sea, most of the fishing dhows are 
operated by Asian fishermen (usually from India and Bangladesh) but the Kuwaiti fishing 
boats (usually luxury fishing yachts) use fast boats with high specifications, meaning that 
even if the hate factor were there, the Iraqi pirates would not benefit from kidnapping the 
Asian fishermen, and the Iraqi pirates’ boats cannot compete with the Kuwaiti luxury fishing 
boats speeds.   
 
Support for my analysis comes from Schneider and Winkler (2013, p. 187) who discussed the 
issue of “legalizing piracy by the Somali pirates”, calling this ‘legalization’ the “Robin Hood 
narrative”.  They claimed that “illegal fishing and the toxic waste cause poverty by declining 
the fish stock”, and that “by piracy they protect Somali waters from the illegal fishing and the 
toxic waste”. Schneider and Winkler (2013, p. 187) also said that “illegal fishing and the 
toxic waste in the Somali waters generated anger against the west, and this anger fuelled 
support for piracy… there is some credible evidence that after the failure of Somalia in 1991 
the illegal fishing started in the Somali EEZ, and even in the Somali territorial waters, carried 
out by some foreign nations without the permission of Somalia”. I agree with Schneider and 
Winkler’s argument, since from the interviews I conducted with Somali pirates in Mombasa, 
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most of them claimed that they became pirates after  the fish stock declined in Somalia waters 
because of illegal fishing, and all of the pirates developed hatred against the west because of 
the illegal fishing issue.  Also some of the pirates said that they were defending their country 
by attacking illegal fishing vessels in Somalia. Link-TV (2009) broadcast a phone interview 
with Mohammed Bashir Waldo who said that “there are many physical evidences of the 
illegal fishing and the toxic waste in the Somali waters done by some foreign companies who 
want to get rid of their chemical materials in the Somali waters because they can’t get rid of 
those materials in their own countries because of the strict rules in their countries”. Waldo 
also said that “one day before his interview; the Somali community captured a huge container 
ship in the Gulf of Aden which was dumping a huge amount of toxic waste in the Somali 
waters”. Moreira (2013) interviewed Franco Oliva  (a former financial controller) who said 
that “the Italian government and the Italian companies are getting involved in some 
development projects in Somali which used to cover the toxic dump in the Somali waters, and 
he provided evidence and pictures to support his claims”. The Link-TV interview and the 
Moreira interview confirmed some of my claims in chapter four, as most of the pirates stated 
that they suffered from skin diseases because of the chemical toxics in the Somali waters, and 
the Somali ambassador in Kenya stated that he held evidence of the dumping of international 
chemical waste in Somali waters.   
 
From all of these inferences it is clear not only that chemical waste dumping and illegal 
fishing do exist in Somalia, but that the ordinary Somali fishermen are fully aware of the 
problem and know who does the illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping, and this 
awareness was responsible for a fresh stimulus to piracy. Illegal fishing and discharged 
chemical waste in the unguarded Somali waters caused an extreme decline of the Somali fish 
stocks (United Nations, 2011, p. 9), and as mentioned by the Somali pirates interviewed in 
this research, this was the main trigger for the original pirates who were fishers. When their 
only source of living was attacked, they shifted their activity from fishing to piracy for two 
reasons: (1) they have no other source of living; and (2) they think that they are protecting 
their country by attacking the illegal fishers or the invaders as they called them during the 
interviews.  Pham  (2010, p. 330) said that “the second factor for the rise of maritime piracy 
is the illegal fishing by the foreign nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Yemen, France, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan” and he also mentioned “chemical waste 
dumping in the Somali EEZ, which together with the illegal fishing, violated the fish stocks 
162 
 
in the Somali waters”. I agree that illegal fishing and dumping is the main cause for the 
increase of piracy in Somalia based on my findings, but illegal fishing and dumping is itself a 
symptom of state failure in Somalia which means that the lack of security forces in the hands 
of the Somali government is the fundamental cause of the increase of piracy.  
 
One of the causes of increased Somali piracy which has often been mentioned in the literature 
is economic, either the weak economy or the high value of the ransom gained from piracy. 
Whitman (2012, p. 1) in the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: The Root Causes and True 
Costs of Marine Piracy, described the economic roots of piracy internationally as threefold: 
“1. the relatively high chances of substantial income; 2. the relatively low costs of counter – 
attack; 3. the relatively low opportunity costs and economic risks”. From my findings I agree 
with Whitman that piracy offers substantial financial rewards. For example, from the pirates’ 
interviews I learned that for pirates who work in a gang, each pirate would receive an average 
of about $10,000 per attack, which is a huge amount of money in comparison to the low 
incomes in Somalia. Also all of the pirates I have interviewed claimed that they have low cost 
skiffs, so preparing for an attack operation would not cost much money. However, as 
Whitman’s (2012) second factor implies, these economic rewards come at a heightened risk 
of being caught. We cannot take the economic causes of piracy in isolation from these risks.  
For example, in the Arabian Gulf, pirates could carry out successful attacks at a minimum 
cost, and gain huge amounts of cash, if they targeted luxury yachts. But the consequences of 
failure due to the presence of high security forces (Whitman’s (2012) second factor) is a 
significant deterrence.  
Like Whitman (2012), Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 2) said that “the extreme increase of 
piracy in Somalia was because of the huge reward of piracy ransoms compared with the very 
low level of household income in Somalia and the low risks of capture and punishments… in 
2010 the earning from piracy was $238 million and the average ransom $5 million”. They 
also said that “piracy has increased because of the willingness of many companies to pay 
ransoms to pirates for the release of their crews and cargos, as a result of which ransoms have 
been raised from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010”. From my findings, I disagree 
with Nelson and Goossens (2011) on the issue of low risk of capture and punishment faced 
by pirates because most of the pirates I have interviewed suffered from serious injuries in the 
process of being captured and imprisoned, although I have only interviewed pirates who have 
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been captured and I assume there are many free pirates. Piracy is dangerous work, because 
pirates in Somalia are at risk of attack by the most modern navies in the world who may be 
willing to open fire on the pirates. The risk of being captured and the severity of punishment 
after capture varied considerably in different parts of the Gulf and Somali area. For example, 
Iraqi and Iranian pirates in the Gulf would only face legal consequences, which are less 
dangerous than the physical consequences of Somali pirates’ fates who could be killed.   
 
Another of the causes of the increase of piracy mentioned in the literature is the lack of 
security on board target vessels or in support vessels. Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 11), 
Liss (2011, Chapter one), Sterio (2010, p. 1477) and Pham (2010, p. 333) all stated that 
piracy increased in Somalia because there is not enough security to protect the shipping in the 
region. Accordingly, they all recommended either (or both) an increase in the naval units in 
the Somali region or the deployment of armed guards on board commercial ships. From my 
field work findings, it was clear that the vessel security issue was of paramount concern. 
Some of the interviewees suggested that because the cause of piracy is lack of vessel security, 
we must increase vessel security. In the central part of the Arabian Gulf, Qatari coastguard 
officers said that the recent decrease in piracy was a result of increasing the naval units at sea. 
Likewise, in the North of the Arabian Gulf, the findings suggested that the reason for the 
decrease of piracy after 2007 was that Iraqi security forces had integrated and cooperated 
with Kuwaiti security forces. However, others stated that increasing vessel security is not an 
appropriate solution. For example, most of the naval experts pointed out that the Somali 
region is huge, and therefore deploying more navies in the area will never be sufficient 
because the Somali pirates’ need an average time of only 15 minutes to hijack a ship, and 
security forces could never be deployed in such a short period of time. Some of the private 
security experts suggested deploying armed guards on ships as they claimed that it was a 
successful way to protect most of the ships. However, although from my data chapter three I 
reported that there were rarely any piracy attacks on armed guarded ships, one of the 
academic experts in international law at Nairobi University said that arming commercial 
ships is a violation of international law because commercial ships are civilian units and 
arming them would undermine their legal status. The resultant analyses support the 
conclusion that the lack of security might be a significant reason for the increase of piracy 
but, increasing security will not necessarily decrease piracy, especially where the size of the 
region is huge. So reflecting this back to the research question “are the current anti-piracy 
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policies and responses sufficient to compete with piracy?”  The answer so far would be that 
responding to piracy from one perspective either military or political would never be enough:  
all types of responses must be cooperated and arranged to work together. 
 
Geographical location is another important factor relating to piracy. Claiming that “state 
failure is not necessarily the reason for increased piracy in Somali” on grounds that “Somali 
was a failed state since 1991, long before piracy began”, Pham (2010, p. 330) attributes 
piracy in Somali primarily to the geographical advantage for pirates of the long Somali 
coastline on the Gulf of Aden. Ong (2014, p. 272) concurred: “one of the reasons is the 
geographical advantage of Somalia as Somali pirates have a huge area of operation all the 
way from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hurmuz”. Pham (2010, p. 330) referred with approval 
to Murphy (2009) who said that “piracy is suitable in places that offer a combination of 
rewarding hunting grounds and acceptable levels of risk and approximate safe havens”, and 
Pham (2010, p. 330)  asserted  that “Somali has got those two factors and this was the main 
reason for the rise of piracy”. However, I disagree with Pham (2010) that this is the main 
reason for piracy, because Iraq has a very limited coast line on the Arabian Gulf, but when 
Iraq failed in 2003, piracy increased and as soon as Iraq formed a new government in 2007, 
piracy started to decrease and vanished completely by 2007. This undermines the claim that 
geographical advantage is the main reason for piracy.  
 
Like Pham (2010), Sterio (2010, p. 330) claimed that “Somali pirates have a very high 
success rate” because “Somali pirates use their geographical advantages very well”, and s/he?  
identifies several geographical advantages: “1. Somalia has the longest coast in Africa which 
is very hard to patrol; 2. The coast is populated with towns in which pirates can easily blend 
in with other insurgent groups; 3.The Gulf of Aden is narrow which allows pirates to bring 
smaller ships to land very quickly, to secure them and wait for ransoms”. My findings 
provide some support for Sterio’s (2010) analysis. One of the naval officers interviewed 
stated that guarding the Somali basin is very hard because the area is so huge that even if they 
deployed all the navies in the world this would not be enough. From the pirates interviewed, 
two of them explained that whilst fishing, they were also waiting for possible easy targets just 
in front of their home town, allowing them to drag the hostages straight away after the kidnap 
to their home town. By contrast, in the north of the Arabian Gulf, the fishing areas and Iraqi 
state coast line are relatively small and easy for the security forces to guard - the average time 
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for naval ships to arrive to the attack location in the Gulf, which is one hour, is much less 
than in the Somali region which must be longer because of the huge area.  Also in the  central 
area of the Arabian Gulf the Iranian pirates would have to travel hundreds of miles to reach 
the lucrative hunting grounds of Qatari waters, and taking hostages all the way back to Iran 
would be a semi-impossible mission because the naval units, Iranian and Qatari, could track 
them during their long journey home.  
 
Another cause of increased piracy in Somalia, according to Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 
40), Sterio (2010, p. 1451) and Pham (2010, p. 331), is the international ignorance of the 
problem and the lack of international willingness and seriousness to deal with it.  My findings 
correspond to some extent with this claim, because in the United Nations office in Nairobi, 
one of the interviewees said that the UN sent only one engineer to train the Somali navy and 
coast guards. From this we can estimate how little effort has been made by the UN. Also both 
of the Somali ambassadors I interviewed, in Abu Dhabi and Nairobi, claimed that the UN and 
other international organizations were at fault  in failing to address  illegal fishing and the 
dumping of chemical waste in Somali waters, and there was a charge of unfair dealing with 
the Somali case by the international community. As for the efforts made by the IMO, when I 
interviewed the IMO officer in Mombasa I asked him about the attempts made to protect 
Somali waters from illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping: at first he denied this 
problem existed, and when I proved to him its existence by showing him several fishing 
vessels in the Somali waters by accessing http://www.marinetraffic.com/, he ended the 
interview. A few days later, I noticed that the IMO website had blocked most of its 
information about shipping in Somali international waters, except the ships routes in the Gulf 
of Eden. This could suggest that some authorities were turning a blind eye to the problem.   
 
Another cause of Somali maritime piracy is the attitude of Oman which is not mentioned 
anywhere in the literature reviewed for this research. In chapter four, analysis of all the piracy 
attacks between 2010 and 2015 found that the Omani international waters are the most 
dangerous waters infected by Somali pirates despite the fact that Oman has got the most 
powerful naval forces in the region. From the first fieldwork period during my interviews 
with the headquarters of the task forces in Bahrain and the security companies in Dubai, the 
inferences led to the conclusion that Oman is well known among pirates for its refusal to get 
involved with regional matters including piracy, and this has led to Omani international 
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waters becoming more populated by Somali pirates than even Somali waters or the Gulf of 
Aden.   
 
Another cause of Somali piracy that has been mentioned in the literature is the lack of 
reporting of piracy. Liwång et al. (2013, p. 101) noted that “all piracy incidents must be 
reported to the International Chamber of Commerce ICC and to the International Maritime 
Bureau IMB”. However, he said that  
“there are two problems with the reporting process: (1) there is over-reporting by the 
commercial ships in the Somali basin and the Gulf of Aden as they report everything 
at sea which makes the maritime scene inaccurate by reporting all the skiffs and ships 
in the areas as suspects of piracy; and (2) some of the commercial ships don’t report 
any of the suspected attacks because they fear the legal consequences of the reporting 
which also makes the maritime scene inaccurate” (Liwång et al., 2013, p. 101).  
Hastings (2009, p. 217) pointed out that “reporting the piracy attacks increased the ships’ 
insurance premiums”, and that “many companies don’t report the piracy attacks when there 
are no human losses and they deal with kidnappers and ransoms without reporting them”. 
When I travelled to the Arabian Gulf in 2012 for the first period of fieldwork I discovered 
that there were piracy attacks in Kuwait between 2003 and 2007 and in Qatar between 2008 
and 2012, but none of them was included in the IMO reports. Several interviewees told me 
that the attacks were not serious, and reporting them to the IMO might scare off international 
investments in the Arabian Gulf and might also increase insurance costs and voyage crew 
wages, so it was better not to report those attacks. One of the interviewees, who was a 
member of a maritime security company in Dubai, said that the companies prefer to negotiate 
with pirates and pay the ransoms without reporting to the naval forces in the area because if 
the navies get involved, the ships will be held for longer periods of time and this would cost 
the companies more money.  
Another cause of Somalia piracy is described by Whitman (2012, p. 1) in the Dalhousie 
Marine Piracy Project - the ability to gain social status through piracy. This cause depends on 
the existence of a collective grievance, and a community’s support for piracy as a means to 
redress that grievance. This cause could be applied to Somalia because from the data analysis 
in chapter four, most of the pirates complained about illegal fishing, corruption, 
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environmental violation and poverty for which they blamed foreign vessels.  However, the 
findings reported herein disagree with the notion suggested by Whitman (2012) that the 
pirates can gain social status through piracy: not all of the pirates could gain any such status, 
because some of them work alone, while others work in gangs which distribute the ‘loot’ 
unequally which means that in the matter of wealth not all of the pirates are treated with the 
same status. It is true that some of the pirates said that they were doing an honourable thing 
by defending their country’s waters from invaders, which might make them heroes in 
Somalia, but not all of the pirates could gain this heroic status. Enhanced social status is even 
less likely for pirates in the Gulf regions: indeed, in Iran and Iraq, piracy would make 
fishermen into criminals not heroes, since they are not fighting for a common cause but only 
for their own self-interest.  
 
A final issue concerning the causes of piracy in Somalia is the usefulness of lists of such 
causes. For example, Whitman (2012) provides us with a list of eleven; Haywood and Spivak 
(2012) three; Sterio (2010) six; Pham (2010) ten; Liwång et al. (2013) four; Murphy (2009) 
three; Nelson and Goossens (2011) nine; Gathii (2010) fifteen; Baniela (2010) twelve; Diaz 
and Dubner (2010) fourteen; Liss (2010) three; Schneider and Winkler (2013) nine;  Moreira 
(2013) ten and Hastings (2009) nineteen . Many of these lists of the causes of piracy are 
interesting, and closely tie in with my own list, but there are some clarifications and 
reservations to be made. One clarification is about the status of the factors. Are the afore-
mentioned authors arguing that all of the factors must be present if any piracy is to take 
place? If not, do the writers tell us how many factors in their lists must be present before 
piracy is likely to occur? For example, if most of the economic and political factors in a list 
were present but none of the social factors would there be piracy or not? Another clarification 
is that some items in the lists may be applicable to some forms of piracy but not to others. For 
example, it may be that Whitman (2012) is right to claim that in some areas, pirates must 
have a marine background but during my research I have noticed that some of the pirates in 
Somalia and in Iraq have been recruited without any knowledge of seamanship or navigation. 
 
5.6 Manifestations at sea of piracy  
At the beginning of this research, it was assumed that there are two types of pirates, the 
financial pirates and the terroristic pirates. Furthermore hypotheses were formulated to 
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determine different manifestations of the two types by analysing their ways of doing piracy 
such as their methods of attack, weapons used, targeting strategies, level of violence used 
against victims, the amount of ransoms, the type of attacking ships used, and their areas of 
operations. However, after analysing at length the causes and motivations behind piracy in 
the Arabian Gulf and Somalia it was discovered that all of the pirates are motivated by 
money, and although some are motivated also by political or ideological motives, they all 
used similar strategies at sea. So trying to distinguish between the pirates by their motives 
proved to be not practical at sea, though it might be essential on land. Even if the Somali 
pirates bear some hatred against the west and America, this has not entailed any differences 
in the piracy strategy used by those pirates compared with the piracy strategy used by other 
pirates in the area. In this section, this point is expanded by discussing the seven main ways 
in which all of the pirates manifest themselves at sea: areas; amounts of ransom; language, 
ethnicity, religion and body types; levels of violence; pirates’ ships recognition; target 
selection; timing; and weapons, ships and manoeuvres. The main outcome of this research is 
to provide a policy to counter piracy in the two regions studied in this research.  By knowing 
the manifestations of pirates at sea based on the above-mentioned categories will provide a 
fuller picture when dealing with pirates at sea more effectively.  
 
  The areas 
 Daxecker and Prins (2013, p. 943, 948) said that “piracy usually flourishes in areas poorly 
guarded in weak security ports”, and that “pirates usually prefer the areas close to major 
shipping lanes such as East Africa”. Following  Daxecker and Prins (2013),  the Gulf of Eden 
is described as a place chosen by pirates because it is an important waterway through which  
“more than 20,000 ships pass annualy” (Nelson and Goossens, 2011, p. 3), and because the 
area is so extensive that naval forces would be unable to guard the whole area effectively. 
More controversially, Shortland and Varese (2014, p. 746) claimed that “in unstable political 
regimes the piracy activities increase only in areas which already rely on criminal revenues”, 
meaning that piracy would not  increase in coastal areas where the locals depend on decent 
businesses. Shortland and Varese (2014, p. 752) held that “the coastal areas such as Berbera, 
Bosasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo and two minor natural harbours Merka and el Ma’an near 
Mogadishu are holding the major ports that the Somali use for trading, exporting and 
importing and those ports wouldn’t provide shelters or anchorage areas for pirates”. So 
Shortland and Varese’s (2014) hypothesis is that piracy activities do not occur in law-abiding 
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areas. However, as will be shown below, the fndings in this research show it is not nessesary 
for the pirates to have criminally-inclined ports: in the  north of the Arabian Gulf, piracy 
occurred suddenly after the failure of Iraq in 2003 and the locals in those days did not depend 
on criminal revenues.  
 
In the case of the Arabian Gulf, there are no data available and/or accessible on the locations 
of piracy that could be found during this study.  Piracy was not even mentioned in the IMO’s 
piracy and armed robbery reports of the area, so at the beginning of this research, I assumed 
that the Arabian Gulf was devoid of piracy. But during the field work which I started in 
Kuwait, it was clear that piracy occurred in Kuwait between 2003 -2007 after the state failure 
in Iraq, and decreased after 2007 when Iraq established a stable government. From the data 
set in chapter four, 67 piracy attacks occurred between 2003 and 2007 in the Northern 
Kuwaiti waters by Iraqi pirates yet none of those attacks was included in the IMO’s piracy 
reports. Also during my first field- work in 2012 while I was in Qatar interviewing the Qatari 
coastguards I was provided with reports of piracy occurring in Qatari waters conducted by 
Iranian pirates (see Appendix L). The official Qatari reports stated that there were 37 piracy 
attacks in the Qatari waters which were not mentioned in the IMO’s piracy and armed 
robbery reports. So from this first fieldwork I concluded that if piracy occurred again in the 
Gulf, then the most dangerous piracy areas would be the north of the Arabian Gulf and the 
central part of the Arabian Gulf in the waters between Bahrain and Qatar and the East of 
Qatari waters. The northern Kuwait waters contain Kuwaiti luxury ships and dhows, because 
Kuwait is one of the richest countries in the area, whereas in Iraq, the economy is weak with 
high levels of poverty and unemployment, so a future rise of crime in Iraq including the 
crime of piracy could be expected. Moreover, Iraq has a single water gate which is in the 
Arabian Gulf, and this means that Iraqi pirates could only form in the Arabian Gulf and 
against the nearest shipping lane which is from Kuwait. Similarly, in the central part of the 
Arabian Gulf, a contrast between the Iranian economy and Qatar was observed: because of 
the high poverty and unemployment rates in Iran, the Iranian pirates could be expected to 
attack the richest and the more valuable ships in the area, with Qatar being one of the richest 
economies in the region. But none of these Arabian Gulf areas contains criminally-inclined 
locally populations. 
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In the Somali case, the literature states that the Gulf of Eden is the most dangerous area 
infested by Somali pirates, but when I analysed all the individual piracy attacks between 2010 
and 2015, I found that the most dangerous waters were the Omani international waters (see 
section 4.3.1), then the Gulf of Eden, then the Somali international waters, then the Yemeni 
international waters, and then the Red Sea.  
 
In summary, pirates choose their area of operations according to several criteria, the most 
important of which is the availability of the target ships, and this means that they seek for 
valuable ships with minimum protection which can be found in the central region of the 
Arabian Gulf and in Omani international waters. Iranian pirates used to travel all the way 
from the Iranian coast to Qatari international waters because the ships there are more valuable 
than the Iranian ships since Qatar has a stronger economy than Iran and Qatari coastguards 
were not capable of protecting the Qatari ships before 2011. . In 2011, Qatar adopted an 
armament project for its coastguards and navy which added more units at sea, causing piracy 
to decrease after 2012 For Somali pirates, who operate mostly in Omani international waters 
and the Gulf of Eden, further criteria for choice of area of operations include the size of the 
area; the shipping intensity in the area; and the deployment of international naval task forces, 
which are in the Gulf of Eden and the Somali coast, For their part, Iraqi pirates choose the 
Kuwaiti northern waters for three reasons; the first reason is the very short distance involved 
for  the pirates which allows them to hit and run to their villages in Iraq; the second reason is 
that Kuwaiti ships are more valuable than Iraqi ships because Kuwait has a stronger economy 
than the Iraqi economy; and the third reason is that the Kuwaiti coastguards and navy are not 
capable of protecting all the shipping in Kuwaiti waters. Note that none of these reasons 
included criminally-inclined ports, since they do not exist in Iraq.  
 
 The amount of ransom 
 
 There have been no kidnap cases in the Arabian Gulf since 2003. By contrast, in Somalia, 
kidnapping for ransom is widespread, and the amounts of money demanded by kidnappers to 
free hostages is huge. Schuberta and Lades (2013, p. 482, 485) stated that “the average 
amount for ransom per vessel increased in Somalia from $15,000 in 2005 to $4.8  million  in 
2011, and that “the typical amount of ransom that the Somali pirate gang in Elyl would get is 
$1.8 million, and the commander in chief received 900,000 USD in return for a typical 
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investment of about 40,000 USD (financing the boat, outboard motors, weapons, fuel, and 
food)… Middle ranks, including an interpreter, an accountant, and supplies logistics officer 
received between 30,000 and 60,000 USD and the ordinary attackers were paid 41,000 
USD”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) noted that “the average ransom rose from $150,000 
in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010”.   
 
However, the pirates I interviewed had different figures. One of the pirates said that his group 
of seven pirates would share the ransom and each pirate would take $2 or $3 million which 
means that the total amount of ransom in one operation could be around $14m to $21m. Also 
this pirate said that the amount of ransom varies depending on the victims. For example, he 
said that they would take less from the fishermen but they would take huge amounts from 
victims who were engaged in illegal fishing or chemical waste. I think that the pirates take 
more ransom from victims engaged in illegal fishing or chemical waste not because of their 
hatred for them, but because those ships are working for big international companies who are 
insured and can afford to pay more than individual fishermen. One of the pirates said that he 
would get $20 to $25 thousand but his bosses would take up to $10 million from one single 
operation. Comparing this pirate who works for a gang leader and the seven pirates who work 
individually for themselves, we can see that if the pirates work within an organization the 
amount of ransom demanded increases greatly.  
 
At the beginning of this research, preliminary findings identified two different types of 
pirates in Somalia, the terror pirates and the financial pirates, and this categorisation assumed 
that the terror pirates would take larger amounts of ransom to satisfy their huge activities in 
Somalia and also to harm the West economically. But from my fieldwork findings, some of 
the Somali pirates reported they were motivated by money only, inferring they are the 
criminals who joined piracy later to benefit from the advantage of high ransoms. So in 
conclusion of this section the pirates in Somalia decide the amount of ransom required based 
on the type of victims, rather than the ideological motives of the pirates, and so if the ships 
belong to a big company then they would require more ransom as the big companies can 
afford to pay the ransoms but, if the victims were ordinary fishermen then the pirates would 
require a lower amount of money. Also the amount of ransom would increase if the pirates 
work under an organized gang, since war lords are more capable of negotiations with the 
victims’ sponsors.     
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 Language, ethnicity, religion and body types  
 
From the analyses of the interviews in the first fieldwork in 2012, it was clear that there are 
many different types of pirates in the Arabian Gulf. In the northern area of the Kuwaiti waters 
there are three types of seafarers: 1. The Kuwaiti seafarers who fish or work on luxury 
vessels and possess more luxurious and modern boats and dress in more fashionable clothes 
as they come from richer backgrounds. Most of the Kuwaitis have lighter skin colours; 2. The 
Indian and Bangladeshi fishermen, who use Kuwaiti dhows, speak broken Arabic and have 
darker skins, and their ethnicities are different from Arabic, so we can easily differentiate 
between them and the Iraqi fishermen or the Iraqi pirates; and 3. The Iraqi fishermen and the 
Iraqi pirates who use old dhows which are less luxurious than the Kuwaiti boats. They are 
slim, they are Shia Muslims, their ethnicity is Arab, and they speak fluent Arabic, but they 
have darker skins than the Arabs. In the central area of the Arabian Gulf there are also three 
types of seafarer: 1. The Qatari luxury boats crews of Qataris who are Arabs with lighter skin 
colours; 2. The Indian and Bangladeshi fishermen with darker skin colours who use the 
Qatari fishing boats; and 3. The Iranian pirates who speak Persian and in some cases broken 
English in which the Arabic/ Persian accent can be easily detected. They have darker skin 
colours than the Qataris but lighter skin colours than the Indian and Bangladesh fishermen.   
 
In Somalia, the divisions between pirate groups are more complex, partly because of 
Alshabab, and partly because of clan differences. Ibrahim (2010, p. 290) stated that “the 
relationship between pirates and Alshabab in Somalia is business, but there are  some clan 
factors as the pirates mostly come from a clan called Darod in  central and  northern  Somalia 
and Alshabab is made up from several clans especially from Hawiyeh who usually come 
from Maqadishio and the  south”. Solomona (2014, p. 352) stated that “70% of Alshabab 
groups are from Digil and Rahanweyn clans”. It seems, therefore, that most Alshabab groups 
come from different clans than the pirates in Somalia.  Solomona (2014, p. 351) pointed out 
that the “Rahanweyn clan even speak different language than other clans”. In the literature,   
it is suggested that all the pirates in the Somali basin are Somalis who are black-skinned and 
Muslims (Solomona, 2014, p. 352; Ibrahim, 2010, p. 291; Ong 2014, p. 270), but during my 
field work, interviewees said that some of the pirates in the Arabian Sea are Iranian and some 
Yemeni pirates operate in the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden. From the face-to-face 
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interviews with the pirates in the prison of Mombasa, I noticed that all of them spoke Somali 
but some of them also spoke Arabic and some of them spoke fluent English.  The naval 
forces in the area have misunderstood the reality in the Somali basin as they assume that all 
the pirates or the suspects have to be Somalis with black skins, and some of the Iranian and 
Yemeni pirates use this misunderstanding to engage in piracy because they would not be 
suspected of piracy. Several pirates mentioned that they had to obtain Yemeni passports so 
they can carry weapons authorised by the Yemeni government for protection, so the naval 
forces would not suspect them of piracy. It is possible that other groups of pirates existing in 
the area from Nigeria or Kenya or other countries in the region make use of similar 
camouflage strategies to practice piracy. 
 
Two of the Somali prisoners admitted that they were working with the Alshabab group - both 
of them are Somali dark-skinned Sunni Muslims. One of them is 16 years old and the other 
one is 28 years old. The 16 year old terrorist, who admitted that he is Al-Shabab member, 
claimed that he was caught on land and the 28 year old claimed that they assumed he is a 
terrorist because he was at sea with Yemeni and Arabs groups. With regard to the 28 year old 
terrorist’s case, it is not common for different ethnic groups to gather together for financial 
piracy.  Somali financial pirates usually come from the same clan or village which means that 
they are usually the same ethnicity, and likewise Yemeni and Iranian financial pirates usually 
come from the same village - which means that a mixed ethnic group in the Somali basin 
would be suspected of terrorist piracy.    
 
 The level of violence 
 
There was no recorded kidnap or killing in the Arabian Gulf during the period 2004-2013 in 
the literature or in the IMO piracy reports (IMO, 2015), and all of my interviewees said that 
the level of violence is minimal from the Iranian or the Iraqi pirates in the central and  
northern areas of the Arabian Gulf. But in Somalia, the case is different as the Somali pirates 
use kidnap for ransom as a strategy and they become more brutal and violent with the victims 
if they do not get a ransom - they might even kill the victim as a consequence of not receiving 
the ransom money. Ibrahim (2010, p. 291) said that “the Somali pirates and Alshabab 
legimate the use of violence within the Muslim tradition (self-defence) against the illegal 
fishing which they will not usually give up using this violence”. Ibrahim (2010, p. 288) stated 
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that “the failure of the U.S. and international policies towards Somalia have generated a 
motive to target the American and Western units by the Somalis and Alshabab”, and he gave 
several policy failures as examples. The reason why Somali pirates are more violent and 
brutal than Iraqi or Iranian pirates is twofold: the first reason is the hatred felt by the Somali 
pirates against international ships because they believe the international community caused 
the Somali state failure and they believe international vessels violated their waters by 
carrying out illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping (Whitman, 2012, p. 31). The second 
reason is that Somalia has been a failed state since 1991 and this caused the crime rate to 
become huge (Baniela, 2010, p. 195), precipitating an extreme economic crisis which made 
the Somali pirates desperate for money because most of them have no alternative source of 
living. By contrast, Iraq and Iran are more stable than Somalia, and kidnapping victims would 
not be practical in Iran or Iraq because the kidnappers can be tracked and chased by the 
authorities in their respective countries.   
 
 Pirates’ ships recognition 
 
One of the issues raised by naval and security officers in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia is that 
the task forces struggle to distinguish between pirates and other ships at sea, and mistaken 
distinctions have led to violations of human rights such as capturing suspects at sea when 
they carry weapons for protections. The aim of this theme is to provide guidelines for the 
observers to recognise and distinguish the pirates’ ships from the other ships in the Arabian 
Gulf and in the Somali basin. In IMO piracy reports since 2003 there have been no recorded 
piracy attacks in the Arabian Gulf region, meaning that we cannot retrieve the types of the 
attacking boats of the pirates from the IMO reports (IMO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). In the Arabian Gulf, I learned from my first field work in 
most of the Gulf States in 2012 that it is possible to distinguish the pirates’ ships by using 
several criteria such as knowing the fishing areas and suspecting any non-fishing ships in the 
fishing areas and also suspecting any fast ships existing in the non- fishing areas. The 
direction of the threat is another very good indicator, as usually the threat of piracy comes 
from the north in Kuwaiti waters whereas it comes from the east in Qatari waters. Also what I 
found from the interviewees was that the manoeuvres of the ships can be a good indicator of 
pirates’ ships in the Arabian Gulf as usually the pirates do not remain in one location for a 
long time and the coastguards would see them travel from one location to another. Also speed 
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is a good indicator as the fishing vessels and ships in the Arabian Gulf do not need fast 
engines (above 100 horse power) but the pirates’ vessels do (see Appendix J).  
 
In Somalia the case is different and more complicated:  it is very difficult to apply the ships- 
recognition criteria that were identified in the Arabian Gulf because in Somalia most of the 
pirates come from a fishermen background which means that the pirates and the fishermen in 
Somalia use exactly the same tools, ships, manoeuvres and locations. However, during my 
first field work in 2012 most of the security experts said that although it is very difficult to 
distinguish between the pirates’ ships and the fishermen in Somalia, two skiffs and one dhow 
in the same location is an indication of piracy because it is a sign of attackers linked to a 
mother ship . Also the number of the crew is a good criterion to detect a pirate ship as a 
fishing skiff only needs 2 to 3 fishermen so if the number is larger, this would be a good sign 
of piracy based on information from naval officer interviews and from the pirates see 
Appendix J).  The approach is also a good sign of piracy, because when a skiff approaches 
other ships at high speed this would be a hostile approach. Another criterion is the existence 
of fishing apparatus: if there is none on board, then this would raise suspicion of piracy. 
Carrying ladders, guns or RPGs are also taken to be signs of piracy, though naval units in the 
area have sometimes misread this criterion, because all Somalis (including children and 
women) carry guns for self-protection purposes. This issue was raised frequently by the 
pirates themselves who claimed that they are innocent and that the navies captured them and 
transferred them to Kenya because they were carrying guns for self-protection. Interviewee 
42, the IMO officer in Mombasa, said that the navies in the area are required to capture 
anyone with weapons for suspicion of piracy, and when I mentioned that all Somalis carry 
weapon for self-protection purposes, he answered that this matter would be further 
investigated in Kenya.   
 
With regard to the vessels used by pirates, I analysed each individual piracy attack in Somalia 
between 2010 and 2015 and discovered that 76% of the attacks were carried out by pirates 
using skiffs. During the pirates’ interviews, I asked them about the ships they used when they 
were captured, and 47% of the pirates claimed that they were using skiffs at the time of the 
capture, the average size of which were 10 meters and the power of their engines varied  from 
40 to 100 horse power. The average crew number is 7 on the skiffs and 18 on big piracy 
ships. The colours of the skiffs are blue, white and red (see Appendix J). 
176 
 
  
So distinguishing between the pirates and other seafarers in Somalia is more difficult than in 
the Arabian Gulf. The Arabian Gulf is smaller than the Somali basin which means that there 
all the ships in the fishing areas can be monitored, and all the states in the Gulf are successful 
states which have navies and coastguards, unlike in Somalia. In Somalia the case is even 
more complicated because the pirates and the fishermen use the same tools, ships, 
manoeuvres and even the same weapons. At the beginning of this research, I thought that the 
level of piracy in Somalia decreased because the Somali pirates became more organized and 
selective, but when I went to Kenya in 2013, I noticed that the task forces in the Somali 
waters changed their strategy and started to capture everyone carrying weapons in the area for 
suspected piracy, and as a result the maritime population declined including piracy and 
fishing:  piracy attacks were 215 in 2011, 89 in 2012, 13 in 2013 and 14 in 2014. Deciding 
whether a Somali skiff was a pirate’s skiff or not was left to the judgment of the nearest naval 
ship, and  this has produced many serious violations of human rights and many mistakes such 
capturing all Somalis at sea who carry weapons. Even in the Arabian Gulf, because 
distinguishing between pirates and other seafarers in the North of the Arabian Gulf is left to 
the judgement of the naval forces, there may be many errors made by the navies.  
  
 Target selection 
 
In this theme, the aim is to understand how the pirates in the Arabian Gulf or the Somali 
basin select their targets and what criteria the pirates use to make their target selections of 
victims’ vessels. At an early stage of this research, I assumed that the politically-motivated 
pirates would choose targets based on nationality so they can satisfy their ideological needs, 
but as I investigated the motivations and the drivers of piracy in the Arabian Gulf and the 
Somali basin, I began to understand that piracy in both regions is mostly driven by financial 
goals as claimed by the interviewees. So even the so-called terrorist pirates from Somalia for 
the most part chose targets to maximise financial returns (e.g. by hostage-taking) rather than 
to make political points. This is the argument put forward by Shortlanda and Vothknecht 
(2011, p. 4) when  they “addressed the concept of hostage taking model as a terrorism activity 
and the Somali pirates as maritime terrorists”. According to Shortlanda and Vothknecht 
(2011, p. 3), “the Somali pirates or terrorists prefer the targets with lower self-protection or 
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far away from the naval protection and they prefer the private sector targets as they are 
willing to cooperate and pay the ransoms”.  
 
From the interviews, it was clear that the pirates in the northern Arabian Gulf are more 
interested in attacking ships at anchor because they are easier to attack and would need less 
time to board than ships making way. Iraqi pirates in the north are not very practised, as their 
piracy started in the north of the Arabian Gulf in 2003 after Iraq’s failure and only lasted to 
2007 so the pirates did not have the experience of attacking ships making way. There is 
another reason for this as the  northern sea is small so the coastguard and the  naval units are 
nearby which means that because attacking a ship under way takes longer, it gives an 
opportunity for naval units to arrive before boarding. This also applies to the Iranian pirates 
in the central region of the Arabian Gulf, who also prefer ships at anchor.   
 
In Somalia, the case is different. From my first field work in 2012, I was told by some 
security officers that Somali pirates travel all over the ocean and seek victims’ vessels 
randomly for easy targets, but other officers said that pirates are organized and have 
information about targets before they leave the shore. From my second field work in 2013 
when I interviewed pirates, some of the pirates said that they only targeted ships that are 
illegally fishing in Somali waters, but other pirates said that they select targets randomly 
based on their availability and easiness to board. Also some pirates said that they would not 
attack Muslim or Arab ships because they said that Muslim and Arab ships do not engage in 
illegal fishing in Somalia. The f act is that Somali pirates do not select targets based on 
nationality or origin but on the easiness of attacking them. Some of the pirates do have 
information about ships in the area which means that they do not  attack randomly, but these 
organized attacks are done by the groups of pirates who work in gangs, whereas the pirates 
who work individually would have less information before they leave the shore. The most 
commonly attacked ships between 2010 to 2015 in Somalia were  oil tankers (22%), then 
bulk carriers (20%), then chemical tankers (14%), then container ships (12%), then cargo 
ships (11%), but fishing ships only 4%, which means that the pirates no longer attacked 
illegal fishers.  This is partly because most of the fishing vessels in the Somali region are 
armed for protection and the navies in the area protect the fishing vessels convoys; partly 
because the top categories in the list of attacked ships are the tankers, bulk carriers, cargos 
and containers as they are the slowest ships in the category and they have small freeboards 
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which makes it easier for the targets to chase and board; and partly because these top 
categories of target vessels yield the most valuable rewards.  
 
Ong (2014, p. 270) makes a similar contrast between piracy in SE Asia and Somalia, stating 
that “the pirates in South East Asia prefer small and mid-size vessels and they prefer to attack 
at night while those targets are at anchor…the reason for choosing those targets by the pirates 
in Southeast Asia is that they need to steal engine parts, cash and some other 
items…[whereas] the Somali pirates prefer to operate in the high seas and they attack a wide 
range of ships such as large cargos, containers and luxury private crafts”.   
 
 Timing  
 
In this theme we are trying to understand the timings of the attacks - during the day, week 
and the year - so we can understand when is the most likely time for the pirates to operate and 
why.  From fieldwork findings in 2012, Kuwaiti officers reported that the most likely time for 
Iraqi pirates to operate in the northern Gulf is during the summer and in the day time because 
the wind speed is minimal during summer months. By contrast, in the central region of the 
Arabian Gulf, Qatari coastguard officers said that the most likely time for attack by Iranian 
pirates is at night time and during Ramadan - Ramadan lasts for one month every year - now 
it is in July and August and it shifts 11 days earlier every year - because during Ramadan, 
Qatari forces would be reduced and Iranian pirates use this advantage to attack fishing vessels 
in the area. However, from Iranian pirates, I also learned that the pirates in the Gulf are 
willing to change their strategy in accordance with the weaknesses of the authorities. A 
question arises here: if the Qatari forces know that the pirates operate in Ramadan when the 
coastguards reduce their forces for one month, why do the Qatari coastguards still reduce 
their units at sea? This theme is linked to the general ineptitude of some governments when 
dealing with piracy. 
 
In the Somali case, Liwång et al. (2013, p. 105)  said that “the best time for the Somali 
pirates to attack the targets is at daytime with a calm sea as the visibility would be much 
better for the pirates”. However, Baniela (2010, p. 194) said that “the Somali pirates usually 
attack at night, from sunset to sunrise , so they can use the advantage of the low visibility”.  
Most of my interviewees said Somali pirates would not operate during the monsoon season 
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because the wave heights and the wind speeds are very high - the monsoon season is from 
May to September every year. Also most of the interviewees including the pirates said that 
the day time is more attractive for the pirates to operate because they can see the ships and 
navigate safely, as most of the pirates do not use technology such as night goggles or radars. 
However, my analysis of all the piracy incidents revealed that while piracy in Somalia drops 
between May and September, making March, January and April the most likely months of the 
year for attacks, some of the attacks happened during the monsoon season. Moreover, Somali 
pirates during Ramadan did attack at night time because Ramadan in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 
2013 was during the summer which is very hot during the day. This is similar to the strategy 
of the Iranian pirates in Qatar where they attack the Qatari ships during Ramadan at night. 
Nevertheless, 75% of the attacks in Somalia were during the daytime, and from the analyses, 
I conclude that most types of pirates, financial or terrorists prefer operating during day time 
because there is better visibility to detect the potential target, and examine its board size and 
its level of self-protection.  
 
 Weapons, ships and manoeuvres  
 
In the literature there is little (The UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012, p. 15) 
detail on the types of weapons or types of ships or the tactical manoeuvres that pirates use to 
attack in the Arabian Gulf or the Somali region, but the general perception is that pirates in 
Somalia  use skiffs and Ak-47 guns. The UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (2012, 
p. 15), stated that “the Somali pirates usually use one single skiff or small vessels or 
sometimes two skiffs to attack the target also they usually use small arms, guns ranging from 
AK47s to RPGs…the Somali pirates usually manoeuvre one of the skiffs alongside and throw 
a hook and then climb on-board to hijack the ship and if they have been detected while they 
do the climbing the pirates usually fire on the bridge to force the master to clear them the way 
and then they will proceed directly to the bridge to take over the ship”.  
 
From my field work in 2012 in the Arabian Gulf region, I found out that pirates in the  
northern area of the Arabian Gulf and the Iranian pirates in the  central area of the Arabian 
Gulf  use  only a small amount of weapons, knives or small guns, because their intention to 
harm the victims is limited. Also pirates in the Arabian Gulf use small boats to attack and 
they usually attack in single vessels. In Somalia, however, the attacks are more dangerous 
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and the Somali pirates are more brutal. From my two periods of fieldwork in 2012 and 2013, 
I saw that most of the interviewees (including pirates) mentioned that the Somali pirates use 
AK-47 guns, grenades and RPGs. As for the pirates’ ships, most of the interviewees in my 
two periods of fieldwork said that Somalia pirates use dhows as mother ships and skiffs to 
attack and board the target ships. However, the IMO’s reports of official piracy incidents in 
Somalia between 2010 and 2015 claimed that 76% of the attacks were used by skiffs only, 
6% of the attacks used speed boats only, and only 1.8% of the attacks used skiffs and mother 
ships together. The accuracy of these IMO’s reports, may however, be questioned, because of 
IMO’s failure to report piracy attacks in the Arabian Gulf. I came to the conclusion that the 
IMO’s piracy reports do not provide the full picture of piracy in either the Arabian Gulf or 
Somalia, and more monitoring must be applied in the reporting system in IMO to ensure 
more reliability.   
 
From interviewing the pirates, I found out that the average size of the pirates’ skiffs is 10 
meters in length and the power of the skiffs varies from 40 to 100 horse power engines. With 
regard to  technology usage, most of the literature (IMO, 2015) and the interviewees, except 
pirates (Appendix J), claimed that the Somali pirates do not use any sort of technology such 
as radars or GPS because they are able  to navigate without them, but from interviews with 
the pirates I noted that 20% of the pirates use GPS for navigation. About tactical manoeuvres, 
most of the literature and the interviews suggested that the Somali pirates usually attack from 
the stern quarters as it is easier to board there, and they usually approach the target from the 
sides and deploy a ladder to board. The pirates first follow the target and might fire several 
bullets to find out if the target vessel is armed-guarded or not and then they approach close 
from the stern sides.  
 
To conclude this sub-theme, noteworthy is that the pirates choose their tactical manoeuvres, 
type of weapons and types of ships they use according to their objectives and circumstances. 
Pirates in the Arabian Gulf use a limited range and number of weapons because their 
objective is not to harm the victims, they only attack for cash or cell phones, but for the 
Somali pirates their aims are to kidnap for ransom which means that they need more weapons 
and have to be more brutal to succeed with speed and effectiveness. When comparing the 
tactical manoeuvres of Somali pirates and pirates in the Arabian Gulf, fishing areas are very 
small in the northern area of the Arabian Gulf waters so coastguards are able to arrive at the 
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locations within minutes of an attack, and Iraqi pirates in the north prefer to board ships at 
anchor rather than when making way because they do not have enough time as the naval units 
will arrive sooner than when in the open ocean. By contrast, in the Somali region, most of the 
ships in the area are traveling throughout the region which is huge, so the navies take more 
time to arrive to the attacking position. Somali pirates have developed their tactical 
manoeuvres to board ongoing ships using heaver weapon types to achieve their goals of 
kidnap for ransom because when attacking ships making way the pirates will need the ship to 
reduce speed and this will not be achieved if the pirates used only light weapons.   
 
5.7  The Consequences of piracy 
 
When analysing the consequences of maritime piracy in two different regions it is useful for 
context to understand how big the problem is, and how reliable the evidence is to support 
associated issues. To illustrate, is the problem because of the number of pirate attacks? Or 
because of the huge size of ransom demands?  Or because of the number of seafarers killed?   
To answer these questions it is necessary to determine how available information is and 
whether it is valid and relevant to the case being studied. How it is possible to ascertain what 
is really happening at sea in those regions we are studying?   The main consequences of 
maritime piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia are the economic expenses incurred to deal 
with piracy in the form of vessel insurance and other security and military costs; the effect of 
piracy on the international economy; the amount of ransoms; vessel losses; and the violation 
of human rights. This thesis has identified variables and characteristics to categorise maritime 
piracy so that more targeted recommendations for action to mitigate piracy can be formulated 
in future.  
 
In the Arabian Gulf, the consequences of maritime piracy were never particularly severe, 
even when piracy attacks were at their peak. , in the north between 2003 and 2007, as shown 
in table 3.1, or in the central area from 2008 to 2012, as shown in Appendix L.  In the north 
of the Arabian Gulf, the Iraqi pirates usually stole only cash, cell phones and food, and there 
was only one recorded murder (in 2004). Similarly, in the central area of the Gulf the Iranian 
pirates mostly targeted cash, cell phones, food and other items, and there was only one 
recorded death (in 2009) when Iranian pirates shot a sailor in Qatari waters The fears of 
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serious consequences are not from the Iraqi or the Iranian pirates but from the Somali pirates 
who operate near the strait of Hurmuz where they attack the GCC’s ships in their ways out or 
in the Arabian Gulf. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) stated that “piracy in the Arabian Sea 
represents the major threat to the GCC maritime trade which their economies depend on. This 
piracy threat is not merely theoretical but real”. This claim by Nelson and Goossens (2011) 
was made about Somali pirates reaching the Strait of Hurmuz and blocking the waterway. 
Most of the literature suggested that the consequences of Somali piracy included increased 
crew wages, soaring insurance costs, vast ransom payments and other economic costs such as 
shipping rerouting (Madsen et al., 2014; Sterio, 2010; Reuchlin, 2012; Nelson and Goossens, 
2011). The total cost of Somali piracy was estimated at “$6 billion in 2012 and $3 billion in 
2013” (Madsen et al., 2014, p. 7). Also the literature reported that the number of hostages 
taken by the Somali pirates between 2010 and 2013 was 2,054  (1,090 in 2010, 555 in 2011, 
349 in 2012 and 60 in 2013) and that the average time for hostages to stay kidnapped was 11 
months (Sterio 2010, p. 1456; Hallwood and Thomas 2013, p. 345; Madsen et al., 2014, p. 7). 
Nikolic and Missoni (2013, p. 316) and Hurlburt and Selye (2013, p. 3) reported  that 35 
hostages were killed by the Somali pirates during this period, and many others suffered from 
physical and psychological abuse by the Somali pirates in addition to bad nutrition.  My 
interviewees explained (see Appendix O) the reason why piracy in Somali is more brutal and 
more dangerous is that in the Gulf the Somali pirates are more armed and more capable than 
other pirates in the world. This is mainly because Somalia has been a failed state since 1991, 
and all types of weapons are easy to get because the security is poor, and governmental 
control over crime is non-existent. In such circumstances, criminal gangs would easily form 
within the ranks of pirates. By contrast, in the Gulf, the Iranian pirates come from a 
successful state with capable security forces, so pirates would not get weapons easily and also 
the pirates would not find it as easy to form a gang with a structure and command chain 
similar to the Somali pirate gangs. Iraqi pirates come from an unstable state where the 
chances of forming a gang and arming its members are easier than in Iran, but Iraq does not 
have a great geographical advantage as the Iraqi coastline is limited and so the pirates would 
not be able to operate freely.   
 
The question  is why are the Somali pirates more dangerous and damaging than the Iraqi or 
the Iranians pirates as they are all pirates i.e., criminals seeking  the same goal which is 
money?  This is especially puzzling, as in the Arabian Gulf there are potential target vessels 
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that are really expensive and valuable luxury ships coming from Kuwait and Qatar which are 
among the richest countries in the world, and the Iraqi or Iranian pirates could obtain more 
money by taking the luxury ships and selling them or taking hostages and getting ransoms 
than by just taking cash, cell phones and other small valuable items. From the analyses of the 
empirical fieldwork data combined with secondary data obtained from reports, I offer the 
following three reasons why Somali pirates are causing more negative consequences than the 
Iraqi or the Iranian pirates in the Arabian Gulf:   
 
 First, Somalia is a failed state with no government and no security since 1991, which 
means that the crime rate is high, the rate of unemployment is high, the economy is weak 
(UN  Data, 2015), weapons are readily available and the forming of organized criminal gangs 
is very easy compared to many other countries.  In this environment, the criminals, including 
pirates, are well armed and more capable than other criminals; the pirates are well-organized; 
and the pirate gangs have good resources in information gathering and logistic supplies. By 
contrast, Iraqi and Iranian pirates come from countries with better weapons control and more 
security able to counter crime, which means that getting weapons is not as easy as in Somalia 
and forming organized pirate gangs is more difficult. Also Iran and Iraq have a better 
economy than Somalia which means that the need for money especially cash is less since 
Iraqi and Iranian pirates have more livelihood alternatives than Somali pirates.   
 Second,  because Somalia is a failed state and the government does not control all parts 
of Somalia, taking hostages from the sea and transferring them to Somalia and keeping them 
for a long time is easier to do in Somalia than in Iran or Iraq where  Iranian and  Iraqi 
authorities could track the hostages locations very quickly.  
 Third, when I have interviewed Somali pirates in Mombasa Kenya I noticed that all of 
them share the same hate against the west because of the illegal fishing and the chemical 
waste dumping in Somalia waters caused by the international ships and the international 
fishing vessels. This hatred has generated a motive for piracy not just financial but also to 
harm the ships in the area because most of the pirates I have interviewed said that they are 
defending their country since piracy is the only action that can keep the international ships 
away from the Somali waters., But in the Arabian Gulf, issues of illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumping do not exist and neither Iranian nor Iraqi pirates have a hate issue against the 
seafarers in the area. In addition, the Iranian and the Iraqi pirates have more common social 
and religion ties with the seafarers in the area as all are Muslims and most are Arabs.   
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5.8 Reponses to piracy 
In this section, the efforts that have been made to deal with the piracy issues in the Arabian 
Gulf and in the Somali basin are discussed. During the research, I observed that the efforts to 
deal with piracy have changed during the years from 2011 to 2015 in Somalia. Earlier in the 
research, I analysed the political responses and the military responses separately, but for this 
section I analyse these efforts together, as a more integrated approach to examining links 
between the different types of responses will bring a more holistic understanding of this 
multi-faceted problem of piracy. In chapter one, I stated six hypotheses to be tested. Two of 
these hypotheses are: “Hypothesis 5: deploying forces only, without dealing with the piracy’s 
drivers underpinning behaviour, will cause the pirates to operate somewhere else”; and 
“Hypothesis 6: deploying force only, without dealing with the piracy’s roots, will cause the 
pirates to develop their military capabilities to compete with the deployed forces”. In this 
section, I present my findings to test these two hypothesises.   
 
Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 1) reported that “the GCC had adopted a coordinated strategy 
of counter-piracy to protect the Arabian Peninsula from the threat of piracy which was a 
recognition that the first action the GCC must do to not lose the case which is to address the 
problem”. However, my findings suggest the GCC is missing addressing the piracy problem 
properly by categorizing piracy under general cases like robbery or terrorism. In Kuwait, for 
example, when I went to the law court looking for piracy cases and files,  it was  impossible 
to find a piracy case because all the relevant cases had been filed under either robbery or 
terrorism which meant I had to read every single case to find an example of piracy. This 
means that data is not collected on piracy specifically or cross-referred to piracy which could 
later be used in a search tool, so the extent of the piracy problem is not evident or easily 
available or accessible. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 4, 5) drew attention to another 
problem of the GCC’s response: the “CTF-152 which is a multitask force consisting of all the 
navies of GCC under the supervision of the U.S. fifth fleet in Bahrain but this task force 
doesn't participate directly in anti-piracy moves…Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf State which 
contributes to marine security beyond its territorial waters. Although all the GCC states are 
enhancing their naval capabilities, apart from Saudi Arabia the others have a limited naval 
role, which is to defend their own territory waters”. Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 6) 
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conclude that unless more political will is shown by the GCC countries to tackle piracy, the 
problem could escalate into a catastrophe for the region:  
“although piracy is not yet a great danger to the GCC [which I challenge based on my 
research findings], it will become more dangerous to Arabian Gulf region due to the 
increasing capabilities of pirates and the expanded areas of pirates’ areas of operations 
as they would block the Strait of Hurmuz (the only entrance in the Arabian Gulf)…the 
GCC need to address piracy directly, and shift the role of counter- piracy from a 
secondary to a primary basis by starting their operations in the Gulf of Aden”.  
More specific complaints made by Nelson and Goossens (2011) against the GCC’s anti-
piracy efforts include the criticisms that the vessels used by the GCC are too few and too 
small to operate offshore; that more training in Visit, Board, Search and Seize (VBSS) 
operations is needed; that more helicopters are required; and that GCC should establish 
special pirate courts to synchronise with internatuional legal bodies.  
Findings in this thesis support many of Nelson and Goossens’ (2011) points, but I disagree 
that the main problem with GCC maritime security is failure of political coordination and 
political commitment. On the contrary, the GCC countries have been successful in 
coordinating their anti-piracy initiatives: as small states with small forces they must unite to 
increase the capabilities of their armed forces, and most of the security interviewees 
mentioned that the GCC is achieving this unity. Piracy was an issue in the north of the Gulf 
between 2003 to 2007 and also was an issue in the central Gulf area from 2005 to 2011, but 
Nelson and Goossens (2011) were evidently not aware of this as the IMO never mentioned 
the piracy attacks in the Gulf, nor therefore, were they aware of the GCC’s success in 
containing these attacks. From my interviews with most of the naval and coastguards officers 
and also from my observation in the operation centres in the GCC coastguards and from my 
experience as a naval officer in the Kuwaiti Navy, I was told that naval coordination in the 
GCC region was going in the right direction and this coordination helped the GCC states to 
quickly overcome the piracy problems in the northern Gulf. Little commentary has 
recognised these successful responses to piracy in the Gulf, and most of the literature 
(Campanelli, 2012; Haywood and Spivak, 2012; Hodgson, 2012; Liwång et al., 2013; 
Hastings,2009) implies that the attempts that have been made to deal with piracy have 
focused on Somalia. In this section, I will offer new insights to fill the  knowledge gap by 
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analysing actions  taken by governments, companies or international organization against 
piracy in the Arabian Gulf and the Somalia region,  and compare the findings to find out 
which attempts have been most effective in dealing with piracy. 
Beginning with the Arabian Gulf, from my first field-work in 2012 in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar 
and Emirates, I noticed that all the navies and coastguards in the Arabian Gulf engaged in a 
very high level of cooperation in the information exchange, similar policies, intelligence 
exchange and a wide range of military communication, and the commitments between the 
governments were well formed in the GCC countries. Most of the interviewees stated that 
this cooperation is effective, and when I visited the U.S. base in Bahrain I found all the 
liaison officers from all the GCC countries gathered in one place, obtaining and delivering 
maritime information from their countries and exchanging them with each other. Moreover, 
there are daily reports delivered directly between all the GCC navies and coastguards, and 
this cooperation has enhanced the level of maritime security in the Arabian Gulf and probably 
caused the rate of piracy to fall in a short period of time, 6 months.  
 
By contrast, in Somalia, most of the literature stated that international ignorance and the lack 
of a regional commitment to apply such cooperative policies have allowed piracy to increase 
and expand during the past years until 2013 after which piracy in Somalia decreased. When I 
analysed all the piracy incidents between 2010 and 2015, the most frequent location that the 
Somali pirates chose to attack the ships was in Omani international waters, even though 
Oman has the most capable naval forces and coastguards in the region. This is likely to 
reflect the position that Oman has refused to join the international fight against piracy except 
on the high seas. One interpretation is that this shows a lack of regional cooperation in the 
Somali region is one of the reasons for increased piracy as Oman’s refusal has meant Somali 
pirates have chosen to shift their activities from the Gulf of Eden to Omani international 
waters. A commitment to cooperate with the international and regional communities is 
essential to combat piracy politically and with military. Even if a state has a military force 
capable of dealing with piracy, there must be a political will to join forces with other states. 
Oman is the best example of a failure to learn this lesson. During my first field-work in 2012, 
I visited the Combined Maritime Forces base in Bahrain CMF which includes all the 
leaderships of the task forces to combat piracy in the Arabian Gulf and the Somali Region 
(CTF150,151 and 152) – i.e. 30 countries from the region and beyond: Australia, Bahrain, 
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Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of 
Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines, 
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, United 
Kingdom, United States and Yemen. Significantly, Oman is not one of the members, despite 
being located between the two prime pirate regions (the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean). 
One view is that Oman is not committed to the regional and international fight against piracy, 
and as a result, Omani international waters have become the most infected location of Somali 
pirates between 2010 and 2015.      
 
 Reuchlin (2012, p. 52) stated  that “the amount of ransoms paid so far to the Somali pirates is 
$626 millions”. This indicates that ransom payments are one of the most significant responses  
made  to piracy by some of the private shipping companies. Revealing the amount of ransoms 
that has been paid to the pirates is helpful to know the economic impacts of piracy. I have 
discussed before the argument that paying ransom for pirates is making the situation more 
complicated and encouraging pirates to attack more people, but there is also increased 
business for insurance companies offering insurance to pay ransom for piratical kidnaps. The 
role of insurance companies and their impact on piracy has received little attention to-date 
and should be examined in future research when action to mitigate piracy is being considered. 
 
Another response to Somali piracy has been to switch routes for maritime transport. 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi (2013, p. 400, 411) said “that the effect of the increase of 
modern piracy on the costs of maritime transport is significant, and that the main affected 
route is between Europe and Asia because the route contains several failed states…some 
shipping companies decided to use the Arctic route to travel from Europe to Asia using the 
Russian coast because this route is safer and also the ships can avoid the expensive costs of 
traveling through the Suez Canal”. Likewise, Nelson and Goossens (2011, p. 3) said that 
“many companies have chosen other ways to avoid piracy in or near the Gulf of Aden”. 
However, one of the Kuwaiti oil company experts suggested that this solution might be useful 
only in the short term, as the pirates are already expanding their areas of operation, and in the 
long-term they will attack along alternative routes.  
 
Another anti-piracy response was international legislation giving permission to national 
navies to arrest pirates in other states’ EEZs. However, this permission did not extend to  
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states’ territorial waters, as Joseph (2010, p. 1293) pointed out: the “UN gave rights to forces 
to pursue pirates in contiguous zones or the EEZs of the coastal states, but this right of pursuit 
ends as soon as a chase enters the territorial waters of a third state”. Joseph drew attention to 
“other legal restrictions on international responses to counter piracy”. During the first year 
fieldwork, I interviewed officers in international navies charged with countering piracy in the 
Arabian Gulf and Somalia (CTF 151 and CTF 152), and they stated that the biggest challenge 
the navies faced was the legislation limiting and restricting their work, and some of the 
officers admitted they had to release pirates after they captured them because of these legal 
restrictions.  
 
The most obvious anti-piracy response is military, and some commentators have suggested 
that a massive military effort would stamp out piracy once and for all section 3.8). For 
example, Pristrom et al., (2013) and Vanˇek et al., (2014) argue that an increase of the 
military forces would help to eliminate piracy in Somalia. However, other commentators such 
as Gathii (2010, p. 112; Bahadur (2011); and Hodgson, (2012),  together with most of my  
interviewees , argue that the military solution to deal with piracy in either Somalia or the 
Arabian Gulf is only a short- term solution because military deployment does not deal with 
the roots of the causes of piracy, it only deals with the results of those roots. Also some of the 
military experts said that because the Somali basin and the Indian Ocean are so large, military 
force to combat the Somali pirates cannot be effective even if all the navies in the world were 
deployed. My findings support this assertion of the futility of military force against Somali 
pirates, but the case in the Arabian Gulf is different as in the  north of the Kuwaiti waters the 
area is small and  naval and coastguards units are more likely to arrive at the attack location 
sooner than the naval units in the Indian Ocean. So I recommend that military deployment in 
the northern area of the Arabian Gulf can (and does) provide a long -term solution, unlike the 
situation in the Indian Ocean. In the central area of the Arabian Gulf, as in the northern area, 
military action helped to decrease piracy In the Somali case, most of the governmental 
officials I interviewed such as the Somali ambassador in Abu Dhabi stated that the UN 
attempts to solve the Somali piracy problem were wrongly focused mainly on military 
actions, when the source of the problem is on the land not at sea. The ambassador also 
claimed that the UN’s limited attempts to deal with the roots of piracy on land, such as by 
empowering the Somali government and strengthening the Somali economy, were not 
effective strategies. The same point was made to me by the UN regional officer in Nairobi 
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who said that the political actions to empower the Somali new government were very weak, 
and as a result Somali piracy increased and became more organized until 2013. My research 
has shown that the problem of Somali maritime  piracy is very similar to terrorism on land 
where the international systems deal with the outcomes of terrorism by applying force to 
counter it, but the problem shifts somewhere else, and often becomes more violent, 
aggressive and distributed to wider geographical areas. It is true that when looking at the 
statistics, the number of piracy attacks in the region has decreased, but this does not 
necessarily prove that the piracy problem has decreased – it may mean that the pirates are 
more organized and more selective in choosing high value targets. This picture is similar to 
that of terrorism, in that the international community thought that they had countered 
terrorism when the statistics showed a decrease in the number of the attacks during the 1990s, 
but then there occurred on September 11, 2001, the huge attack on the World Trade Centre. I 
suggest from the greater understanding gained from my research that the same situation is 
happening with piracy, the U.N. assume that counter-piracy efforts are on the right lines 
when they notice a decrease in the number of attacks, but they ignore other factors such as the 
further geographical areas that the pirates can reach such as the Strait of Hurmuz or the Red 
Sea, the level of violence, the average ransom and the type of targets they are able to attack.  
 
Armed guards and other on-board anti-piracy measures such as water cannons or dummies 
are among the additional important measures that have been used more recently by the 
commercial ships to counter piracy. Most of the ships traveling near the dangerous waters 
now deploy armed guards on board. Some commentators such as Bryant et al. (2013, p. 76) 
who investigated “the role of anti-piracy measures which can reduce successful piracy 
attacks”, have suggested that armed guards have played an important role in protecting the 
commercial ships in Somali waters. Some experts claimed that arming the ships is essential to 
protect the safety of the crews and to scare the pirates away, and my findings in chapter four 
suggest that there were no successful hijackings when armed guards were deployed. 
However, Pristrom et al. (2013, p. 687) said that “the International Association of Ports and 
Harbours IAPH believes that armed guards on board merchant ships will increase the 
violence from the pirates and they suggested that the use of weapons must be restricted to the 
military staff on internationally agreed missions”. Some of my interviewees claimed that 
armed guards on board commercial ships are illegal and will spread violence and encourage 
pirates to use heavier weapons. Results from this research suggest that arming commercial 
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ships might help to scare pirates away for a short time, but the pirates will reorganize 
themselves to deal with the situation of armed guards by, for example, arming more heavily 
since temporal trends show that pirates have evolved over time becoming more adaptive to 
the context in which they are working. Moreover, arming commercial ships would allow 
civilians to act violently with no control which could result in a violation of human rights by 
misjudging a threat situation, evidence of which was observed through interviewing those 
prisoners who claimed to be wrongly arrested as pirates.  
 
Another anti-piracy policy which has had a significant effect in reducing Somali piracy 
attacks is the wholesale arrest of all armed seafarers in the Somali basin. Before I went to 
Kenya in 2013 for the second period of fieldwork, I noticed that the number of incidents of 
piracy in Somalia was dropping rapidly, which, based on my understanding gained from 
attending the 4th Maritime Piracy & Security Summit Conference, January 2013 in London, 
was because the Somali pirates had become more organized and selective. They preferred to 
attack one ship and ask for a higher ransom instead of attacking ten ships and asking for 
fewer ransoms of smaller denominations. But when I went to Kenya and visited the pirates in 
Mombasa, the UN office in Nairobi and the IMO regional office in Mombasa, I discovered 
another possible reason for the piracy incidents decrease in 2013. This reason was alluded to 
when I interviewed the naval officers in 2012 in Bahrain: one officer said that when they 
captured the pirates they would take away their weapons and their fuel and release them 
because their countries did not have the ability to take international prisoners. But at the end 
of 2012, the U.N. established three regional maritime courts in Kenya, Seychelles and 
Mauritius allowing the international task forces in the Somali region to transfer the captured 
pirates to those three courts. I was told by the IMO officer in Mombasa that the naval forces 
in the Somali area now capture any Somali seafarer with weapons and transfer them to one of 
those courts for further investigation and trial. As a result, the maritime population decreased, 
including pirates and fishermen, and this was the main reason for the reduction of piracy in 
the Somali basin. However, this new strategy of lengthy detention in dealing with suspected 
Somali pirates might decrease the rate of piracy in the Gulf of Eden or the Somali waters for 
a short time, but the root of the problem is still there and pirates will move away from the 
Somali basin to operate elsewhere, as can be observed now off the Nigerian coast and the 
west African coast more generally (IMO, 2015; ICC, 2014).  
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Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1), like several other commentators, asserted that “the anti-piracy 
responses have failed to define the roots causes of piracy by focusing only on countering 
piracy at sea”. This claim is consistent with my research approach which is that the world 
needs to focus on the roots of piracy which are on land, and if the current policies continue to 
ignore the roots, then they are likely to continue to fail.  
 
5.9 The violations of human rights of suspected pirates   
Another issue of major concern over Somali piracy (though not of piracy in the northern 
Gulf) is the violation of human rights. During the second field-work in 2013, I found that 
most of the pirates had been held in the prison for long periods of time, 3 to 6 years, (see 
Appendix P) without trial or conviction, and when I asked some of the officers in the prison 
why this was the case they claimed that the Kenyan justice system is very slow. I also 
discovered that some Somali pirates in the Kenyan prison were treated without due 
consideration for their human rights. Several commentators have spoken about violation of 
the human rights of Somali pirates, or the suspects of piracy, both at sea and in Kenyan 
prisons. Some of the violations mentioned are that  pirates in  Kenyan prisons face physical 
abuse such as torturing; failure to  have their legal rights recognized; lack of  fair trials in the 
Kenyan courts; and  long detention periods without conviction. Sloan and Griffiths (2012, p. 
80) explained “the catch and release [policy] which some of the naval forces use as a strategy 
in the Somali waters…...the naval ships in the Indian Ocean if they capture pirates they 
would destroy their equipment and weapons and they would leave them with little food, 
water and fuel and then they will set them free”. This strategy was mentioned by the Korean 
officer in Bahrain during my first fieldwork and also by the British Naval officer in Bahrain, 
and during my second field-work by some pirates.  .  
 
Osiro (2011, p. 14) spoke about the Kenyan processes of prosecuting suspected Somali 
pirates: “the Somali pirates are not treated with an adequate justice system as they usually 
take a long time to transfer and try  the  Somali pirates in Somalia”. Also Osiro (2011, p. 14, 
12) said that “the Somali pirates in Kenya are not legally advised or provided with 
lawers…[and the] presumption of pirates’ guilt has been the norm in the Kenyan justice 
system…many Somali pirates experienced torture and physical abuses in the Kenyan prisons. 
Also the Somali pirates inside the Kenyan prisons don’t receive sufficient medical 
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treatments”. From my second fieldwork in Kenya, summer 2013, some of the pirates claimed 
they had been tortured by the navy that captured them at sea, and they asserted that the reason 
for the torture and the physical abuse was to extract information from them. I personally have 
seen some of the pirates with legs or hands amputated, and was told that they suffered 
wounds from  combat against the navies, and when the navies captured them they amputated 
their legs or hands  because they did not want to spend time and money to treat their wounds. 
Most of the pirates complained that there is no sort of medical facility inside the prison and if 
any of the prisoners needed medical care they would wait for a long time to get permission to 
be taken  to an external medical care facility. All of the pirates I met in the Mombasa prison 
said that they were not allowed to be visited by their families or to make phone calls, so most 
of them did not know anything about their families since they had been transferred to Kenya. 
When I went to the prison commander in Mombasa, Shemola Tower Prison, I asked him 
about the rights of visitors for the pirates, and he acknowledged that they were not allowed to 
be visited or to make phone calls, but he did not provide any reason for this. When I asked 
him about the poor medical care inside the prison he responded that Kenya is not a rich 
country and they do not have enough funds to provide better health care to the prisoners. I 
then told him that I have just been to the UN office in Nairobi and they informed me that they 
provide funds to the Kenyan government to develop the prison facilities; he said that the 
Shemola Tower prison never received any of those funds and he claimed that he did not know 
about those funds. I noted during my second fieldwork in Kenya that most of the pirates held 
in Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, have been there without any trial or conviction for 
years. The pirates claimed that the Kenyan justice system is very corrupt, and they have to 
pay money to the court as a bribe to get a faster trial. Also several pirates said that they have 
never seen a lawyer and some of them claimed that they did not know what their crime was.  
Etzioni (2011, p. 14) said “that the Human Rights Watch claimed  that the Kenyan courts 
can’t assure fair trials for the Somali piracy suspects”, and that “the Kenyan prisons have 
poor conditions and the Somali piracy suspects face long detention periods without 
conviction”.  
 
It appears from the respondents that corruption is widespread in Kenya, and that the pirates’ 
claims about the corruption of the justice system in Kenya are accurate. Some of the pirates I 
have met in Mombasa prison claimed that they were caught because the navies suspected 
they were pirates due to the weapons they carried for self-protection purposes. They said that 
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the navies in the area capture anyone who is black at sea who carries weapons and transfer 
them to Kenya for trial. I doubted this claim at the beginning, but when I went to the IMO 
office in Mombasa and interviewed the IMO officer, he said that the navies in the area 
changed their strategy in 2012 and started to capture any person at sea carrying weapons and 
transfer them to Kenya for further investigation. I asked him ‘how would you know if the 
suspect is a pirate or a fisherman?’, and he replied that the authorities in Kenya would ask 
about the company which the fisherman working for, or the port he travelled from. I told him 
that Somalia is a failed state and most of the fishermen are self-employed - he then refused to 
talk about this issue further.   
 
Moreover, many violations of human rights are likely to be unknown because of the common 
practice of suppressing information about pirate attacks. During my first field work trip in 
2012, I noticed that none of the piracy attacks which happened in the north of the Arabian 
Gulf between 2003 and 2007 were reported to the IMO, since they do not appear on any 
formal reports held by the IMO. Also when I went to Qatar I noticed that none of their piracy 
attacks had been reported to the IMO as they don’t appear in (ICC, 2014 or IMO, 2015). In 
Kuwait, I was informed that the government in both Kuwait and Qatar gave instructions to 
the coastguards and the navies not to report any of those piracy attacks to the IMO for two 
reasons; the first reason is that those piracy attacks are not serious or dangerous and reporting 
them to the IMO might attract the media’s attention which would make the problem worse. 
The second reason is that reporting those minor attacks might increase the fear of piracy in 
the Arabian Gulf which might affect maritime businesses and investment in the area and 
increase the maritime security insurance costs in the Arabian Gulf. This lack of information 
makes it difficult for researchers to track any violations of human rights against the captured 
Iraqi pirates in the north of the Arabian Gulf or the Iranian pirates in the central part of the 
Arabian Gulf.  
 
Finally, a Yemeni liaison officer told me that the Indian navy used physical abuse against the 
Somali fishermen and the Somali pirates in the Somali basin region. On Youtube.com I found 
some distressing clips of killing and shooting pirates by the Russian navy and other 
commercial ships with armed guards. For example, a video clip posted by Tuter (2014) 
showed unknown armed guards on a commercial ship shooting and practising shooting 
Somali pirates who had already surrendered in the water, and by the end of the video all of 
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the pirates had been killed. Also there are tens of video clips on Youtube.com where the 
navies in the Somali waters shoot the pirates’ ships with heavy machine guns causing the 
ships to sink and sometimes the pirates are killed. But little of this material is logged in 
official records.  
 
On the positive side, from fieldwork observations in the Arabian Gulf states, I can confirm 
that Iraqi pirates in Kuwait are well treated in  prison and getting all their rights of medical 
treatment, family visits and nutrition. Also I have seen the facilities inside the Kuwaiti prison 
for international prisoners who are allowed to make FaceTime calls and Skype calls to see 
and contact their families abroad. When I went to Qatar, the coastguard and the naval officers 
informed me that these facilities are also available in Qatari prisons.   
 
In conclusion, failure to protect the human rights of Somali pirates and Somali fishermen 
reflect poor behaviour by the authorities responsible, and is likely to fuel further resentment 
among future potential pirates.   
 
5.10 Proposed solutions to piracy problems 
In this section, suggestions made in the literature and from the data gathered during my 
fieldwork to deal with piracy in the Arabian Gulf and in Somalia is discussed. In the Arabian 
Gulf, attempts to deal with Iranian and Iraqi pirates appear to have been successful.   In the 
Somali case, although the number of the attacks decreased in the Somali basin area in 2013, 
the decrease of piracy has been accompanied by extreme violations against human rights of 
suspected pirates, and the pirates have moved to operate somewhere else. I will briefly 
outline in this section recommendations proposed which is given a fuller treatment in the next 
and final chapter of the thesis.  
 
In the literature, there are three main recommendations focused on the Somali case. The first  
recommendation is restoring Somalia to viable statehood as suggested by Haywood and 
Spivak (2012, p. 109,   Bruton (2010), and  Ong (2014, p. 290).  The second recommendation   
is to create a fair legal system for trying suspected pirates as suggested by Nelson and 
Goossens (2011, p. 6) and Ong (2014, p. 290). The third recommendation is more investment 
in, and coordination of, counter-piracy efforts at sea as suggested  by Nelson and Goossens 
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(2011, p. 6, 3);  Gathii (2010, p. 106);  Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1) and Ong (2014, p. 290). 
Sterio (2010, p. 1452) stated that “combating piracy in Somalia failed in the early stages of 
the problem because the cooperation was weak between the neighbourhood countries in the 
region”. My findings from the interview data endorse  all these  recommendations: the first as 
a long-term strategy; the second as a medium-term strategy, and the third as a short-term 
strategy. I would add a personal plea to the international community to address the problems 
of ransom payments, perhaps by banning governments and private companies from paying 
ransom demands from pirates. I will return to these important actions and other 
recommendations in the final chapter.   
 
5.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed several themes thematically comparing the literature with the 
primary data gained during this research. One theme is the definition of piracy, and I have 
compared several definitions in the way they   affect the military and political responses on 
the ground. The main factors here   are the locational and motivational, and by comparing 
them to the information gathered from the policy makers, naval officers and private maritime 
companies, I conclude that these two factors have a significant effect on the responses made 
by anti-piracy organizations, which must be reviewed.  
The motivation behind piracy is one of the most important themes in this research. However, 
I conclude in this chapter that the motive of Iraqi, Iranian and Somali pirates is not the main 
key behind forming their strategy whether it is kidnap for ransom or hit and run, because 
there are other causes which form those strategies.   Piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia 
has a mixture of motives:  the main one is financial but political and ideological motives exist 
in some cases though they do not affect the strategy followed by the pirates in the region.  
Somali state’s failure led to a breakdown of law enforcement, a weak economy, poverty and 
unemployment, all of which increased the crime rate in Somalia including piracy. The high 
ransoms gained from piracy attracted criminals to join the pirates’ gangs. These two causes 
motivated the later pirates who were ordinary criminals but changed their crime activities to 
piracy to benefit from the high ransoms and the low law enforcement.  The pirates who have 
ideological motivations have been influenced by their hatred against the west because of the 
illegal fishing and the chemical waste dumping in Somali waters. But even pirates with 
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ideological motivations are pirating to gain the high ransoms to satisfy their financial needs 
as well as their ideological needs (or the ideological needs of others who are putting pressure 
on them). Stopping illegal fishing and the dumping of chemical waste in Somalia would not 
deter those later pirates, but solving the economic crisis, restoring security and encouraging 
investment to offer jobs for the Somalis would help to deter them.  Nevertheless, to stop  
piracy in Somalia,  we have first, to end illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping in 
Somali waters; second to decrease the hate against the west by increasing the quality of 
education; and third to offer more jobs and investment to improve  the Somali economy and  
increase  domestic security. 
The section on the manifestations at sea of piracy has revealed that although the pirates have 
tactics and strategies that can be predicted, they are able to cope with the circumstances and 
develop their skills, tactics and manoeuvres to compete with the responses made. For 
example, the most dangerous waters in the Somali region used to be the Gulf of Eden but as 
soon as the naval units increased in this waterway the Somali pirates enhanced their shipping 
capabilities, logistics and the types of ships they have to travel all the high seas which are less 
protected.  
 
To summarise the responses to maritime piracy, where piracy is caused by a failed state such 
as Iraq in 2003, the first thing that international organizations must do is to empower a new, 
less corrupted government and help this government to enhance the security and the economy 
by injecting foreign and national investment to provide more employment opportunities for 
the citizens which would decrease the crime rate including piracy. But where piracy is a 
result of a weak economy and poverty but with high security such as in Iran, the pirates may 
shift their piracy activities to a different location with less security, as the Iranian pirates 
shifted to Qatari waters because the Qatari naval forces were less capable than the Iranian 
naval forces. In this case, the most effective measure is to empower the home country of 
those pirates to develop a better economy, with more jobs and education. In the Somali case, 
where (as in Iraq in 2003), there is a lack of both security and economic viability, the UN has 
established task forces to protect the shipping in the Gulf of Eden and in the Somali waters, 
and most of the regional countries are cooperating in the military operations against piracy 
except Oman (CMF, 2002). Oman’s inaction resulted in Somali pirates expanding their 
operational area to Omani international waters because Oman was not part of the Task Forces 
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to combat piracy. Moreover, the attempts to empower Somalia’s new government were very 
weak in comparison to the huge economic crisis and poverty in Somalia as Somalia has been 
a failed state since 1991. In the Somali case, both military attempts and political and financial 
attempts are essential to solve piracy, but military actions are only a short-term solution 
because the real problem is on land and the main causes for the Somali piracy are the illegal 
fishing and the chemical waste polluting of the Somali waters. Most of the naval experts 
stated that deploying forces in the Somali region will not be enough because the area is huge 
and the pirates will move to the less protected locations such as the Omani waters or the deep 
ocean. Likewise, deploying armed guards on board commercial ships was not recommended 
by most of the academic experts and the international politics experts because this may cause 
the pirates to use heavier weapons and they will become more brutal. Also, some of the 
interviewees said that arming a commercial ship is not legal according to the international 
law 
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6 Chapter Six:  Conclusion  
 
This conclusion has two parts: (1) a summary of the thesis’ main findings, and (2) a list of 
recommendations on how to combat marine piracy.  
6.1 Summary of findings 
 There are five main findings in this thesis. First is the importance of clarifying the definition 
of piracy. This clarification is not only of semantic or intellectual importance, but also of 
practical importance. Let me explain. From the start of this research, the aim was to provide 
an answer to the question “are the current anti-piracy policies and responses sufficient to deal 
with piracy?” This question was focused on the anti-piracy policies and responses in the 
Arabian Gulf and Somalia.  My first objective in achieving this aim was to examine the 
currently used definitions of piracy to find out what is the most appropriate definition of 
piracy for use by the task forces, lawyers, courts or shipping companies. From my first 
fieldwork interviews with naval and coastguard officers and private maritime security 
companies, I discovered that the definition of piracy could play a major role in chasing and 
combatting pirates and overcoming  many of the  obstacles faced by task forces in obtaining a 
clear strategy when dealing with pirates in the region. One of the problems is that pirates can 
drag hostages into the territorial waters of Somalia causing the international naval task forces 
to stop chasing them as they are authorised to operate against piracy only in international 
waters. Conversely, Iranian pirates drag Qatari ships outside Qatari’s territorial waters, 
causing the Qatari coastguards to stop chasing them and to call for help from the naval forces, 
which gives the pirates more time to carry out their attacks and escape the scenes. If the 
pirates were defined as terrorists, neither of these obstacles would apply.  
The second main finding of the thesis is about the causes of piracy in the Arabian Gulf and in 
Somalia. One of the most frequently cited causes of piracy is state failure (Gathii, 2010, p. 
108; Sterio, 2010, p. 1451). But my findings have shown that while state failure may be a 
contributory cause, it is not a sufficient cause:  other factors are essential.   In the Somali 
case, we found that state failure explained the increase of piracy, because in failed states the 
crime rate in general rises, but it did not account for kidnap for ransom. Likewise, when Iraq 
was a failed state between 2003 and 2007, piracy increased in that region, but the pirates did 
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not engage in kidnap for ransom: rather the piracy in the North of the Arabian Gulf consisted 
of stealing cash and other valuable items with no serious harm to the seafarers.  
So while state failure alone might increase piracy, it does not generate kidnap for ransom, 
which has other causes. The fact is that three additional factors are necessary to explain the 
rise in kidnapping for ransom in Somalia: illegal fishing/chemical waste dumping; a long 
coastline on a busy shipping route; and a slow response from counter-piracy forces.  
Commentators are right to point out that illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping led to a 
decline in the fish-stocks which left Somali fishermen with no alternative other than piracy to 
earn a living (Diaz and Dubner, 2010, p. 4; Liss, 2010, Chapter one; Schneider and Winkler, 
2013, p. 187; Link-TV, 2009; Moreira, 2013). Also, illegal fishing and chemical waste 
dumping was a reason for generating hatred in the minds of fishermen, and this hate would 
turn them into pirates with the will to kidnap for ransom. So illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumping were responsible for an increase in piracy and also for an increase in 
kidnapping for ransom. However, this only affected a minority of people - the people who 
suffered directly from this violation - and so if the problems of illegal fishing and chemical 
waste dumps in the Somali waters were solved, it would not end piracy in Somalia.  
The point is there are three types of pirates in Somalia: the original pirates who were the 
fishermen directly affected by illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping; later pirates who 
were already criminals and joined piracy as a business venture because of the huge profits 
involved; and terrorist pirates who were satisfying other political needs. Solving the illegal 
fishing and chemical waste dumping problem in Somalia would probably stop the fishermen, 
the original pirates, from attacking ships and turn them back to fishing, but the other two 
categories of pirates would continue kidnapping for ransom since they did not join piracy 
because of the illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping, but either for the ransoms or for 
accomplishing political goals. When looking at piracy in the Arabian Gulf the issue of illegal 
fishing and chemical waste dumping does not exist, yet limited amounts of piracy still 
occurred in the North and in the Central area. So illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping 
is not the main reason for piracy to occur in any area of the Arabian Gulf. We must note also 
that illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping cannot occur in waters protected by stable 
states, so they presuppose state failure which leads fishermen to step forward and take control 
to defend their waters and legitimise piracy. 
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The second factor necessary for kidnapping for ransom is geographical.  According to several 
commentators (Murphy, 2009; Pham , 2010, p. 330; Sterio, 2010, p. 330), the geographical 
features of Somalia’s coastline was the main reason for Somali piracy as Somalia has a huge 
coastline on the Gulf of Eden, one of the most important waterways in the world. It is 
undoubtedly true that this geographical advantage is an essential factor for pirates engaging 
in kidnap for ransom because the pirates need shelters to keep the hostages in without being 
tracked. However, Somali pirates travel long distances to other regions such as the Arabian 
Sea to attack ships, which means that the Somali geographical advantage is not the main 
cause for their piracy operations.  
By contrast to Somalia, Iraq has a very limited coastline on the North of the Arabian Gulf, 
and although  piracy increased when Iraq failed in 2003 despite the small fishing areas in the 
North which was well protected by the Kuwaiti coastguards, kidnap for ransom was not 
undertaken by Iraqi pirates, partly because the hate factor was absent, and partly because  
Iraqi pirates do not have geographical advantages to take hostages as the Iraqi coastline is 
short and can be monitored by the Kuwaiti RADAR system. In the case of Iran, although it 
has the longest coastline in the area, Iranian pirates travel all the way to Qatar to attack ships 
and steal limited amounts of cash. This means that Iranian pirates did not use the advantage 
of the geographical advantage in Iran because Iran is relatively stable compared to Iraq and 
Somalia.  
The third factor necessary for kidnapping for ransom is the slowness of counter-piracy 
operations to develop in the form of regional forces to combat or engage the states and 
organizations in the region to conduct treaties and cooperation including speeding the process 
of the justice systems in the region by forming decent and capable maritime courts and also in 
the matter of enhancing the IMO piracy reporting system to make it quick and accurate in the 
perspective of time and location. Spivak (2012, p. 40), Sterio (2010, p. 1451) and Pham 
(2010, p. 331) drew attention to “international ignorance and lack of political will to tackle 
piracy which allowed it to increase”. When Somali fishermen first found in 2004 that the only 
way to get huge amounts of cash quickly was by kidnapping hostages, after this incident they 
developed the piracy business which attracted the later pirates to join them.  In Iraq, after 
state failure in 2003, piracy started to rise, but the countries in the region and the west paid 
more attention to it than in Somalia, and counter-piracy efforts began as Iraq became more 
stable in 2007. Significantly, the peak of the piracy attacks in the North of the Arabian Gulf 
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by the Iraqi pirates was between 2003 to 2007, after which international willingness to deal 
with the failure of Iraq played an important role in reducing piracy.  
The third main finding of the thesis is about the motivation of pirates in the Arabian Gulf and 
Somalia. Most lay people probably assume that pirates are simply motivated by financial 
gain. Many commentators take the same view: for example, Haywood and Spivak (2012, p. 
15), Leeson (2010, p. 1220), Gathii (2010, p. 102), Mejia et al. (2009, p. 894), Dana (2005, p. 
157), and Whitman (2012, p. 32) all claimed that Somali pirates were motivated only by 
money. However, the truth is much more complicated than that. While financial gain is 
undoubtedly a major factor in motivating virtually all pirates, it is not the only factor, nor 
always the most important factor. For example, some interviewees such as interviewees 1 and 
7 claimed that Iranian and Iraqi pirates in the Arabian Gulf were motivated by their 
governments to accomplish political goals by applying maritime threats in the Gulf because 
of the political conflicts between Iraq, Iran and the GCC states. Other commentators such as 
Liss (2011, p. 157, 158), Joseph (2010, p. 1273), Sterio (2010, p. 1458),  MacPhee (2012, p. 
7), and Reuchlin (2012, p. 49) stated that Somali pirates were motivated by ideological  ends, 
because they are  linked to terrorist organizations in Somalia.  
My finding is that while pirates in the Arabian Gulf, Iraqis and Iranians, are motivated mostly 
by money, the motives for Somali pirates are mixed: primarily financial (to make a living 
when fishing opportunities have evaporated; or as criminals attracted to ransom  money); but 
secondarily either vengeful (the original Somali pirates, artisanal fishermen, have an 
additional motive which is defending their waters from  illegal fishing and chemical waste 
dumping) or terroristic (obtaining money for Al-Shabab).  
The fourth main finding of the thesis is that just as there are two types of piracy in the area – 
financial piracy in the Arabian Gulf; and terrorist piracy in Somalia – so there are two types 
of piracy tactics employed. The Iraqi and Iranian pirates either prefer anchored targets in 
areas close to their respective territorial waters and far away from the security units so they 
can hit and run fast, or if the coastguards are nearby, they drag the victim ships outside the 
12nm so the coastguards cannot chase them and then hit and run. By contrast, the Somali 
pirates operate in areas far away from the task forces on the high seas and they prefer ships 
with lower freeboard and ships that are under way. For the Iranian and Iraqi pirates, the best 
time to attack is at night so they can use the advantage of low visibility, and they usually 
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attack ships at anchor in well-known fishing areas so they do not need light to seek for ships 
in the open sea. By contrast, because the Somali pirates travel for long distances in the open 
sea looking for targets with low freeboard and with no armed guards, to make sure that there 
is no naval ship around, they need good visibility, which means operating during day time.  
The fifth main finding of the thesis is that piracy is a multi-faceted and complex problem 
which cannot be solved by simple solutions. There is no single panacea; every case of piracy 
is different, and demands a customised response. Some commentators do suggest single 
solutions. For example,  Nelson and Goossens  (2011, p. 6),  Sterio  (2010, p. 1452),  
Pristrom et al., (2013),  and Vanˇek et al., (2014) suggested that the best way to deal with 
piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia is to increase the military task forces and enhance  
cooperation between the international or regional task forces. However, other authors such as  
Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi, (2013, p. 411), Joseph  (2010, p. 1293),  (Gathii (2010, p. 
112), Bahadur (2011) and Hodgson (2012) criticised the idea that enhanced military 
deployment alone will deal with piracy, arguing that this is only a short-term solution; it 
would merely cause the pirates to move away and operate somewhere else, because  it  does 
not  deal with the roots of piracy. The interviewees I engaged with during my fieldwork were 
divided on the effectiveness of enhanced military deployment - some were convinced by it, 
others were unconvinced. .  
When evaluating the military responses and comparing them with the increase or decrease of 
piracy, I noticed that in the North Arabian Gulf the reason for the increase of piracy between 
2003-2007 was the failure of Iraqi security, and that when Iraq became more stable and the 
Iraqi coastguards and Navy were re-established, the crime rate was reduced in Iraq including 
piracy. At first sight, this seems to confirm the effectiveness of military deployment. But in 
fact, the main reason for the decrease of piracy was not the military response but the regional 
political cooperation to stabilize Iraq. In the Central Arabian Gulf, the case for enhanced 
military deployment is more convincing than in the North of the Arabian Gulf, as the Iranian 
pirates targeted the Qatari ships because of the lack of protection from the Qatari side, since 
before 2005, Qatar did not have enough coastguard or naval units, but when Qatar hugely 
enhanced its navy and coastguards, piracy became under control and decreased to its minimal 
rate (see Appendix L) in 2012.  In Somalia, the case for enhanced military deployment is 
weak, because Somali pirates have attacked ships many hundreds of miles away from the 
Somali coast, and no amount of military response could possibly cover such vast areas. 
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Several naval experts and commanders told me that the area of Somali piracy is so huge that 
even if all the navies in the world were deployed they would not be sufficient to counter 
piracy because the average Somali pirates only need 15 minutes to hijack any ship.   
In 2013, piracy in Somalia  decreased  not because of increased military deployment but for 
four other reasons: (1) the U.N. regional office in Nairobi established three maritime courts in 
Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to deal with pirates in the regions, and this encouraged  
naval units in the area to capture pirates and transfer them to one of the three courts instead of 
the strategy of catch and release which most of the task forces previously employed ; (2) the 
second reason was the change of  strategy adopted  by the task forces in the area to one of 
capturing any Somali seafarer carrying any sort of weapon as a piracy suspect, and 
transferring them to one of the three courts for further investigation. This move caused a 
decrease in the Somali maritime population including the piracy population. (3) The third 
reason for a fall in piracy in Somalia was to arm the commercial ships, which was effective in 
scaring the pirates away. In my interviews, some of the pirates stated that the first thing they 
would do when finding a target is to make sure that the ship is not armed-guarded otherwise 
they would seek a different unprotected target. Several commentators have argued in favour 
of arming commercial vessels. For example, Bryant et al. (2013, p. 76) held that according to 
the statistics, it did decrease piracy attacks. This was also the suggested response offered by 
several maritime security experts. However, other commentators such as Pristrom et al. 
(2013, p. 687) and Fanning et al. (2012, p. 1) have argued  against arming  commercial ships 
on grounds that arming the ships  increases violence. I would add that such a policy does not 
deal with the roots of piracy; it could be a violation of international law, as it changes 
commercial ships from a civilian role to a military unit; and it could displace pirates from 
targeting commercial vessels to targeting fishing vessels.  (4) The fourth reason for the 
decrease in  piracy in Somalia was a change in shipping routes to avoid piracy infected areas  
(Martínez-Zarzoso and Bensassi, 2013, p. 411; Nelson and Goossens, 2011, p.  3). This 
change was effective at first, but no longer, because Somali pirates are now able to operate in 
remote areas far away from the Somali coast and the Gulf of Eden, so there are no longer any 
safe areas. 
However, none of these reasons deals with the root of piracy, which is the state failure in 
Somalia, so they are at best short-term responses. The fact is that any response taken against 
pirates without dealing with the root of the problem is doomed to failure in the long run. 
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Dealing with the root of the problem in Somalia entails a two-pronged policy: first, to end 
illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping; and second, to build up the Somali political 
system. Protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing and chemical waste dumping will deal 
with the original pirates, fishermen, while helping the Somali government to rebuild its 
security establishment and supporting international investment in Somalia to provide job 
opportunities and eliminate poverty will deal with both the criminals who became pirates to 
obtain ransoms, and the third group of pirates who have ideological or political ends.  
 The main contributions of the thesis are to provide a clear typology of piracy in the Arabian 
Gulf and in Somalia based on factors such as motivation, causes, tactics and consequences; to 
explain the responses to each type of piracy; and to evaluate the effectiveness of those 
responses in reducing piracy. More specific contributions arose out of the comparisons 
between the statistical data I have analysed in chapter four and the other sources of data 
presented in the literature and gained from the interviews. For example, some of the literature 
and some of the interviewees stated that Somali pirates are linked to Alshabab groups which 
make them more likely to target American and Western ships in order to damage the 
American and Western economies, and unlikely to attack Muslim or Arab ships. However, 
when I analysed all the piracy attacks in Somalia between 2010 to 2015, I noticed that the 
selection of the targets is based on the type of ships as the Somali pirates prefer to attack 
containers, bulk carriers and oil tankers, irrespective of the flag of the ships, meaning that 
most of the Somali pirates are not motivated by political or radical motives. Another specific 
contribution relates to a finding in chapter four that the most dangerous waters are the Omani 
international waters which are the most infected by Somali pirates in spite of the strength of 
the Omani naval forces compared to other naval forces in the area. This finding supports the 
claim made in the literature and some of the interviewees, that international indifference is 
one of the causes of the increase of piracy. A third specific contribution relates to sea 
conditions favouring piracy. In chapter four, I analysed the sea conditions which the Somali 
pirates most like to operate in, and I found that Somali pirates were less likely to conduct 
successful attacks when the wave height is more than 3 meters. This finding supports the 
claims in the literature and in the interviews which state that Somali pirates are less likely to 
operate in the Monsoon season (from May to September).  
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6.2 Recommendations 
 
6.2.1  Template guide 
 
The central recommendation that emerges from this thesis is the construction of a template or 
formula to guide our search for solutions to the piracy problem. Although recommending 
solutions to solve piracy is very difficult because every case is different and has its own 
complex of variables and there is no single panacea, nevertheless, it is possible to formulate 
some common principles to guide the quest for solutions. The following equation 
encapsulates the conditions for piracy to happen in any particular place:  
Motive + consequences + target availability + location = piracy 
By analysing and understanding the variables in the above piracy equation we can identify 
the type of piracy in question, and this will allow us to suggest the most suitable solution for 
that type of piracy. The following analysis will help us to understand each variable of the 
equation: 
Motive: The motive of the attack provides the reason why the pirates are attacking the ships 
in a specific location and we have to understand how high the desire of money is if we 
assume that money is the motive. For the pirates in the Arabian Gulf, we understand they are 
looking for money only and there is no other motive. However, the Iranian and the Iraqi 
economies are not as bad as the Somali economy which,   (based on UN Data, 2014)), makes 
the desire for money by Iranian and Iraqi pirates less acute than for the Somali pirates. The 
Somali pirates are looking for money but also for revenge against the illegal fishing and the 
chemical waste dumping that has occurred in the Somali waters that generated hatred against 
international shipping in the area which is the driver for kidnapping for ransom. So the 
motive variable for the pirates in the Arabian Gulf is simple and weak compared to the 
complex and strong motive of the pirates in Somalia. But the question is “do all the pirates in 
Somalia have hatred in their minds because of the illegal fishing, and do all the pirates in the 
Arabian Gulf have no motive other than money?”  From my research findings, the answer to 
this question is no.  The original Somali pirates (the fishermen) are the only pirates who are 
affected by the decline of the fish-stock, which means that the other Somali pirates do not 
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have the hate factor. In the case of the Arabian Gulf, some of the pirates had political motives 
because of the political conflicts between Iraq, Iran and the Arabian Gulf states, but only 
Somali pirates engaged in kidnap for ransom.   Pirates in the Arabian Gulf, whether or not 
motivated by political ends, needed only small amounts of money, and so engaged in a hit 
and run strategy not a ransom strategy.  
Consequences:  This variable is to understand what consequences the pirates might face when 
they attack. For example, in the Arabian Gulf, the consequences for the pirates are legal, 
because all states in the region are successful states, but for the Somali pirates the 
consequences are more dangerous because they might face death at sea. The consequences  
include the strength of the security forces in the area, and  by understanding the amount of 
damage that those security forces could inflict  on pirates, we will be able  to forecast the 
willingness of the pirates to operate in that area.  
Target availability: Target availability varies from pirates’ intent only on stealing items to 
pirates’ intent on kidnapping for ransom. In the Arabian Gulf, the targets are usually a limited 
number of fishing dhows, whereas in Somalia the number of the targets is huge as the Gulf of 
Eden is one of the busiest waterways in the world, meaning that the targets in the Somali 
basin are more available and easier than the targets in the Arabian Gulf.  
 Location:  This variable helps us to understand where the pirates might attack and why they 
choose their locations to attack, and also how the location affects their actions after the 
attack. In the Arabian Gulf, the locations for the fishing areas are known and specific and 
could be monitored by the navies and coastguards in the area. This is why it is very hard for 
pirates in the Arabian Gulf to kidnap hostages. In Somalia, the case is different as Somalia is 
a failed state and if the pirates kidnap hostages it is very difficult for the limited security 
forces to track them in Somalia as the area is huge. Also in Somalia, most of the pirates are 
from villages on the coast and as Somalia is a tribal state, pirates can be protected by their 
own village or tribe making the task of tracking the hostages very difficult.  
By applying this template or formula, it may be possible for the authorities to better 
understand, and thereby respond more effectively, to threats of piracy.  
6.2.2 Political solutions 
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As the failed state is one of the main causes for the increase of crime including piracy, 
helping a state to have a powerful and uncorrupted government would be the first solution if 
piracy increased in any region, as the example of Iraq in 2003 shows. Somalia is one of the 
most failed states in the world and the crime rate is the highest, so empowering a stable 
Somali government is a priority as a first step.  
Iran and the Arab Gulf states have many political conflicts and these conflicts might produce 
hate or political motives for potential Iranian pirates.  It is difficult to isolate pirates from the 
political contexts of their societies, meaning that political conflicts between nations will be 
reflected in rates of piracy, both negatively and positively. I think that the naval and 
coastguards in the area must read the political situations in the region and must estimate how 
much  hate might cause pirates to increase their activities, and according to those estimates, 
calculate where best to deploy their forces in the region.  
From the Somali ambassadors interviewed during my  fieldwork  it was clear  that the Somali 
government  needs  a more powerful security sector, because at present the clans, gangs, 
pirates, criminals and terrorists are more powerful than the government’s security forces. I 
recommend, therefore, that establishing a powerful government in Somalia entails providing 
its security sector with arms, personnel and training. However, establishing a powerful and 
stable state in Somalia is a long-term solution, and in the short-term, more immediate steps 
must be taken, as indicated in the next sections. 
6.2.3 Military action  
 
Military action to use force to combat piracy is an effective and essential short-term strategy, 
though it does not deal with the root of piracy. Where piracy is caused by a failed state, then 
the priority is restoring the failed state, as in the Somali and Iraqi cases, but, when piracy is 
caused by low levels of naval existence in a huge coastline region such as the Qatari waters, 
then increasing military activity would be the priority.  
When we look at the trends of piracy in the Arabian Gulf we  notice that military  attempts to  
deal  with piracy in the north and the central Gulf area were effective and managed to 
decrease piracy, but in Somalia, despite the international community’s use of  military efforts, 
changing the shipping roots, and deploying armed guards to deal with the Somali pirates, 
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those attempts did not solve the piracy problem but made the situation more complicated and 
more dangerous not least by raising the ransom rate. This failure led the international 
community to change its military strategy to one of capturing everyone at sea with weapons 
and transferring them to the three designated courts in the region. This integrated military 
strategy worked to decrease the number of piracy attacks in 2013, though it generated more 
human rights violations.  
I agree that designating the maritime courts in the Indian Ocean region is a positive step to 
deal with piracy but because the justice system in Kenya is corrupt and slow, resulting in 
violations against human rights, I do not agree with the strategy of capturing all seafarers 
with weapons and transporting them to these courts.  I recommend that the naval forces in the 
Somali region deal with weapons-carrying seafarers with more discrimination by taking the 
following five steps:  1) Acknowledging the differences between the types of weapons used 
for protection and the types of weapons used for kidnap. The criminals in Somalia use 
Kalashnikovs and similar machine guns, so for protection the seafarers must carry similar 
weapons and the naval forces must realise this and not consider people who carry 
Kalashnikovs as necessarily pirates. Pirates need more tools than weapons to kidnap ships, 
such as ladders, extra fuel tanks, grenades, more than five people on a skiff, and skiffs 
traveling around mother ships.  By considering all of these factors together the naval forces 
must decide in the initial investigation units at sea whether the captured seafarers are suspects 
or not and then decide whether to send them to the regional maritime courts.   2)  Establishing 
specialised investigation departments on-board the naval ships in the area. 3)  Monitoring the 
maritime courts in the region to root out corruption and injustice. (4) Separating fishing zones 
from international shipping zones. We can split the maritime RADAR scene in the Somali 
region to allow the RADAR system to monitor two different sectors; the Somali sector which 
will include all Somali ships (fishers and pirates), and the second sector which will include all 
other international ships. If any Somali skiff travelled outside the designated Somali area, the 
naval forces would know it was a potential pirate boat. This strategy would provide 
protection for Somali fishers and would also allow the naval ships to reduce the number of 
suspects from all skiffs at sea to the skiffs who travel near the international shipping routes.  
When the international navies provide protection for the Somali fishing areas, this would lead 
the Somali fishermen who presently carry weapons for protection not to carry them anymore 
which would decrease the number of the suspects in the Somali maritime sector. Moreover, 
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this strategy would mean that the commercial ships would not need armed guards anymore, 
which was arguably contrary to international law, and caused the pirates to use heavier 
weapons which made them more violent and more dangerous. This strategy could also be 
applied in the Arabian Gulf, especially in Kuwaiti waters. (5) Improving naval intelligence. 
Intelligence is the most important resource in wars, and military actions will never be 
effective without good intelligence. The Somali pirates have good intelligence from insiders 
who provide them with important information about potential target vessels - such as the 
locations, the existence of armed guards and the value of the ships.  For the military to 
operate effectively they must have insider information about the pirates.  One of the pirates I 
interviewed recommended that the Somali government should make use of pirates themselves 
to protect the sea because they know the area well and they have good seamanship skills. I 
believe that using the Somali fishermen for intelligence and information would be effective 
for the following reasons:  it would provide employment for the Somali seafarers which will 
decrease crime when recruiting them;  it would provide valuable information about pirates 
which will make the navies more effective and less confused when distinguishing between 
pirates and other seafarers; and  by building an information exchange between the Somali 
fishing communities and the navies, it would allow the navies to know the locations of 
fishing, the number of fishing skiffs, and the types of fishing skiffs in each fishing area which 
will make the task of distinguishing between fishing skiffs and other skiffs much  easier.    
6.2.4 Economic solutions   
 
My final recommendation, economic solutions, has two prongs: first, to end the payment of 
ransoms; and second to boost the Somali economy. What makes Somali pirates so eager to 
carry out kidnap for ransom is the extremely high amount of ransom that can be obtained.  
Most of the private companies pay ransoms to the pirates directly to release their ships and 
crews quickly. Also more insurance companies are getting into the business now by insuring 
the ships and being able to pay ransoms faster. This has encouraged the pirates to increase the 
number of attacks and increase the amount of ransoms demanded, which is now more than t 
$10 million on average to release a single ship. However, suddenly banning the companies 
from paying ransoms to pirates would cause deaths of kidnapped crews. I recommend that the 
first step to stop ransom payments is to restrict negotiations with pirates to governments only, 
and ban the private companies from engaging in the process of negotiations for payments.  
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This would slow down the negotiation process. The next step would be for governments to 
limit the amount of ransom that can be paid, and keep decreasing this amount, making sure 
that no government provides ransoms above the limits. The governments must keep lowering 
the maximum ransom level until it is not worth the risk of the dangers to the pirates involved 
in launching piracy attacks. The second economic solution is to wean Somali pirates away 
from piracy by improving their economic position at home. To solve piracy in Somalia I 
believe that investments must be made in the maritime sector such as fish processing, ship 
building, port facilities and other maritime investments to provide the kind of jobs that would 
attract the original pirates in Somalia.  Likewise, in other Gulf countries which have weak 
economies, the international community must invest in the maritime sector and facilitate 
maritime businesses such as fishing and fish processing, to provide pirates with alternatives 
to piracy.   
The current decrease in piracy in the Arabian Gulf and Somalia should not lull us into the 
false sense of security of thinking that the problem has been solved. The problem has been 
contained, not solved, but for how long? Piracy will only be solved when all the Gulf States, 
especially Somalia, become stable and prosperous societies, which may take decades to 
achieve. The new insights presented in this research thesis offer a way forward for 
governments to be proactive rather than reactive through applying the simple formula to help 
provide context-specific information on piracy so that more tailored policy can help target 
actions more likely to mitigate piracy in the longer term.  
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Appendix A  The topics covered in the fieldwork in order to answer the 
research questions 
Pirates The Somali state  
 
Ethnicity and personal  group  
 
Socio-economic and ideological status   
 
What led them to be pirates? 
 
Practical and tactical methods used for piracy 
(pirate’s ships, weapons, moves and technology)  
 
 
 
What has led to the failed state? 
 
What is the main cause of Somali piracy? 
What is the best way to stop piracy in Somalia? 
What is currently being done? 
What has failed in the past to stop piracy? 
 
 
Navies, coastguards & private companies Academic Experts in Piracy 
 
Information about areas at sea vulnerable to piracy 
 
The current maritime security policy and how  
effective it is  to counter piracy  
 
Practical and tactical information about the security 
resources and the pirates’ resources  
 
How to improve the current policy to make it more 
effective to counter piracy 
 
 
 
Information about the current situation and statistics 
of piracy in the areas 
 
The types of piracy and the characteristics of each 
type 
 
The international responses to each type of piracy 
 
The individual (local) responses to piracy 
 
The drivers, ideologies and causes behind piracy 
 
The current way to counter piracy 
 
The best way to improve responses 
 
 
Commercial shipping companies  
 
Information of areas of operation 
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Information about types of ships 
 
Information about  anti-piracy procedures 
 
The effectiveness of the security units at the area of 
operation 
 
How to improve  current anti-piracy policies  
 
How has the incidence and frequency of piracy 
changed over time? 
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Appendix B  Interview inventory 
Interviewee’s Type The Type of the interview The number of interviews  
1. Kuwait Naval Force and the 
Kuwaiti Coastguards 
Semi structured interviews   
2 
3. Kenya Jails Semi structured interviews (pirates) 20 
4. Somali Embassy in Abu Dhabi 
and Kenya 
Semi structured interviews  
2 
5. CTF 152, CTF 151 and CTF 150 
in Bahrain 
Semi structured interviews  
6 
6. Private security Companies in 
Dubai and Kuwait 
Semi structured interviews   
3 
7. Kenyan Embassy in Somalia 
(based in Nairobi, Kenya) 
Semi structured interviews  
2 
8. Qatari coastguards in Qatar Semi structured interviews 2 
9. Academic experts in the 
University of Nairobi 
Semi structured interviews  
2 
10. The United Nation Office in 
Kenya 
Semi structured interviews  
2 
11. The International Maritime 
Organization in Kenya 
Semi structured interviews  
1 
12. Kuwait Oil Tankers company 
Kuwait 
Semi structured interviews  
1 
   
Total: 43 
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Appendix C  The interview questionnaire contents according to each type of 
respondent 
Kuwait Navy, Coastguards, CTF 152 and Omani 
Navy  
Pirates in Somalia 
 
1. Personal  questions: 
 
(a) What is your name, age, position and rank? 
 
(b) How long have you been working in this 
position? 
 
(c) What is your main role? 
 
 
(d) How many people work under your 
command? 
(e) What is your highest level of education? 
 
1. Ethnicity and personal  group questions: 
a. What is your name? 
b. How old are you? 
c. What is your religion? And do you 
consider yourself religious? Do you pray 
every day? Do you fast during Ramadan? 
Do you pay to charity as required by 
Islam? 
d. What is your nationality? 
e. What is your marital status? And how 
many children do you have? 
f. What is your educational background? 
g. How many languages do you speak? 
h. What is your current official job? And how 
long you have been working in it? What 
are your previous jobs? 
i. How much is your monthly income? 
j. What sort of property do you have? How 
many people are living with you? 
k. What does your religion state about piracy? 
l. What led you to become a pirate? 
 
 
2. Questions about pirates: 
 
 
(a) Describe the piracy issue in the area of 
your command 
1. How extensive is it?  
2. What area is the most and least 
dangerous? Why? 
3. How many incidents have you dealt 
 
3. Piracy strategic  and ideological 
questions: 
 
a) How long have you been practising piracy? 
And how many times have you been 
caught? When do you admit defeat? 
b) How many successful operations have you 
made? And how many failed operations? 
How do you define success and failure? 
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with? 
4. What is the level of piracy threat? 
5. How many pirates in total do you 
think operate in your area of command 
and where do you think they originate 
from? What do you think is their 
background e.g., fishers? 
(b) Describe the type of pirates in this area:  
i.e., physical shapes, ethnicity, language, 
religion, nationality and their way of 
dressing?  
(c) What do you think is the main motive of 
piracy? 
(d) How many pirates, gangs and bases are 
there in the area? 
(e) How do you get information about pirates? 
(f) How do you usually deal with kidnappers? 
(g)  What do you think is the best way to deal 
with them? Paying ransoms or using force? 
And why? 
(h) How do you treat pirates after you capture 
them? 
(i) What is the punishment that the law 
imposes on pirates? 
(j) Are there any informal ways pirates get 
punished? 
(k) What do you think are the reasons for the 
recent increase in piracy? 
(l) What is the best way to counter piracy and 
why? Can you also give examples of failed 
attempts? 
 
 
c) How many pirates do you have in your 
group? And how many groups are you 
involved with? 
d) What is your role in the group? 
e) How often do you practise piracy? Daily? 
Weekly? Monthly? Yearly? 
f)  What is your usual time selection? [Day or 
night? Which day of the week? What time 
of the year?] And why do you choose this 
time specifically? 
g) How do you choose your targets? Is it 
regarding to the nationality of the ship? 
Size? Direction? Area? Type? Or do you 
select targets randomly? 
h) What are your preferred areas in which to 
conduct piracy and why? 
i) How do you get information about targets? 
And are you aware of the shipping 
schedules?   
j) How long do you spend preparing for one 
operation?   
k) How much funding do you need to conduct 
one operation? And how do you obtain 
funds? 
l) Does your group cooperate with other 
groups?  
m) Do you share information about targets 
with other groups?  
n) How many groups of pirates do you know?  
o) What are your aims from piracy? Money, 
ransom or goods?  
p) How much money do you earn from each 
operation? 
q) How do you share money in the group? 
 
 
4. Practical and tactical questions? 
 
(a) What type of ships do you have? Hull, 
 
5. Practical and tactical questions: 
 
a) What type of boat or ship you have [size, 
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speed, engines? 
(b) What are the main sources of information 
you use when planning a piracy operation? 
(c) [Add another question] 
(d) What type of weapons do you have? 
(e) What type of technology do you have? 
(f) How many units do you have in the area 
and how effective do you think they are? 
(g) How fast do you respond if any piracy 
attacks have been reported? 
(h) What time of the year, month, day do you 
think is most dangerous to expect piracy? 
And why? 
(i) How do you recognize pirate ships? 
(j) Describe the suspect’s aspects [type of 
ships, technology, nationalities, flags, 
speed, approach and other aspects]? 
 
hull, colour, name and brand? And how 
many of them does your group own? 
(k) What are the main sources of information 
you use when planning a piracy operation? 
b) [Delete, and change (k) to (b)] 
c) Do you use that boat for other practices? 
What are the other practices? 
d) What type of engines do you have? What is 
your maximum speed? 
e) What type of technology you use? 
(RADAR, GPS, Depth Sonar)  
f) [If the pirate doesn’t have any technology]: 
How do you navigate at night? And how 
do you know your position? How do you 
track targets? 
g) What are the weapons you often use? 
h) How do you approach the target? From 
which direction? And at what speed? 
i) How do you get on board targets? What are 
the tools you use for boarding them? 
j) How much time do you need to fully 
control the target? 
k) How long do you spend on board targets? 
l) How would you usually deal with the 
victims? Do you use violence? 
m) Do you give them shelter, food and water? 
Do you check if they have medical needs? 
Do you treat all victims in the same way? 
E.g. men/women and children? 
n) Do you deal with victims according to their 
religions, ethnicities, languages, and 
nationalities? 
o) Have you ever killed victims?  
p) What are the reasons for the failure/success 
of piracy operations?  
q) What are the things ships or crews must do 
to prevent piracy? 
Somali and Kenyan  Embassies Academic Experts of piracy 
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1. Personal  Questions: 
 
(a)  What is your name? 
(b)  What is your position? 
(c)  What is your religion? 
 
2. Information about pirates: 
 
(a) What are the causes of piracy in your 
country? 
(b) What has your country done to counter 
piracy? 
(c) What is your plan to counter piracy and 
how effective do you think it is? 
(d) How effective is the UN policy to 
counter piracy? 
(e) Have any other organisations been 
involved in trying to counter piracy? 
(f) Have the UN carried out any action to 
solve the causes and drivers of piracy? If 
so, what action?  
(g) Did your country follow the UN’s 
policy to counter piracy? Why/Why not?  
(h) Due to your reports, how many pirates 
from your country are free? 
(i) Does your government influence piracy 
in any way?  
(j) Does piracy have any relationship with 
terrorist organizations? If so, what?  
(k) What do you think the future of piracy 
in the area will look like? How do you 
think it will change if at all? 
(l) What happens to the victims who have 
been kidnapped and taken to your 
country? Locations? 
 
 
 
1. Practical and tactical questions: 
1. Personal  questions: 
 
(a)  Name, age and position  
(b)  What is your academic background and 
experience? 
 
2.  Questions about piracy: 
 
(a)  Describe the current piracy situation and 
statistics in Somalia and Kuwait? 
(b) How do you differentiate piracy in Somalia 
or Kuwait from other areas? 
(c) Define the drivers, ideologies and causes 
for each type of piracy? 
 
3.  Questions about policies: 
 
(a)  What are the current international policies 
and responses to deal with piracy? 
(b) Are those policies and responses effective? 
Why? 
(c) What are the individual countries’ 
responses to piracy? (Kuwait, GCC, 
Somalia, USA, UK etc.) 
 
4.  Questions about security: 
 
(a)  Describe the tools used by pirates in each 
area? Weapons, ships, engines, 
technology? 
(b) Describe the manoeuvres pirates use in 
each area? Speed, approach, etc.? 
(c) Describe the naval forces in each area:  are 
they effective? Why? 
(d) Describe the naval responses in each area? 
Are they effective? Why? 
(e) Describe the anti-piracy protection policy 
used by ships? Are they effective?  Why? 
(f) What is the best way to improve naval 
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(a) Tell me about the units you have to 
counter piracy – navy, coastguards and 
private companies?  
(b) Tell me about procedures you follow to 
deal with piracy reports 
(c) Are your forces effective in countering 
piracy? How?  
(d) Are the procedures you follow to counter 
piracy effective? Why? 
 
 
effectiveness in countering piracy in each 
area? 
(g) What is the best way to improve self-
protection procedures for the commercial 
ships to counter piracy? 
 
Commercial  Shipping Companies  
 
1.  Personal  questions: 
 
(a)  What is your name, age and 
position? 
(b) How long you have been working 
in this position? 
(c) What is your experience and 
educational background? 
2.  Questions about the ship: 
 
(a) What type of ship do you work on? 
(b) What is the crew number? 
(c) What are your areas of operation? 
(d) What is the annual schedule of the 
ship? 
(e) What type of technology do you 
have on-board? 
 
3. Questions about piracy: 
 
(a)  How do you rate the threat level in 
your areas of operation? And why? 
(b) Do you get information about the 
threats expectations before you 
leave harbour? If yes, who 
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provides this information? And 
how do you rate the effectiveness 
of them? 
(c) How do you describe piracy in 
your area of operation? 
(d) What type of pirates do you expect 
in your area? Nationality, 
language, age, religion?  
(e) Have you ever faced a piracy 
attack? Describe your experience? 
(f) Describe the tools that pirates may 
use in your area? Type of ships, 
technology, weapons, approaches, 
manoeuvres, speed, etc. 
  
 
4.  Questions about security: 
 
(a) Describe the anti-piracy 
procedures you follow? 
Manoeuvres, speed, crew 
responses, ets. And how do you 
rate them in terms of their 
effectiveness in achieving their 
goals? 
(b) Describe the tools you have to 
counter piracy? Weapons etc. And 
how do you rate them? Do you feel 
you have adequate resources to 
deal with acts of piracy? 
(c) What in your opinion could be 
done to improve your anti-piracy 
responses?  
(d) Do you feel you have adequate 
training to deal with piracy? If not 
then what training would you 
benefit from? 
(e) Describe the naval presence in 
your area? Numbers, type of ships. 
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(f) Is the naval presence enough and 
effective? 
(g) In your opinion what do you think 
is the best that can be done to 
improve the naval units 
effectiveness in countering piracy? 
(h) Do you feel there is sufficient 
intelligence and knowledge to deal 
with piracy? If not what is 
missing? 
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Appendix D  The list of interviewees and organizations who will be targeted 
in the field works.  
Pirates Location 
 
1. Kuwait Navy 
 
2. Kuwait Coastguards 
 
 
 
Kuwait 
 
Kuwait 
 
Navies, Coastguards & private security Contact details 
 
3. Kuwait Oil tankers 
 
4. Kuwait Oil Company 
 
5. Maritime Security project 
 
6. Qatari Coastguards 
 
7. Coalition Task Forces CTF 150 
 
8. Coalition Task Forces CTF 151 
 
9. Coalition Task Forces CTF 152 
 
10. Maritime security companies 
 
11. The Somali Embassy 
 
12. The Somali Embassy 
 
13. Nairobi University 
 
14. United Nations Office 
 
 
Kuwait 
 
Kuwait 
 
Kuwait 
 
Doha, Qatar 
 
Manamah, Bahrain 
 
Manamah, Bahrain 
 
Manamah, Bahrain 
 
Dubai, UAE 
 
Abu-Dhabi, UAE 
 
 
Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Nairobi, Kenya 
 
 
Nairobi, Kenya 
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15. Kenyan Embassy of Somalia 
 
16. Shemola Tower Prison (Somali 
pirates) 
 
17. International Maritime 
Organization Office IMO, 
Security Regional Marine 
Rescue Coordination Centre. 
 
Nairobi, Kenya 
 
 
Mombasa, Kenya 
 
 
 
Mombasa, Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Appendix E  The list of all interviewees targeted in the two periods of 
fieldwork.  
Pilot Fieldwork – July 2012 (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Dubai and Abu-Dhabi) 
No. Age 
Date of the 
interview 
Venue Back ground of the interviewee 
1 33 22/7/2012 
Kuwait Sabah Al-
Ahmad coastguard 
base 
Chief of Maritime Operations in Kuwait Coastguards 
2 41 25/7/2012 
Safir International 
Hotel - Kuwait 
Team Leader of Marine Operations in Kuwait Oil 
Tankers Company 
3 37 25/7/2012 
Safir International 
Hotel - Kuwait 
Team Leader of Marine Operations in Kuwait Oil 
Company 
4 42 28/7/2012 
Safir International 
Hotel - Kuwait 
Project  Director of  the Maritime  Security Project in 
Kuwait 
5 37 2/8/2012 
Mohammed Al-
Ahmad Naval base 
Kuwait 
Commanding Officer on one of the Kuwaiti Naval Ships 
6 36 6/8/2012 
The Qatari Royal 
Naval Base- Qatar 
The Commander of the Operations Department in the 
Qatari Coastguards 
7 26 6/8/2012 
The Qatari Royal 
Naval Base- Qatar 
Security and Safety Officer in the Qatari Coastguards 
8 33 7/8/2012 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
Kuwaiti Coastguard Officer and the Liaison Officer for 
the CTF 152 (Bahrain) 
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9 24 7/8/2012 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
U.S. Naval Office Training  Officer and  Wide Regional 
Engagement Officer in the CTF 152 (Bahrain) 
10 38 8/8/2012 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
British Royal Naval  Officer in CTF 151 (Bahrain) 
11 32 8/8/2012 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
Korean Liaison Naval  Officer of the CTF 151 (Bahrain) 
12 42 8/8/2012 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
Pakistani Intelligence  Officer of the CTF 150 (Bahrain) 
 
13 
 
34 
 
8/8/2012 
 
The U.S. Naval Base 
in Manama, Bahrain 
 
Yemeni Coastguard Liaison  Officer in the Coalition 
Forces (Bahrain) 
 
14 
 
40 
 
10/8/2012 
 
Crown Plaza Hotel – 
Sheikh Zayid Street, 
Dubai, UAE 
 
Manager  Director of Orion Maritime  Security  
Company (Dubai) 
 
15 
 
41 
 
11/8.2012 
 
Crown Plaza Hotel – 
Sheikh Zayid Street, 
Dubai, UAE 
 
Chief Executive Officer of Envoy 360 Maritime  
Security Company (Dubai) 
 
16 
 
55 
 
12/8.2012 
 
The Somali Embassy, 
Abu Dhabi, UAE 
 
The Somali Ambassador in Abu Dhabi (UAE) 
 
Fieldwork two – August 2013 (Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya) 
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No. Age 
Date of the 
interview 
Venue Back ground of the interviewee 
17 56 
 
12/8/2013 
 
Somali Embassy, 
Nairobi, Kenya The Somali Ambassador 
 
18 
 
70 
 
13/8/2013 
 
Nairobi University, 
Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Professor in Environmental Law in Nairobi University 
(Nairobi, Kenya) 
19 
 
45 
 
13/8/2013 
 
Nairobi University, 
Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Professor in Diplomacy and  International  Studies in 
Nairobi University (Nairobi, Kenya) 
20 
 
29 
 
14/8/2013 
 
United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 
UNODC, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
 
Associate Program Officer, Legal  Counter Piracy  
Program in the United Nations Office (Nairobi, Kenya) 
21 
 
52 
 
14/8/2013 
 
United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 
UNODC, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
 
Training Coordinator Djibouti Code of Conduct Project 
Implementation Unit in the United Nations Office 
(Nairobi, Kenya) 
 
22 
 
57 
 
14/8/2013 
 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
 
Senior Assistant Director of  Foreign Service in the 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs in the Kenyan Embassy 
of Somalia (Nairobi, Kenya) 
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23 
 
33 
 
16/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  1 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
24 
 
45 
 
16/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate   2 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
25 
 
40 
 
16/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  3 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
26 
 
35 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirates 4 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
27 
 
32 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  5 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
28 
 
34 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  6 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
29 
 
41 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  7 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
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30 
 
24 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  8 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
31 
 
25 
 
19/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
Pirate  9 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
32 
 
30 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 10 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
33 
 
30 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 11 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
34 
 
36 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 12 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
35 
 
16 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 13 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
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36 
 
19 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 14 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
37 
 
30 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 15 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
38 
 
43 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 16 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
39 
 
28 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 17 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
40 
 
22 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 18 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
41 
 
32 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
 
Pirate 19 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
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Kenya 
 
42 
 
28 
 
20/8/2013 
 
Shemola Tower 
Prison, Mombasa, 
Kenya 
 
 
Pirate 20 (Shemola Tower Prison, Mombasa, Kenya) 
43 
 
51 
 
21/8/2013 
 
Security regional 
marine rescue 
coordination Centre, 
Mombasa, Kenya 
 
The IMO  Maritime Liaison Coordination Officer in the  
Security  Regional  Marine  Rescue  Coordination 
Centre (Mombasa, Kenya) 
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Appendix F  The bases used by Somali pirates for logistics and hostage-
keeping.  Provided by the Pakistani Intelligence Officer in Bahrain 
CTF150.  
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Appendix G The areas where pirates originated, and the areas where they 
were captured.  
 Area of origin Area of capture 
Interviewee 23 Puntland Puntland 
Interviewee 24 Puntland  
Interviewee 25 Somali Desert Al-Hoor (5 km from shore) 
Interviewee 26 Puntland  
Interviewee 27  `Near Maqadishoe 
Interviewee 28  Somali Coast 
Interviewee 29 Somali Land Gulf of Eden (coming from 
Yemen) 
Interviewee 30 Maqadishoe Baraw (Somali territorial waters) 
Interviewee 31  Close to Somali coast 
Interviewee 32 Bosaso Gulf of Eden (coming from 
Yemen) 
Interviewee 33 Maqadisheo Near Maqadisheo 
Interviewee 34 Putland 20 nm from Yemen 
Interviewee 35   
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Interviewee 36 Bosaso 60 miles from Somali coast 
Interviewee 37 Maqadisheo Near Maqadisheo 
Interviewee 38 Adaly (on the coast)  
Interviewee 39 Hafoon 20 miles from Hafoon 
Interviewee 40 Maqadisheo Near Maqadisheo 
Interviewee 41 Galkaeyo Near Yemen 
Interviewee 42 Bosaso Near Bosaso 
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Appendix H The types of weapons and technologies used by pirates. 
 Type of weapons Type of technology used 
Interviewee 23 AK47 GPS & cell phones 
Interviewee 24 3 guns none 
Interviewee 25 Big knives none 
Interviewee 26 9mm pistol (9bullets) none 
Interviewee 27 2 AK 47  none 
Interviewee 28  none 
Interviewee 29  none 
Interviewee 30   
Interviewee 31  none 
Interviewee 32  GPS 
Interviewee 33 guns none 
Interviewee 34   
Interviewee 35 One gun GPS 
Interviewee 36  GPS 
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Interviewee 37 2 AK47 none 
Interviewee 38   
Interviewee 39   
Interviewee 40   
Interviewee 41   
Interviewee 42 One gun none 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
Appendix I Data about the pirates’ ethnicity, religion, languages, job, 
education, marital status and other information.  
  Income Religio
n 
Age Languages Job Education Marital 
Interviewee 23  Enough Sunni 33 Somali Fisherman 
(10years) 
 Illiterate  Single 
Interviewee 24 $8000 
for one 
trip 
Sunni 45 Somali Fisherman, driver 
and transfer 
illegal immigrants 
Primary 
school 
Married (7 
children) 
Interviewee 25  Sunni 40 Somali  Fisherman  Illiterate Married (9 
children) 
Interviewee 26  Sunni 35 Somali Fisherman on 
Yemeni boats 
(2years) 
Read and 
write 
Married (5 
children) 
Interviewee 27  Enough Sunni 32 Somali & 
Habashi 
Fisherman (8 
years) 
Write and 
read 
Married (9 
children) 
Interviewee 28 $30,000 
for one 
operatio
n 
Sunni 34 Somali, 
English & 
Sawahili 
 Pirate Primary 
school 
Married (2 
children) 
Interviewee 29  Enough Sunni 41 Somali Transfer people 
from Maqadisheo 
to Yemen 
Read and 
write 
Married (6 
children) 
Interviewee 30  Enough Sunni 24 Somali  Fisherman Read and 
write 
Married with 
2 wives (2 
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children) 
Interviewee 31 $50-
$100 a 
month 
Sunni 25 Somali Fisherman  Primary 
school 
Married (1 
child) 
Interviewee 32 $100 a 
month 
Sunni 30 Somali, 
Arabic and 
English 
 Fisherman Primary 
school 
Married (5 
children, 2 
died of 
illness) 
Interviewee 33 $100 - 
$200 
monthly 
Sunni 30 Somali  Fisherman  Illiterate Married (1 
child) 
Interviewee 34  Enough Sunni 36 Somali  Fisherman Read and 
write 
Divorced (no 
children) 
Interviewee 35  Sunni      
Interviewee 36  Enough Sunni 19 Somali   Fisherman Secondary 
school 
 Single 
Interviewee 37 $3 daily 
($90 
monthly
) 
Sunni 30 Somali, 
Arabic and 
English 
(fluent 
English) 
Fisherman (6 
years) 
 Illiterate  Divorced (2 
children) 
Interviewee 38  Enough Sunni 43 Somali Fisherman and 
driver 
 Illiterate Married (6 
children) 
Interviewee 39  Enough Sunni 28 Somali Fisherman (10 
years) 
Secondary 
school 
 Single 
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Interviewee 40 Not 
enough 
Sunni 22 Somali Fisherman (2 
years) 
Read and 
write 
 Single 
Interviewee 41  Enough Sunni 32 Somali  Driver Read and 
write 
Married (3 
children) 
Interviewee 42  Enough Sunni 28 Somali Fisherman (7 
years) 
Read and 
write 
Married (1 
child) 
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Appendix J Pirates' ships types, size, colour, crew number and speed. 
 Ship type or 
name 
size speed colour Crew number 
Interviewee 23 skiff 12m 50 knots (100 
horse) 
red 7 
Interviewee 24 skiff   blue 9 
Interviewee 25  big ship    28 
Interviewee 26  Skiff called 
Layla 
 capacity of 
10 people 
60 horse white 6 
Interviewee 27 3 skiffs `20 m  white 11 on each 
skiff 
Interviewee 28 2 fiberglass boats 35 m  white 5 on each 
Interviewee 29 skiff    4 
Interviewee 30 skiff 9 m  white 6 
Interviewee 31  speed boat 10 m  white 9 
Interviewee 32  fiberglass 
(ALshabah) 
 2 engines 40 
horse each 
blue 9 
Interviewee 33 1 big and 1 skiff  The big boat with 
car engine 
white 11 on the skiff 
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Interviewee 34 skiff 4 m 2 Yamaha engine 
and one spare 
 9 
Interviewee 35      
Interviewee 36  fiberglass 
(ALshabah) 
 2 engines 40 
horse each 
 9 
Interviewee 37  big boat and 2 
skiffs 
  white  
Interviewee 38 2 skiffs 5 m 40 horse & 2 
engines 30 horse 
white 3 & 4 
Interviewee 39  big boat (called 
FOLF) 
15 m Yamaha 4 pistons green 9 
Interviewee 40 2 skiffs and 1 big 
ship 
  white 11 
Interviewee 41 skiff 10 2 (40 horse 
engines) 
blue 9 
Interviewee 42  big ship (10 tons 
of fish capacity) 
and skiffs 
   18 (mixed 
Yemenis and 
Somalis) 
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Appendix K Maritime terror pirates' monthly income, religion, age, 
languages, job, education and marital status. 
 income Religio
n 
Age Languages Job Education Marital 
Interviewee 35 $800 Sunni 16 Somali Cloth seller  Illiterate  Single 
Interviewee 42  Enough Sunni 28 Somali Fisherman (7 
years) 
Read and 
write 
Married (1 
child) 
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Appendix L  Piracy attacks between 2008 and 2012 in the Central of the 
Arabian Gulf provided by the Qatari Coastguards.  
No Date and 
Time 
Locatio
n 
Pir
ates 
ship 
size 
Pirate
s ship 
colour 
Pirate
s ship 
engine
s 
Nu
m
be
r 
of 
pir
ate
s 
Weapo
ns 
Pirates’ behaviour Victims 
Name 
and 
National
ity 
1 15/3/2012 
Out of 
EZ 
 Grey 
One- 
engin
e 
Irania
n 
Boat 
 
Carryi
ng 
weapo
ns 
They stole GPS, and cash of 
500 QD, Cell phone, and 
several kind of fish 
 Qatari 
Dhow 
(Bin 
Shaafar) 
3124 
 
 Qatari 
Dhow 
(alshahd
oof)  
3401 
2 25/9/2012 
Out of 
EZ 
  
Irania
n 
dhow 
And 
Irania
n boat 
  
They were moving around 
the dhow and asking for 
water and food 
Qatari 
Dhow 
(almarz
ooq)  
3065 
3 8/7/2011 
Out of 
EZ 
 
Blue 
and 
Red 
2 
engin
es 
4 
1 gun 
& 3 
knives 
Stole GPS 
 
Stole one icon Radio 
 
Stole the navigation 
Compass 
 
Stole 4 fish fridges 
 
Stole 4 watches 
 Qatari 
Dhow 
(murdhi
) 
3296 
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4 24/6/2011 
1 NM 
into 
the 
Iranian 
Waters 
 Red  3  
There was violence against 
the sailors 
 
Stole 1 GPS 
 
Stole 2 cell phones 
 
Stole 25 fish fridges 
Bahraini 
Dhow 
5 26/9/2010 
Somali 
case 
      
Not 
relevant 
case 
6 23/9/2010 
Iranian 
Waters 
  
2 
Irania
n 
Boats 
5 
on 
ea
ch 
bo
at 
All 
armed 
with 
weapo
ns 
Stole 34 fish fridges 
Bahraini 
Dhow 
(jawhara
t al 
Arees) 
8809 
7 8/82010    
2 
engin
es 
4 
Klashi
nkov 
We have received from the 
Kuwaiti Coastguards notice 
that at 0345 they had a 
piracy report on 4 ships 
(Armani, USA, Syrian and 
Korean ships) 
 
Inside  Iraqi Waters 
 
Pos: 048 46,28E 29 42 08N 
 
They stole 2 Laptops 
 
9 cell phones 
 
6 VHFs 
 
4 ships 
(Armeni
an, 
USA, 
Syrian 
and 
Korean)  
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cash of 5000 USD 
8 18/6/2010 
SW 
the oil 
Rig 
shahee
n 
 
Red 
& 
white 
Irania
n 
Boat 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
They attacked the ship and 
broke the bridge and cut all 
the wires 
 
The stole all the devices in 
the bridge and the valuables 
of the sailors 
Qatari 
dhow 
(aldir’e) 
3563 
9 18/6/2010 
South 
of 
alshah
een iol 
rig 
 
Blue 
and 
white 
Irania
n boat 
with 
2 
engin
es 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
They fired 2 shots in  the air 
to instil  fear  in    the sailors 
 
Then they boarded the ship 
and stole everything, 
including  the sailors’ 
valuables 
Qatari 
dhow 
(almarz
ooq) 
3065 
10 16/6/2010 
44 NM 
NE 
Lafan 
island 
32 
feet 
Blue 
Irania
n boat 
with 
2 
engin
es 
 
250 
hours 
power 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
They attacked both dhows 
and stole everything on 
board 
 
They also towed one of the 
dhows 15 NM out of  Qatari 
waters towards  Iranian 
waters 
Qatari 
dhow 
(meezar
) 
3544 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(mafroy
) 
3046 
11 31/5/2010 
24 NM 
NE 
Ras 
Rokin 
 
White 
with 
red 
stripe 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
5 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
They threatened the dhow 
and t led it into  Iranian 
waters 
 
They stole 3 cell phones 
 
Clothes 
 
Food 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(rakan) 
3286 
254 
 
GPS 
 
All the fish on board 
 
Stole a record book with 
details of 600 positions of 
fish apparatus (sea cages)  
12 
24 NM 
NE Ras 
Rokin 
  
White 
with 
red 
stripe 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
5 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
They boarded the dhow 
 
They seriously harmed the 
Captain  
 
Stole 5 cell phones 
 
3 fish fridges 
 
GPS 
 
Cash of 1200 QR 
 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(almufa
gger) 
3207 
13 30/5/2012 
The 
North 
oil Rig  
 
White 
with 
red 
stipe 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
3 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
Stole 1 cell phone 
 
GPS 
 
Cash of 1200 QR 
Qatari 
dhow 
(saher) 
3240 
14 30/5/2012 
The 
north 
oil Rig 
27 
feet 
White 
with 
red 
stripe 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
3 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
knives 
Stole 3 cell phones 
 
GPS 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(bdah) 
3365 
255 
 
Cash of 500 QR 
 
Amount of fish 
15 20/5/2010 
East of 
the 
Gas 
Rig 
alrayya
n 
24 
feet 
White 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
Under the threat of arms 
they towed the dhow to 30 
nm of the Qatari EZ, 
 
They stole 20 iron cages 
 
5 cell phones 
 
golden bracelet 
 
watch 
 
2 GPSs 
 
2000 QR 
 
2 fish baskets 
 
 They held the dhow until 
0330 the next day and then 
released it. 
Qatari 
dhow 
(walhan
) 
3395 
16 22/4/2010 
North 
of 
Halool 
island 
22 
feet 
White 
with 
2 red 
stripe
s 
Irania
n boat 
with 
1 
engin
e 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
The stopped the dhow and 
harmed the sailors 
 
Under the threat of arms 
 
Stole 100 kg differebt kind 
of fish 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Hijaz) 
3367 
256 
 
 
GPS 
 
VHF 
 
8 cell phones 
 
cash of 1700 QR 
17 27/3/2010 
South 
of the 
North 
oil Rig 
 
White 
and 
red 
Irania
n boat 
4 
Armed 
with 
guns 
Harmed the sailors 
 
Stole GPS 
 
Sailor device 
 
Lights 
 
3 fish fridges 
 
cash of 200 QR 
 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(dilham) 
3367 
18 27/3/2010 
West 
of the 
Easter
n Aad 
 
White 
with 
red 
stripe
s 
Irania
n boat 
5 
Armed 
with 
Kalash
nikovs 
They harmed the sailors 
 
Stole  sailing  device 
 
GPS 
 
Fish fridge 
 
Qatari 
Dhow 
(Hilal) 
 
3067 
257 
 
Life jacket 
 
The dhow’s documents 
 
The sailors’ IDs 
19 11/3/2010 
North 
of Bin 
zayan 
Bouy 
30 
feet 
 
1 
engin
e boat 
  
Under threats,  they stole 
 
GPS 
 
Fishing nets 
 
Several kind of fish 
 
Food 
 
Cash of 100 QR 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Mubara
k) 
 
3227 
20 10/3/2010 
North 
of 
Raqaw
i 
(Bahra
in) 
 
One 
red & 
the 
other 
is 
white 
2 
Irania
n 
boats 
3 
on 
ea
ch 
bo
at 
Armed 
with 
guns 
and 
they 
fired 
on the 
air 
We have received a message 
from the Bahraini 
coastguards that a Bahraini 
Panosh called (`najim) with 
7 Indian sailors have been 
attacked at 2100  
 
They harmed the sailors 
 
They stole  
 
2 GPS 
 
echo sounder 
 
Bahraini 
Panosh 
(Najim) 
 
4341 
258 
 
cash of 70 BD 
 
3 cell phones 
 
43 fish fridges 
 
 
 Note: Iran have captured 
and punished 5 pirates who 
attacked this ship  
 
www.alwasatnews.com/275
8/news/read/387700/1.html 
 
 I have found that the 
Bahraini ship has been 
kidnapped and the Iranian 
Authorities captured the 
kidnappers and handed the 
ship over to Bahrain.  
 
21 5/9/2009 
South 
of the 
North 
oil Rig 
 Red 
1 
yama
ha 
engin
e  
 
75 
hours 
power  
3 
ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
They harmed the sailors 
 
They stole 
 
 
Cash of 1150 QR 
 
GPS 
 
Nokia cell phone 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Tayil) 
 
3234 
259 
 
2 fish fridges 
 
They cut the dhow’s ropes 
and travelled for 4 hours 
towards Iran 
 
 
22 3/9/2009 
40 nm 
North 
of 
Lafan 
Island 
  
Irania
n boat 
4 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
They fired close to the dhow 
and stole 
 
GPS 
 
Cell phone 
 
Food 
 
Several kind of fish 
Qatari 
dhow 
(thahran
) 
 
3484 
23 18/1/2009 
26 23 
960 N 
 
52 11 
980E 
7 
met
ers 
White 
1 
engin
e 
4 
1 rifle 
 
1 
machin
e gun 
They stole  
 
500 kg of fish 
 
GPS 
 
Cell phone 
 
Fishing apparatus (lines) 
 
Clothes 
 
Food 
Qatari 
dhow 
(noor 
albath) 
 
3407 
260 
 
 
24 
17/1/2009 
 
at 1000 
     Gun 
They fired at the dhow and 
killed one sailor 
Saudi 
fishing 
boat 
25 
14/12/200
8 
 
at 2130 
26 37 
24 N 
 
51 47 
23 E 
 
Red 
from 
the 
top 
 
White 
and 
blue 
from 
the 
botto
m 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
They fired 3 warning shots 
and boarded on the dhow 
 
They stole every thing 
Qatari 
dhow 
(shahid) 
 
2330 
26 
14/12/200
8 
 
at 2100 
4 nm 
NE of 
the 
Rayya
n oil 
Rig 
 
26 40 
500 N 
 
51 39 
500 E 
 Red 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle  
and 
knives 
Failed attempt to stop the 
dhow 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Mubara
k) 
 
3227 
27 
14/12/200
9 
 
at 2100 
4 nm 
NE of 
the 
Rayya
n oil 
Rig 
 
26 40 
500 N 
 
51 39 
 Red 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
Failed attempt to stop the 
dhow 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Altayef
) 
 
3200 
261 
 
500 E 
28 
14/12/200
9 
 
at 2100 
4 nm 
NE of 
the 
Rayya
n oil 
Rig 
 
26 40 
500 N 
 
51 39 
500 E 
 Red 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
Failed attempt to stop the 
dhow 
Qatari 
dhow 
(alfeel) 
 
3135 
29 
14/12/200
9 
 
at 2100 
4 nm 
NE of 
the 
Rayya
n oil 
Rig 
 
26 40 
500 N 
 
51 39 
500 E 
 Red 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
They stole 
 
Cash of 1500 QR 
 
GPS 
 
Torch 
 
VHF 
 
Food 
 
Fishing apparatus 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Abu 
alkhair) 
 
3185 
30 
14/12/200
9 
 
at 2100 
4 nm 
NE of 
the 
Rayya
n oil 
Rig 
 
 Red 
2 
engin
es 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 rifle 
and 
knives 
They stole 
 
1100 QR 
 
cell phone 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Azzam) 
 
3456 
262 
 
26 40 
500 N 
 
51 39 
500 E 
 
VHF 
 
Food 
 
Several kind of fishes 
31 
10/12/200
8 
 
at 1630 
1 nm 
North 
of the 
Bin 
zayyan 
bouy 
 
Top 
red  
 
Blue 
from 
down 
1 
yama
ha 
engin
e  
 
75 
hours 
power 
  
The stole 
 
1200 QR 
 
GPS 
 
VHF 
 
Echo sounder 
 
2 cell phones 
 
2 watches 
 
clothes 
 
food 
 
fishes 
Qatari 
dhow 
(danah) 
 
3019 
32 24/8/2008 
Near 
the 
Northe
rn gas 
Rig 
 
 
Red 
& 
white 
 
7 
Ira
ni
an
s 
 
They stole 
 
GPS 
 
Qatari 
dhow 
(shahid) 
 
3230 
263 
 
26 24 
856 N 
 
52 02 
911 e 
VHF 
 
3 fish fridges 
 
2 cell phones 
33 
10/8/2008 
 
at 2200 
NE of 
the 
Northe
rn oil 
Rig 
 
26 38 
736 N 
 
51 57 
659 E 
15 
feet 
Red 
& 
white 
1 
engin
e 
 
250 
hours 
power 
4 
Ira
ni
an
s 
1 
machin
e gun 
Stole  
 
Cash of 5000 QR 
 
GPS 
 
4 cell phones 
 
20 ironic fish cages. 
Qatari 
dhow 
(aljanoo
bi) 
 
3559 
34 4/8/2008 
West 
of the 
rayyan 
oil Rig 
 
26 93 
864 N 
 
51 62 
421 E 
21 
feet 
 
wit
h 
GP
S 
Red 
top 
 
White 
down 
1 
Yama
ha 
engin
e 
 
75 
hours 
power 
4 
wi
th 
In
di
an 
dr
es
se
s 
1 
unkow
n gun  
 
and 
knives 
Harmed the sailors  
 
Stole 
 
Cash of 1800 QR 
 
2 cell phones 
 
3 fish fridges 
 
clothes 
 
fishing apparatus 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Rabih) 
 
3270 
35 
27/4/2008 
 
10 nm 
north 
of the 
north 
  
1 
engin
e 
3 
Ira
ni
an
1 gun 
They threatened the sailors 
and stole 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Alfaisal
264 
 
at 2200 oil Rig s  
GPS 
 
Clothes 
 
Fishes 
) 
 
3101 
36 
26/3/2008 
 
at 0100 
28 nm 
NE of 
the 
Lafan 
Island 
 
26 23 
00 N 
 
52 06 
00 E 
 Red 
1 
engin
e 
3 
Ira
ni
an
s 
Machi
ne gun 
and 
knives 
They towed the dhow and 
stole 
 
All cell phones 
 
VHF 
 
GPS 
 
200 QR 
 
and the damaged all the 
electricity wires 
Qatari 
dhow 
(Almuta
qid 
billah) 
 
3307 
37 26/3/2008 
6 nm 
north 
of the 
Northe
rn oil 
Rig 
 
Red 
& 
white 
 3 
Machi
ne 
guns 
They harmed the sailors 
 
Stole 
 
GPS 
5 watches 
2500 QR 
fishes 
Qatari 
dhow 
(merza)  
3544 
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Appendix M Pirates' fatalities and injuries. 
  
Pirates been killed 
 
 
Pirates been injured 
 
Interviewee 23 
 
 
1 
 
Injuries and some with amputated  
arms or legs 
 
Interviewee 25 
 
 
4 
 
 
Interviewee 31 
 
 
4 
 
4 (the interviewee had a  leg  
amputated ) 
 
Interviewee 42 
 
 
3 
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Appendix N  The numbers of the Somali pirates captured and transferred 
to Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius. 
Kenya: 
Status Detained by Number of prisoners (sentence) Total 
On demand 
 
 
Denmark 28 (4-24 years?)  32 
EUNAVFOR (Spain) 4 
Convicted  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUNAVFOR (Germany) 9 115 convicted  
 
98 remaining in 
Kenya 
USA 7 (4 years – are these figures average 
lengths of sentence?) 
USA 9 (5 years) 
EUNAVFOR (Sweden) 7 (7 years) 
EUNAVFOR (Germany) 7 (20 years) 
EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (5 years) 
USA 10 (8 years) sentence complete 
UK 8 (10 years) 
EUNAVFOR (Germany) 7 (5 years)  
EUNAVFOR (Spain) 7 (5 years) 
EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (20 years) 
UK 6 (5 years) 
EUNAVFOR (spain) 7 (4.5 years) 
EUNAVFOR (Italy) 9 (7 years) 
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Acquitted USA 17 17 
 
Repatriations 
17 to Puntland 
Dec 10 
 
 
Seychelles:  
Status Detained by Number of Prisoners (sentence) total 
On demand Netherlands 11 20 
EUNAVFOR (Netherlands) 
 
9 
Convicted  Netherlands 6 (5 x 24 years, 1 x 12 years) 112 convicted 
 
44 remaining in 
Seychelles 
 
Prisoner 
transfers: 
 
17 to Somaliland 
Mar 12 
12 to Somaliland 
Dec 12 
Denmark 4 (3 x 24 years, 1 x 16 years) 
Denmark 4 ( 3 x 21 years, 1 x 14 years) 
UK 7 (6 x 7 years, 1 x 2 years) 
UK 13 (1 sentenced to time served, 3 x 2.5 
years, 8 x 12 years, 1 pleaded guilty 
and sentenced to 10 years) 
EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (6 years are these figures average 
lengths of sentence?)) 
Seychelles coastguard 11 (10 years) 
10 (20 years) 
6 (24 years) 
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5 (18 years) 
9 (22 years) 
5 to Puntland 
Dec 12 
25 to Puntland 
Mar 13 
8 to Puntland 
May 13 
 
Repatriations:  
1 to Puntland 
Aug 12 
 
EUNAVFOR (Spain) 11 (10 years) 
USA 15 (13 x 18 years, 2 x 4 years) 
Acquitted UK 1 1 
 
Repatriations: 
1 to Puntland 
Aug 12  
 
Mauritius:  
Status Detained by Number of prisoners (sentence) total 
On demand EUNAVFOR (France) 12 12 
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Appendix O The naval units’ responses as reported by pirates. 
 The navy that captured 
the pirate 
The pirate’s remarks about  that 
navy 
How long stayed 
on board 
Interviewee 23 US navy The US and Dutch navies are 
the strongest in the area 
 
Interviewee 24 German   
Interviewee 25 Danish They capture everyone at sea 
including fishermen and targets 
+ they do illegal fishing +the 
ship has letter L7 on its hull 
+they sent HELO then they 
came + they opened fire first 
 
 
38 days 
Interviewee 26 British RN Opened fire first and killed 
pirates 
16 days 
Interviewee 27 French Do fishing and sell it to big 
boats + they capture all Somali 
fishermen to let their ships do 
fishing freely 
6 days 
Interviewee 28 British RN Fired first and killed   
Interviewee 29 US navy Fired at the boat only 2 months 
Interviewee 30 Danish Fired and killed 3 months 
Interviewee 31 Danish Opened fire from the ship and 
from air + they cut off the 
2 months 
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interviewee’s leg 
Interviewee 32 Italian Sent a HELO and then the ships 
arrived + they didn’t speak the 
pirates’ language that’s why 
they suspected them 
42 days 
Interviewee 33 French  Faked reports about suspects  
Interviewee 34 German  No killings or injuring 7 days 
Interviewee 35 Kenyan army   
Interviewee 36 Italian  No kills or injuries + they 
tortured the pirates 
45 days 
Interviewee 37 French Sent HELO and fired 6 days 
Interviewee 38 Germany Fired from HELO but with no 
injuries 
13 days 
Interviewee 39 US Sent speedboat first but they 
didn’t fire 
2 months 
Interviewee 40 French Used violence and torture 6 days 
Interviewee 41 German Faked pictures of them carrying 
guns 
 
Interviewee 42 British RN No violence used against pirates  
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Appendix P  The times the pirates spent in Shemola Tower prison without 
being convicted, and the lengths of sentences. 
 Stayed in prison without 
conviction  
Convicted with Total time in prison 
Interviewee 23    
Interviewee 24 4 years 5 years 9 years 
Interviewee 25 3 years Not convicted yet  
Interviewee 26 2 years 5 years 7 years 
Interviewee 27 4 years `20 years 24 years 
Interviewee 28    
Interviewee 29 6 years 4 years 10 years 
Interviewee 30 3 years Not convicted yet  
Interviewee 31 2 years Not convicted yet  
Interviewee 32 4 years 7 years 11 years 
Interviewee 33 4 years 20 years 24 years 
Interviewee 34 4 years 5 years 9 years 
Interviewee 35    
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Interviewee 36 4 years 7 years 11 years 
Interviewee 37 5 years 20 years 25 years 
Interviewee 38 5 years 20 years 25 years 
Interviewee 39 4 years 5 years 9 years 
Interviewee 40 5 years 20 years 25 years 
Interviewee 41 5 years 4 years 9 years 
Interviewee 42 5 years 10 years 15 years 
 
 
 
